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CONTENTS: 1. Problem Presentation: Outstanding Territorial Dispute 2. Background of the Problem: History of the Disputed Territories and Bilateral Relations 3. Latest Developments 4. Conclusion 5. Appendix: Historical Maps
Problem Presentation: Outstanding Territorial
Dispute
On October 19, 1956, the Joint
Declaration was signed by the USSR
and Japan,
formally ending the state of war, establishing diplomatic relations and
resolving most of the outstanding issues between the two countries. A formal
peace treaty however was not concluded. It was postponed for an indefinite
time until the resolution of an outstanding territorial dispute. As of today,
almost half a century already passed since that day, but the dispute has
still not been resolved and peace treaty not concluded. For Japan, as recently expressed by former Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (now State Minister for affairs related to the Northern Territories), it is “impossible” to accept any
agreement with Russia
that will not result in reverting the disputed islands to Japanese
sovereignty.
Russia,
in turn, is not prepared to renounce title to any part of today’s territory.
The territories still disputed include the islands of Kunashiri (Kunashir),
Etorofu (Iturup), Shikotan and Habomai Archipelago including the smaller
islands of Shibotsu (Zelyonyi), Taraku
(Polonskogo), Suisho (Panphilyeva),Yuri and Akiyuri (Anuchina). All of the
above islands are referred to as “Northern Territories”
in Japan and “South Kuril District” in Russia.
The current state of Russo-Japanese
relations, poses a number of problems of both international and regional
character:
1. Absence of final peace treaty
blocks normal development of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia.
2. The disputed area may potentially
become an area of tension thus sparking escalation of military presence and
the arms race in the region which may become extremely dangerous keeping in
mind that Russia
is a nuclear power with loosening control over its arsenals of mass
destruction and remote military structures.
3. The outstanding territorial
dispute blocks economic cooperation between the two countries, including
Japanese investments in the Russian Far East. This could possibly boost the
depressed economy of the Russian Far East and Siberia, as well as create a
significant number of new jobs in Japan. Today’s economic
depression in the Russian Far East and South Siberia (Russo-Chinese frontier)
itself is a source of potential
instability in North-East Asia which could be significantly relieved through
economic cooperation between the Russian region and Japan.
4. Russo-Japanese conflicts in the
fishing area around the disputed islands result in loss and damage of
property, and even loss of human lives (in cases when Russian coast guard
fires at Japanese fishing vessels).
The disputed islands are part of
much bigger territory, which was historically claimed both by Japan and Russia. It includes relatively
big island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) and all the
islands of Kuril (Chishima-retto) archipelago. As a result of World War 2, Japan officially renounced title to Sakhalin and most of the Kuriles. However, the South
Kuriles/Northern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomai
group), now under Russian sovereignty, are still claimed by both conflicting parties neither
of which is ready for compromise acceptable to the opposite party.
Background to the Problem: History of the Disputed Territories and Bilateral Relations
The Early Days (Click here to see the map)
Historically inhabited by Ainu and
Nivkha peoples, the area of Karafuto (Sakhalin), Hokkaido (Ezo) and Kuriles (Chishima)
became an object of Chinese (Yuan, later Ming dynasty) and Japanese expansion
in early 13th century. Four hundred years later, rapidly expanding
eastwards Russian Empire challenged the above two powers by establishing its
first strongholds on the North Pacific (Okhotsk)
coast in1639 and 1645. The following two centuries faced Russia becoming a
Pacific power claiming sovereignty over Sakhalin island and the Kuriles as
well as over Amur and Ussouri Territories on the mainland (now Amur province
and Maritime territory of Russian Federation, by the time described
North-East territories of Manchu China). During the same period, Japan was
rapidly expanding northwards. Having defeated the Ajnu and Nivkha at the
battles of Syaksyain and Kunashiri-Menasi (in
1669 and 1789 respectively), the Japanese finally established firm control
over Hokkaido,
Kunashiri, Etorofu Shikotan and Habomais. The end of the 18th
century also saw Japanese strongholds and settlements established on Central
and North Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin and
some armed clashes between Russians and Japanese in the frontier area (see
map 1). In contrast to the Russian Empire whose core was too far away from
its Pacific possessions with no over-land routes available, Japan was in
a position of effectively colonizing disputed territories, rapidly
outnumbering native inhabitants. As a result, by the middle of the 19th century, Hokkaido and the South Kuriles were integral parts of Japan,
whereas Russian and Chinese possessions in the area could be characterized as
underpopulated, unintegrated territories only nominally belonging to the
claimant countries.
Japan and the Russian Empire: From Shimoda to Portsmouth
In early 1853, Manchu China officially gave up its claims to Sakhalin leaving the Sakhalin-Kuriles to be an object
of Russian and Japanese ambitions only. Two years later in 1855, Russia and Japan established diplomatic
relations. The same year (7 February, 1855) the Treaty of Shimoda (the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation
and Delimitation) was concluded. Among other
important agreements, the Treaty of
Shimoda included the agreement on national borders between the two
empires in accordance with which most of the Kuril islands were recognized as
part of Russia while Japanese sovereignty was confirmed over the islands of
Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan (the smaller islands of Habomai group were
not mentioned while they were regarded as part and parcel of Ezo-Hokkaido,
Japanese sovereignty over which was not even questioned). Article 2 of the
treaty stated that: “henceforth
the boundary between the two nations shall lie between the islands of Etorofu
and Uruppu. The whole of Etorofu shall belong to Japan,
and the Kurile Islands, lying to the north of and including Uruppu, shall
belong to Russia”.
During the talks preceding the signing of the Shimoda treaty, Russian
representative Commodore Putyatin confirmed that basing on the “careful
survey” the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu
were regarded as an inalienable part of Japan. The Treaty of Shimoda also
regulated the status of Sakhalin/Karafuto island which was not supposed to be
partitioned between the two parties but was to remain under Russo-Japanese
condominium (see map 2). Further
territorial disputes between Russia
and Japan
came in the middle of the 70s of the same century. Both countries proposed
partitioning the Sakhalin/Karafuto island less then 20 years after the
conclusion of the treaty of Shimoda.
Japanese proposal was to establish new national border along the 50th
parallel whereas the Russians insisted on the border along the 48th
parallel. The talks between the two countries resulted in conclusion of St.
Petersburg Treaty of 7 May 1875, according to which Japan gave up its claims
to Sakhalin/Karafuto in exchange for Russia’s renouncing title to all the
Kuril islands in favor of Japan. Thus 18 more islands from Shimushu in the
north, to Uruppu in the south, were added to Japanese possessions (see map 3). The
Treaty of St. Petersburg, however, did not put an end to conflicting
ambitions in the area. Certain political circles in Tokyo
never accepted the loss of Sakhalin, while
Russian military strategists kept planning future “acquisition” of the
Kuriles. Further tensions between Japan
and Russia followed the
increase of Japanese influence in Korea
and Russian influence in north-eastern China
(Manchuria). The two empires were at the
brink of military conflict after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, as a result
of which Japan gained Formosa (Taiwan)
and the Liaotung Peninsula with the city of Port-Arthur (Shimonoseki Treaty of 17 April
1895). Supported by Germany
and France, Russian
intervention that followed the Shimonoseki Treaty, forced Japan to surrender its title to Liaotung to Russia (see map 3). The escalation of bilateral
tensions resulted in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 and the defeat of
Russian army and navy. The Treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905) that
followed the Japanese victory, gave Japan title to Liaotung and half
of Sakhalin/Karafuto to the South of the 50th parallel (see map 4).
Japan and Soviet Russia/USSR: Between
Two World Wars
The Russo-Japanese borders
established by the Treaty of Portsmouth remained legally unchanged until the
end of World War 2. Several attempts to expand its territory at the expense
of it's northern neighbor were made by Japan between 1918 and 1925 when
the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent civil war brought total chaos and
anarchy to Siberian and the Far Eastern provinces of the collapsed Russian
empire. In 1918 Japanese troops occupied a significant part of the Russian
Maritime and Amur Territories with the port
of Vladivostok and the city of Khabarovsk using as a
pretext protection of Japanese citizens and support of anti-bolshevik forces
in the above areas. Two years later, Japanese troops occupied Northern
Sakhalin (a territory with recently discovered coal and oil fields), a
hinterland around the mouth of Amur river and some sectors of Chita province (the latter operation performed by
Japanese units already deployed in Manchuria).
However, no official annexations of Russian territory took place during Japanese intervention in
Russian Far East and Siberia (see map 4). Step-by-step
normalization of bilateral relations between Japan and the new government of
Communist Russia (since 1922, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/USSR) that
followed the end of Russian civil war,
resulted in gradual evacuation of Japanese forces from Chita, Khabarovsk and
Vladivostok in 1922 and Northern Sakhalin in 1925. In November 1940 already
involved in World War 2, Japan made an attempt to purchase northern
part of Sakhalin from the USSR
attracted by its coal and oil fields but the diplomatic maneuvers around that
territory resulted in no success.
The End of World War Two: Northern Territories Lost to the USSR (See map 5 and map 6)
The last shift of the national
border between Russia (by
that time, the USSR) and Japan occurred at the end of World War 2 after
the Soviet attack on Japan
in August 1945. During most of the world war, there were practically no
hostilities between Japan
and the USSR
based on the Neutrality Pact signed on 13 April 1941. The 1941 Neutrality
Pact was legally binding until 13 April 1946. Prior to the conclusion of the
pact, an attempt was made by the Russian government to acquire southern
Sakhalin/Karafuto and the Kuriles/Chishima as a price for proposed
non-aggression treaty. This territorial claim was made in November 1940
against the principles of both St. Petersburg
and Portsmouth
treaties. However it may be important to mention here the two major principles
of “Leninist Foreign Policy” which Soviet leadership followed since 1917 (the
year when communists came to power). The first was the principle of
non-responsibility for the treaties signed by Tsarist (pre-communist) regime.
The second one was the principle of non-necessity of fulfilling the
agreements with “bourgeois” (non-communist) governments even if each
particular agreement was signed by Soviet leadership. Violation of
non-aggression pact with the Republic of Georgia in 1921, Partition of Poland
in 1939, aggression against Finland the same year, occupation and annexation
of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940,- are only few examples of how
Soviet Russia was breaking legally binding international agreements and
treaties. Furthermore, according to George E. Lensen, Soviet territorial
claims of November 1940 included all the islands of Kuril Archipelago with
Kunashiri and Etorofu ignoring the fact that Japanese sovereignty over the
latter three islands was never questioned and no previous Russian government
ever claimed them.
On August 9, 1945 the USSR entered the war against Japan. This
violation of the 1941 Neutrality Pact took place three days after the atomic
attacks on Hiroshima,
when the Japanese Empire was collapsing under the military pressure of the
Allies. That act of Russian military collaboration with the Allied Forces in
the Asia-Pacific region became possible only after the Kuriles and Southern
Sakhalin/Karafuto were promised to the USSR
at Yalta conference (4-11 February 1945) as a
compensation for its involvement in Allied operations in Asia.
In Yalta US and Britain generally accepted the following Soviet proposal,
entitled “Marshal Stalin’s Political Conditions for Russia’s Entry into the War against
Japan”: “The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of
Japan in 1904 should be restored: The southern part of Sakhalin and its
adjacent islands should be returned to the Soviet Union… The Kuril Islands
should be handed over to the Soviet Union”. The above statement
contained at least two legal inaccuracies:
1. The
Kuril/Chishima Islands were never conquered by Japan
from Russia but were given
to Japan
in exchange for Sakhalin/Karafuto in
accordance with the St. Petersburg Treaty of
May 7, 1875.
2. The
southern part of Sakhalin incorporated into Japan
as a result of Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, was lost by Russian Empire
and not by the Soviet Union (the state which
never existed before February 1922). Keeping in mind that the territory in
question never belonged to the Soviet Union,
it could be transferred but not “returned” to that country.
According to Bohlen,
US President Franklin
Roosevelt accepted Soviet proposals due to the fact that he “thought that
both southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles had been seized by Japan in the 1904 war and that Russia was
only getting back the territories that had been taken from her”. That sounds strange,
keeping in mind that prior to the Yalta conference, the U.S. State Department
made a survey of Russo-Japanese territorial problems and on 28 December 1944
produced a detailed memorandum (Blakeslee Memorandum) which included
recommendation to leave the southern Kuriles (Etorofu and Kunashiri) under
Japanese sovereignty. The status of the Habomai islands was not even put in question.
Not all Soviet territorial claims to Japan were confirmed at Potsdam
Conference of 26 July, 1945. Article 13 of Potsdam Declaration stated that
“Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”(italicized by
me, A.A.). The concept of “minor islands as we determine” could definitely be
used as a pretext both to leaving southern Kuriles to Japan and to
transferring them to the USSR.
The Soviet declaration of war of August
9, 1945 was immediately followed by active military operations of Soviet
troops against the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria.
In the area of Kuriles/Chishima however, no active military operations were
taking place prior to official acceptance of Potsdam
terms by Japan
on August 15, 1945. That can probably be explained the fact that
Soviet-American talks regarding the parts of Japan
to be occupied by the USSR
did not result in any concrete agreement until August18. Soviet dictator
Joseph Stalin insisted not only on the right of the USSR to occupy the Kuriles and South
Sakhalin/Karafuto but also on the inclusion of Hokkaido into future Soviet sphere of control. Harry Truman who succeeded to the U.S. presidency on the death of Roosevelt in
April 1945, opposed the idea of putting Hokkaido under Soviet influence. Truman’s
position was supported by Britain
and Nationalist China, and finally Stalin had to accept it officially by 18
August 1945. On 18 August 1945 (after official cease-fire) Soviet artillery
shelled the coast of the Northern Kuriles.
On the August 19th, Soviet troops stationed on Kamchatka peninsula were
ordered to occupy all the Kuriles, plus part of Hokkaido
to the north of the line running from the city of Rumoi
to the city of Kushiro. That order proved that
in spite of the official acceptance of the Allies’ provisions allowing Soviet
control to be established over the Kuriles/Chishima and Sakhalin/Karafuto
only, the USSR still
planned the occupation of Hokkaido
or at least the northern part of it. Such action could have resulted in the
annexation of that territory, establishing a pro-Soviet administration or
just using it as a chip in future peace talks. Soviet invasion in the Kurils
was met with Japanese resistance due to which it was only August 21 when the
Japanese garrison on Shimushu surrendered following orders from its General
Headquarters. 10 days later, on September 1, 1945 the last Japanese troops in
the area surrendered to the Soviets on Kunashiri and Etorofu (this time without
resistance). The battle for the Northern Kurils postponed the occupation of
all archipelago and made Soviet military and political leadership to give up
the idea of occupying Hokkaido.
However on September 2, 1945, Soviet troops occupied Shikotan and Habomai
group, the islands which were
geographically and politically not part of the Kuril archipelago. More than
200, 000 Japanese citizens residing in the Northern Territories prior to Soviet
occupation had to flee south leaving behind their homes and property. Many of those who did not leave, were
deported to concentration camps in Siberia
together with thousands of Japanese prisoners of war. Thousands of civil
refugees died at the sea as their vessels were sunk by Soviet submarines and
aircrafts .
On February 2, 1946 the USSR
unilaterally declared the annexation of South Sakhalin/Karafuto, all the
islands of the Kuril archipelago (including Kunashiri and Etorofu) and
Shikotan-Habomai group. Immediate russification of the annexed territories
followed: between 1946 and 1948 almost all Japanese names were replaced with
Russian-Soviet ones, the remaining of pre-war 400, 000 Japanese residents of
the Northern Territories were forcibly deported to Hokkaido and a special
Sakhalin province including all former Japanese territories, plus northern
Sakhalin, was established on January 2, 1947.
The San Francisco Peace Conference
and Peace Treaty
Almost immediately after the end
of the war, both Japanese politicians and various groups of citizens started
addressing American and Soviet leadership and asking for the return of Northern Territories.
This was the starting point of still existing Northern Territories Problem (Hoppo
Ryodo Mondai). In most cases Japanese protests were focusing on the Southern
Kuriles (Etorofu and Kunashiri) and the Shikotan/Habomai, group only, giving
up all claims to South Sakhalin and
central/northern Kuriles. As a legal pretext, Japanese protesters used the
statement of the Allied powers confirmed during Potsdam
conference according to which Japan
was to be stripped of all the "territories which she has taken by
violence and greed". The term of territories acquired “by violence and
greed" could theoretically be applied to South Sakhalin, Manchuria,
Liaotung, Korea, Taiwan and the Pescadores (see map 5), but it could hardly
be applied to Etorofu, Kunashiri and
Shikotan-Habomai which have been confirmed as inalienable part of Japan at
the very first international treaty regulating Japanese northern borders
(Shimoda). While Soviet leadership ignored all Japanese territorial claims,
the position of U.S.
government was a subject of slow evolution from rejecting all attempts of Japan to regain any losses towards the
tendency of re-interpretation of Yalta
statements. This shift in the American approach towards northern borders of Japan was probably connected with the
development of the Cold War that strained Soviet-Western relations in general
and Soviet-American ones in particular and put Japan
in position of potential ally of the USA
in possible confrontation with the USSR
and communist China.
Between September 4 and 8, 1951, the San-Francisco Conference settled most of
the diplomatic and security issues stemming from World War 2 in the
Asia-Pacific region, resulting in San Fransisco Peace Treaty between Japan
and the Allied Powers including the United States and the United Kingdom. The
USSR was the only Allied
power that refrained from signing the San-Francisco treaty due to the
disagreement on its border with Japan. The U.S. position on the
Northern Territories was officially expressed in San-Francisco by John Foster
Dulles who basing on research made by State Department experts, made a
statement according to which the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and
Habomai group “were never historically or geographically considered part of
the Kurile islands and therefore Russia had no right to occupy them even
under the so-called Yalta agreement”. The reaction of Soviet
delegation in San-Francisco was not marked by any compromise. From the point
of view of the USSR, the
future of the disputed islands had been determined in 1945 in Yalta and Potsdam
and was not to be revised. It should be mentioned however that both Yalta and
Potsdam provided some space for future adjustments of borders, keeping in
mind that the statement: “Japanese
sovereignty should be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”(see p.10),
allowed to reconsider the status of such islands as those defined by Japan as
Northern Territories.
Japan and the USSR: From the 1956 Declaration to the
Collapse of the Soviet Union
The positions of both Japan and the USSR regarding the disputed
islands, did not change significantly during the first five years after San-Francisco.
The years of 1955-56 brought the first talks between the two countries aimed
at normalization of bilateral relations. During long and uneasy negotiations
involving above all other matters, the problem of the Northern Territories, the new Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev defined the Japanese offer to establish the border north to
Etorofu “unrealistic”. However on August 10, 1956, Khruschev offered Japan
Shikotan and the Habomais as the “final Soviet offer” in return for dropping
all claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu (see map on next page). After some
hesitation Japan rejected
that “final offer” and offered the USSR to sign a “normalization
agreement” instead of a peace treaty, thus leaving the territorial issue
open. The USSR
agreed, and on October 19, 1956, the Joint Declaration (normalization
agreement) was signed by both countries. Article 9 of the Joint Declaration
included Soviet promise to return Shikotan and the Habomais at the moment
when Japan
becomes ready to sign the peace treaty.
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“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree
to continue…negotiations for the conclusion of a Pease treaty. In this
connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics… agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands
and the island
of Shikotan, the
actual transfer… to take place after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty…”
Swearingen, Roger, The
Soviet Union and the Postwar Japan,
Stanford, Calif., 1978, pp.223-5
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Between October 1956 and the
break-up of the USSR in 1991, there were several attempts to resolve the
dispute. In January 1960 the USSR
hardened its position on the Northern
Territories, trying to tie up the return of the
Habomais and Shikotan with the revision of U.S.-Japanese security
cooperation. In October 1973, facing support of Japan
by the U.S.A. and
Communist China, Moscow stepped back to its position of
1956. The position of Tokyo was not subject to any major changes although
some political parties surprisingly including the Socialist Party and the
Communists, demanded not only the return of Kunashiri, Etorofu and the
Habomais but all the Kuriles, insisting on the border as of the treaty of St.
Petersburg (1875) to remain unchanged.
A certain breakup in Soviet-Japanese relations seemed to be on the way
on 16-19 April 1991 when the USSR
President Mikhail Gorbachev paid a visit to Japan. During talks between
Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu, the USSR for the first time after
World War 2, officially acknowledged the existence of outstanding territorial
dispute between the two countries. The talks resulted in the conclusion of 15 agreements between the
two countries (predominantly of economic and environmental nature) and the
Japan-Soviet Joint Communique in which both sides expressed their readiness
and willingness to accelerate all required preparations for the peace treaty.
By the “preparations” Japan
meant resolving territorial problems, together with some other important
issues. The goal of Soviet leadership was to avoid any concrete steps aimed
at resolving the dispute on the disputed islands. At the end of April 1991,
mass media of both Japan
and the USSR
released information regarding the future development of bilateral relations.
Materials published in Japan
could be interpreted as readiness of the new Soviet leadership to return the Northern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and
the Habomais) to Japan.
Russian publications of the same time described any hopes for redrawing the
Soviet-Japanese border as “unrealistic” and dangerous for Gorbachev and his
political career. Among other reasons explaining the above situation was the
quickly worsening economic situation in the USSR and rise of chauvinistic and
nationalist emotions in the country. The Soviet leader himself when offered
by Kaifu to cede the islands to Japan in exchange for the Japanese “support
of perestroika”, answered that such an approach would be “humiliating and
impermissible”.
Thus the 1991 “breakthrough” on territorial issue was restricted only to the
Soviet acceptance of the existence of territorial problem. The 19 April
Communique happened to be final of
Japan-Soviet relations, and Gorbachev was the first and the last Soviet
leader to visit Japan.
Less than 8 months later, on 8 December 1991, the USSR ceased to exist. From now on
the Northern Territories Problem became an issue of Japan and Russia,
the country which on 27 December of the same year, was recognized by Japan as the successor state of the USSR.
Latest Developments
Yeltsin Era (1991-99):
Russo-Japanese Dialog on Northern
Territories Continues
The end of the USSR and formal end of communism gave birth to
new hopes in Japan for the
return of Northern Territories.
Both Russian President Yeltsin and the democratic press of the new nation
condemned various aspects of international politics of the USSR and during
the years of 1991-92, some outstanding territorial disputes were solved in
favor of new Russia’s neighbors (for example, confirmation of
Russian-inhabited Crimea as part of Ukraine, confirmation of Russo-Kazakstani
border leaving four predominantly Russophone provinces under the sovereignty
of Kazakstan, readiness to discuss disputed border issues with China). The first year after the desintegration of
the USSR
was marked by activisation of all aspects of Russo-Japanese relations. In
February 1992, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze was quoted by Kyodo News as remembering the
existence of Russo-Japanese borders of 1875 (when the Northern
Territories were part of Hokkaido
and Japan) . This statement, plus the remark
of Russian ambassador Poltoranin regarding a 10 to15-year transitional period
required for the transfer of disputed islands to Japan and the planned visit
of President Yeltsin to Tokyo, were accepted in Japan as a sign of a new
breakthrough in bilateral relations. In Russia, however, the rumors of
possible territorial concessions to Japan provoked active opposition
beginning with hundreds of thousands of letters from Russian citizens to
their president and ending with highly emotional speeches made in Russian
Parliament by Communist and Nationalist deputies. As the result, Boris
Yeltsin’s visit to Japan
was cancelled and Russian President made a statement that no transfer of Northern Territories
was possible at that moment. Both the cancellation of Yeltsin’s visit and his
latter stateement caused negative reaction and disappointment in Japan and
blocked a number of previously planned cooperation projects.
In October 1993, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin finally paid an official visit to Japan, and after negotiating with
then Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, the Tokyo Declaration was
signed together with package of 18 other documents. The Declaration was
clearly aimed at «working out fair peace treaty, solving territorial claims
basing on historical facts and legal documents… as well as on the principles
of law and justice».
Since then, during Russo-Japanese talks on lower levels, the Tokyo
Declaration has been repeatedly confirmed as the basis for the development of
bilateral relations. At the same time no concrete steps aimed at future
transfer of the disputed islands, have been mentioned by Russian side. On the contrary, in November 1993, Russia restricted visa requirements for
Japanese citizens in the area of Kuril Islands and Russian border guards were
allowed to open fire at vessels violating the sea borders of the Russian Federation.
The latter action was characterized by the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as a reaction to increased activity of Japanese poachers in the
waters surrounding the disputed islands.
During the years of 1994-95 there
were a number of visits of Russian high-ranking officials to Japan (Deputy
Prime Minister Oleg Soskowiec, Deputy Defense Minister Gromov, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, Presidential envoy Ivan Rybkin, a.o.). At the
end of all bilateral talks that followed, both sides confirmed the intention
to proceed further for the early conclusion of a peace treaty, based on the
Tokyo Declaration.
In April 1996, Japanese Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a meeting
during which bilateral relations and Russian reforms were discussed. The two
leaders once again confirmed their intention to speed up preparatory work for
the future peace treaty basing on the Tokyo Declaration, and agreed that it
is important to revitalize the peace treaty negotiations at the Foreign
Minister level. The same month a session of Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty
Working Group took place in Moscow.
Finally, the last years of the “Yeltsin Era”
resulted in the two Russo-Japanese “No-tie Summits”. The first one was held
in Krasnoyarsk
on 1-2 November 1997. Characterized by an attempt of creating a ”personal
relationship of trust and friendship” between the two leaders, the
Krasnoyarsk summit resulted in working out of “Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan” based
on the Tokyo Declaration but aimed at practical realization of its
principles. Some major elements of the "Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan”
included:
- Promotion of Japanese investments in Russian Federation
- Involvement of Japanese corporations in modernization of
Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as the airports, power stations and
seaports of Russian Far East
- Japanese acceptance of the guarantees provided by 11 Russian
banks for Japanese investments
·
Agreement to conclude the peace treaty by the year 2000.
Once
again, the territorial issue was mentioned indirectly only, as a
pre-condition of the planned peace treaty and with no concrete agreements.
The last “No-tie Summit”
between Yeltsin and Hashimoto took place during the Russian President’s visit
to Kawana (Japan)
on 18-19 April 1998. Between the two
“No-tie Summits” the following progress has been made in bilateral relations:
- Japanese fishermen were allowed to fish (on a commercial basis)
near the Kuril Islands.
- Russian military presence
in the Kuril Archipelago was significantly reduced.
- Foreign trips between Japan the Russian Far East
area without visas became possible.
- Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty Working Group (with Foreign Affairs
Ministers of both countries as co-chairmen) kept working.
The Kawana Summit resulted in the
Kawana Agreement, which was a development of "Yeltsin-Hashimoto
Plan". The Kawana Agreement contained besides all, the following
proposals:
- Japanese transfer to Russia
the first 600 million USD, as
part of the previously planned 1.5 billion credit to Russia.
- Governments and business circles of both countries promote the
creation of joint company aimed at development of Japanese investment in
Russia.
- Construction of a Japanese-owned car factory in Moscow province and a Japanese-owned
fish cannery in the Kuriles
·
In the field of security: “search and rescue” games in the Sea of Japan
by the navy forces of both countries for the summer of 1998.
Russian President also proposed to
work out a broader concept of "peace, friendship and collaboration
treaty" instead of “just a peace treaty”.
This meant that besides solving the territorial disputes, the proposed treaty
could enforce collaboration in the field of economy, security and other
issues. President Yeltsin also transferred to Japan some secret documentation
from the KGB archives regarding the Japanese POW forcibly kept in Russia after
World War 2. In his turn, Prime Minister Hashimoto made a new proposal for
the future peace treaty between the two countries. The new proposal
recommended Russia’s
official recognition of the South Kuril islands / Northern
Territories (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais) as
part of Japan.
However practical transfer of the disputed islands could be postponed.
The latter proposal received an
official answer only during the visit of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to Moscow on 12 November
1998. The Summit meeting with President
Yeltsin in Kremlin resulted in both leaders signing the Moscow Declaration on
Establishing a Creative Partnership between Russian
Federation and Japan. The Declaration confirmed
both countries' official commitment to further strengthening Japan-Russia
cooperation in all areas, including politics, economy, security, culture and
international cooperation and resulted in signing a number of important
agreements. The Russian side provided its response to the proposal made by Japan
(Hashimoto) in Kawana in April. The Russian counter-proposal was “to solve
the problem in such a way that it would promote bilateral financial, economic
and any other possible cooperation in S.Kuril area without harming national
interests of any of the two parties".
Yeltsin’s offer contained the following major points:
- There should be a separate agreement on South
Kuriles after the signing the peace treaty in 2000.
- Keeping in mind "the delicacy" of the problem, both
parties should agree on non-promulgation of the contents of their
initiatives.
The contents of new Japanese
offers that followed Yeltsin’s counter-proposal, were never published. However, according to
some confidential sources, Obuchi made one more offer as a pre-condition for
the future peace treaty. In case Russia
considered accepting that last Japanese proposal, she should officially
recognize jurisdiction of Japan
over the Northern Territories
without immediate transfer of the islands. Russian administration and
population were to remain on Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais
for an indefinite period of time. Russia declined the proposal.
That meant that Russia
still kept avoiding any steps not only towards the return of the disputed
islands but even official recognition of Northern
Territories as part of Japan. Since the Moscow Summit of
November 1998, there was no further development of territorial issue between Japan in Russia until the end of 1999 when
Boris Yeltsin transferred power to Vladimir Putin.
The Era of Boris Yeltsin brought
no significant change in the Russian approach to the problem of the Northern Territories from the position of the USSR before
Gorbachev. The only shift was the recognition of the existence of the
outstanding dispute. The above situation sharply contrasted with Russia’s approach towards her territorial
dispute with China
during the same period of time. For example, by 11 November 1995
Russo-Chinese border was moved up to 350 meters back into Russian territory
leaving China with a number of disputed islands in Amur and Ussuri rivers and
thousands sq.miles of previously Russian cedar forests and hunting grounds.
The demarcation of new Russo-Chinese border was met with sharp opposition on
behalf of thousands the Russian citizens and the administration of frontier
areas, which in contrast to opposition towards the return of South Kuriles to
Japan, was ignored by Russian leadership.
Putin Era (2000 - present): “No
Outstanding Territorial Disputes”
The approach of new Russian
President Vladimir Putin to the problem of the Northern Territories demonstrates the
slide back to pre-1956 Soviet position on the disputed islands. In spite of
demonstrated general willingness to improve bilateral relations and promote
economic cooperation, Putin stated a number of times that from his point of
view, there are no outstanding territorial problems between Russia and Japan. The special session of Russian Government
on November 9, 2000 devoted to the development of the Kuriles was one of
quite a few actions of modern Russian leadership demonstrating that Russia’s aim
in the region to secure its control over the islands instead of ceding them
to any foreign country. The recent statement by Russian Parliament deputy (Union
of Rightist Forces) Irina Khakamada that she doubts there will be a peace
treaty between the two countries in the near future,
and the denial by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reports in the
Japanese media that President Putin has suggested that the occupation of the
Kuriles “had been a mistake”,
are further indicators of firm Russian position of non-transferring the
disputed islands. In his turn, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori confirmed
that as of today, Japan is not going
to bargain away any of the claimed South Kuril islands and that quickly
resolving that dispute would be the best way topromote "peace and
security" throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Conclusion
The Problem Still Unresolved
Basing on the above and on the
current tendencies of political development, one may conclude that the
territorial dispute between Japan and Russia still remains unresolved, and no
significant progress has been made since the middle of the passed century.
Such a situation strains bilateral relations and blocks normal development of
both political and economic cooperation between Japan
and Russia.
The Position of Russia
Modern Russian leadership is not
too far from the most conservative circles of Russian Federation (among them
communists and nationalists) following the old populist slogans like “Sacred
borders of the Motherland are inviolable”. This approach is supported by most
Russian media. As a result, the majority of Russians, especially
representatives of older generations, tend to oppose any territorial
concessions to Japan.
This attitude sharply contrasts with public attitude towards adjustments of
Russo-Chinese border ceding to China territories much bigger than the islands
claimed by Japan and even towards confirming existing borders of Russia with
Ukraine and Kazakstan that left millions of Russians abroad. A smaller group
of Russians (among them democrats, moderate nationalists and the majority of
entrepreneur class) is ready to support the idea of returning Northern
Territories to Japan in case that gives Russia Japanese credits and increased
investments. The attitude of the latter group to the existing problem can be
illustrated by the statement of Russian human rights activist and moderate
nationalist Alexander Solzhenitsyn who recently wrote: “Here we can see the
unforgivable bluntness of our leaders in their attitude towards South Kurils. After having carelessly given tens of…
Russian provinces to Ukraine
and Kazakstan, they demonstrate fake patriotism by refusing to give back to
Japan the islands that never belonged to Russia…”.
However those Russians who express support of the above statement, do not
represent the majority of the population and are unable to influence modern
tendencies in Russian foreign policy. Many Russians are also afraid that the
transfer of disputed territories to Japan
may cause unrest and the establishment of dictatorship in Russia.
The Position of Japan
The position of Japanese
government and significant part of the population has been clearly expressed
in a booklet on the problem issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan in 1999:
“Japan fervently hopes to provide
a firm legal basis for mutual trust between the Japanese and Russian peoples
by resolving the territorial issue and concluding a peace treaty and
drastically improve relations between the two countries. We believe that the
building of neighborly and friendly relations, and promoting cooperation
without animosity between Japan and Russia, would not only meet the interests
of both nations, but also greatly contribute to ever-lasting peace and
stability both in the Asian Pacific region, and, the whole world… We are
convinced that the Russian people, if allowed to consider the facts shown in
this booklet, along with values based on law and justice would come to the
conclusion that returning what Japan calls the Northern Territories--the
islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai to Japan is the just and
correct course of action. We think it is best that the resolution of the
territorial issue should be a mutually agreed-upon decision made by fair
judgement based on an accurate understanding of the facts”.
The above statement allows to
believe that the Government of Japan, as well as the majority of the
Japanese, consecutively, support the idea that no peace treaty and no
normalization of Russo-Japanese relations is possible unless South Kuriles / South Chishima are returned under Japanese
jurisdiction. The basis for such a conviction is formed by the principles of
“historical justice” and “national honor”. Certain circles in Japan would welcome the inclusion of southern
Sakhalin/Karafuto and the whole Kuril archipelago into Northern Territories, however that part of
the Japanese population does not represent the majority and is unlikely to
influence current political process.
The Position of Indigenous Ainu
and Nivkha People (The Third Party?)
The position of the indiginuos
population of the disputed area has been sofar never taken into consideration
by either Russia or Japan.
However, from the beginning of the 90s various Ainu organizations of Japan
(there are no Ainu people living in Russia any more; those who were not
killed or deported to Japan during the complicated periods of history, were
most likely totally russified) started expressing their attitude towards the
above territorial problem in most cases defining it as a “dispute between
thieves”. That statement expresses the
opinion that both parties were invaders that partitioned the land to which
none of them had moral or legal right. At the moment it is hard to say
whether the above approach is shared by the majority of Ajnu people. Another
offer was made in 1992 by the president of the Ainu Council of the Kuriles
and Sakhalin (Toyooka Masanori) who proposed
both the Russian and Japanese governments to create an Ainu autonomous
district on one of the islands, which would help to preserve Ainu culture.
There is no information available at the moment regarding the point of Nivkha
people, who form a vanishing community of several hundred families in the
very north of Sakhalin island and have no
organization representing them.
Current Economic and Demographic
Situation in Northern Territories
As of today, the disputed islands
of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais can be described as a sort
of “forgotten territory” of a weakening Russian Federation. In spite of
persistent attempts of Soviet and Russian administrations to settle the
conquered territories, the islands still remain under-populated. They can
boast less than 9000 settlers, making population density the lowest in
Russian Far East (1.5 per square km.) and significantly contrasting with the
demographic situation when the islands were part of Japan.
Examining the detailed maps of the islands, one often finds former Japanese
settlements with Russian names and an abbreviation “nezhil.” (Russian
word for “uninhabited”) in brackets. The population of South
Kuriles is not only decreasing but also aging due to extremely
high unemployment, isolation and harsh climate. The remaining inhabitants are
constantly suffering from shortages of consumer goods, food, fuel and
electricity. During the last 50 years, the economy of the islands was based
exclusively on fishing and serving numerous garrisons, naval bases and radar
stations. The unique nature of the islands provided potential for the
development of tourist industry which was impossible due to the fact that the
islands were restricted even to most of Russians, not to mention foreign
visitors. The economy of the islands today is in a sharp decrease because the
fishing resources are rapidly running short, the importance of military
activity is going down and the development of tourism is impossible due to a
lack of funds. Even correspondents of Russian media recently visiting Northern Territories
have to admit that the islands produce an impression of “no-man’s land”.
What are Possible Gains of Russia if the
Outstanding Dispute is Resolved?
If the outstanding territorial
dispute between Russia and
Japan is finally resolved,
the possible gains of Russian
Federation could be the following:
1. Japan, which is already the biggest
creditor of Russia after Germany, could significantly increase its financial
assistance to Russian
Federation
2. Japanese investments in Russian
Far East may increase to such an extent that they may stop the current
recession of the economy Russian Far East and Siberia and as a result, making
those areas much more profitable to Russia
3. Keeping in mind that Russian
strategists seriously believe in the potential threat of Chinese expansionism
once China becomes more
self-reliant in missile, space and military technology, Russia may be
interested in developing a Russo-Japanese security alliance. The latter,
however, is not possible before the return of the Northern
Territories to Japan.
4. Ceding the disputed islands to
Japan should not damage Russia’s prestige (neither international, nor inside
the country) at least due to the fact that even if the islands are returned
to Japan, Russia will still keep most of the territories gained as a result
of its military operations during the last weeks of World War 2.
5. Resolving the dispute will
significantly decrease military presence at the Russo-Japanese frontier which
modern Russia
can hardly afford.
What are Possible Gains of Japan if the
Outstanding Dispute is Resolved?
In case Japan
receives back the disputed islands, the possible gains of Japan could
be the following:
1. Japan will finally obtain what in Japan is
believed to be “historically fair borders” which will keep together all
Japanese lands. The concept of territorial integrity is an important element
of Japanese political culture. The return of lost territories will also be
regarded in Japan
as “healing national wounds”.
2. Business circles of Japan will finally have a “green light” to
invest in Russia and gain
access to natural resources of Russian Far East and Siberia.
That can significantly boost today’s troubled Japanese economy.
3. Even relatively small disputed
islands can help solve demographic problems of relatively overpopulated Japan.
4. Resolving the dispute will
significantly decrease costly military presence at Japan-Russia frontier.
Can the Outstanding Russo-Japanese
Dispute be Resolved in the Near Future?
Although some opportunities that
sprung up during the previous years due to the end of the Cold War, were
lost, the next decade still provides a chance to settle the long territorial
dispute. It is hard to believe that Japan will drop its claim to what
is believed to be legally and historically an inalienable part of the
country. On the other hand, Russia
may still reconsider its policy of keeping all the Kuril archipelago as a
part of “fair loot” for participation in World War 2. If that happens, the
two Asia-Pacific powers will come to a completely new stage of bilateral
relations from which both societies will definitely gain. From the global
point of view, resolving this old conflict may turn northern part of
Asia-Pacific region into a realm of both security and stability.
Recommended Reading
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi
The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations
01/98 Trade Paper
Nimmo, William F.
Japan and Russia : a Reevaluation
in the Post-Soviet Era
Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press,
c1994
"Northern
Territories" and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives
Edited by James E. Goodby,
Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Nobuo Shimotomai
Under the Auspices of the United States Institute of Peace
Westport, Conn. 1995.
Rees, David,
The Soviet seizure of the Kuriles
New York : Praeger, 1985
Recommended Websites
Japan-Russia
Relations (Territorial Issues)
Japan's Northern Territories Contents Preface A History of the Territorial
Boundaries Between Japan and Russia World War II and the Origins of the Northern
Territories Issue Negotiations Toward the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory
Secret of Sakhalin
Island
With Kuril Archipelago, Sakhalin Island is one of the territories disputed between Japan and Russia for a long time. The most
of materials exposed here are unknown in the western literature.
http://www.karafuto.com/
The Northern
Territories in International Politics
JAPAN ECHO Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1976 The Northern Territories in
International Politics SASE Masamori THE HIRASAWA THESIS Since Japan is a
land of free public opinion, the views that have been advanced on the issue
of the northern territories
have
http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/030207.html
"Northern
Territories" and Beyond -- Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives
A comprehensive examination of the past, present, and future of
Russian-Japanese relations.
http://info.greenwood.com/books/0275950/027595093x.html
Russia
December 2000 Japan-Russia Foreign Ministers' Meeting Japan-Russia Relations
Overview Overview of Japan-Russia relations (Diplomatic Bluebook 2000)
Economic Relations Japan's Assistance for Russia (April 2000) Progress of
Implementation of the Hashi
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia
BBC
News | Despatches | Russia and Japan's island row
Russia's president is to meet Japan's prime minister to discuss four disputed
islands that have left the two countries in an official state of war. Juliet
Hindell reports from the port
of Nemuro.
http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/low/english/despatches/newsid_79000/79497.stm
Building a New
Japan-Russia Relationship
JAPAN ECHO Vol. 24, No. 5, December 1997 Building a New Japan-Russia
Relationship HAKAMADA Shigeki Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryûtarô and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin met on the morning of June 20, the first day
of the Denver Summit of th
http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/240508.html
Japan and
Russia -- A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era
An examination of the Japanese and Soviet attempts to resolve their
outstanding differences.
http://info.greenwood.com/books/0313284/0313284407.html
Historical
Details
Russia-Japan Treaty of Amity The Russia-Japan Treaty of Amity was signed in Shimoda,
Izu, in 1855.Under this treaty, the border of Japan and Russia was
established betweenthe islands of Etorofu and Urup.It was confirmed that the
islands to the south
http://www.pref.hokkaido.jp/soumu/sm-hrtsk/history/history-e.html
Stewart, Gwendolyn, Russia Redux, Chapter 2 (the
People's Choice),
http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~gestewar/peopleschoice.html
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