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Between the
Achaemenid era and the beginning of the 19th century, Persia played
a significant and at times decisive role in the history of the Georgian
people. The Persian presence helped to shape political institutions, modified
social structure and land holding, and enriched literature and culture.
Persians also acted as a counterweight to other powerful forces in the
region, notably the Romans (and Byzantines), the Ottoman Turks, and the
Russians. But the Persian-Georgian relationship was by no means one-sided,
for the Georgians contributed substantially to Persia's military and
administrative successes and even affected its social structure, especially
under the Safavids.
Information about
relations between the Achaemenids and the inhabitants of present-day Georgia
is fragmentary. During the Achaemenid domination of eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia (546-331 B.C.E.) proto-Georgian tribes
were, according to Herodotus (3.94), included in the 18th and 19th satrapies
(T. Kaukhchishvili, ed., pp. 10-11). Although the territory of present-day
southern Georgia
fell within the Achaemenid state, the Achaemenids apparently never brought
those tribes living further to the north under their control. When they tried
to do so their aggressiveness led to the formation of large associations of
northern proto-Georgian tribes (Melikishvili, pp. 235, 273). Xenophon was
aware of the changed conditions in 401-400 B.C.E. when he noted in the Anabasis
that these tribes, including those of Colchis
(q.v.), had ceased to be under Achaemenid rule (Mikeladze, ed., pp. 13-14).
By this time proto-Georgians were moving into the Kura
valley, where, merging with indigenous tribes, they eventually formed the
Georgian people (Lang, 1966, pp. 57, 75-76; on political formations in
eastern Georgia, see Melikishvili, ed., pp. 422-44).
Alexander's victory over
Darius III in 331 B.C.E. gave impetus to the formation and consolidation of
an independent Georgian monarchy in the following two centuries (on political
and ethnic questions between the 3rd and 1st centuries B.C.E., see
Melikishvili, ed., pp. 445-67). The first king of Iberia, the ancient name for the
territory of present-day Kartli (Kārtīl) and Kakheti (Kākhet), or eastern
Georgia, was the half-legendary Parnavaz (S. Kaukhchishvili, ed., I, pp.
4-10, 26), who took Persian institutions as models in organizing his realm.
The example set by the Persian state system in eastern Georgia was undoubtedly a consequence of the
earlier influence exercised by tribal formations in southern Georgia. Long
controlled by the Achaemenids, they extended Persian influence northward, as
their aristocracies expanded their own power base.
Between the 3rd and
7th centuries C.E. Iberia maintained a precarious existence between the two
great rivals for control of the Caucasus, namely Persia
and Rome (later Byzantium). Georgian kings successfully
played one off against the other and thereby preserved their freedom of
action. But as they came to rely on Rome to
uphold strong monarchical institutions, they became estranged from the great
nobles, who sought support from Persia to thwart the centralizing
ambitions of their kings.
Decisive for the
evolution of the Georgian state was the foundation of the Sasanian Empire in
224. By replacing the weak Parthian realm with a strong, centralized state,
it changed the political orientation of Iberia
away from Rome.
Iberia apparently became a part of the Sasanian state during the reign of
āpūr I (240-70), who in his famous inscription at Ka“ba-ye Zardot (l.3)
listed Iberia (Wirān) as one of the lands that paid him tribute
(Melikishvili, pp. 391-92). Relations between the two countries seem to have
been friendly at first, as Iberia
cooperated in Persian campaigns against Rome,
and the Iberian ruler was a high dignitary of the Sasanian realm, not a
vassal who had been subdued by force of arms (S. Kaukhchishvili, ed., I, p.
57). But the aggressive tendencies of the Sasanians were evident in their
propagation of Zoroastrianism, which was probably established in Iberia
between the 260s and 290s (Lukonin, p. 32).
In the contest for
supremacy in the Caucasus, the advantage lay with Rome, whose armies defeated the Persians in
a series of battles toward the end of the 3rd century. The Treaty of Nisibis
in 298 assured Roman control of eastern Georgia (Kartli) for the next sixty
years (Frye, pp. 130-31). Roman predominance proved crucial, since the
Georgian king and leading nobles were converted to Christianity, probably in
330. By making Christianity the state religion, they erected what became an
insurmountable barrier to Persian influence in the region.
In the 4th century
the position of Iberia
worsened, as its powerful neighbors became increasingly aggressive. Iberian
kings chose Rome (Byzantium)
as the least dangerous to their independence, but Persia
became predominant after the defeat of the Roman armies before Ctesiphon in 363 (Frye,
pp. 137-38). Rome ceded control of Kartli to Persia, and
the king of Kartli, Varaz-Bakur II (363-65), became a Persian vassal, an
outcome confirmed by the Peace of Acilisene in 387. Although a later ruler of
Kartli, Pharsman IV (406-9), preserved his country's autonomy and ceased to
pay tribute to Persia (S.
Kaukhchishvili, ed., I, p. 133), Persia prevailed, and Sasanian
kings began to appoint a viceroy (pitiax/bidax) to keep watch on
their vassal. They eventually made the office hereditary in the ruling house
of Lower Kartli, thus inaugurating the
Kartli pitiaxat, which brought an extensive territory under its
control. Although it remained a part of the kingdom of Kartli,
its viceroys turned their domain into a center of Persian influence
(Berdzenishvili et al, I, p. 109).
Sasanian rulers put
the Christianity of the Georgians to a severe test. They promoted the
teachings of Zoroaster, and by the middle of the 5th century Mazdaism had
become a second official religion in eastern Georgia alongside Christianity.
Yazdegerd II (438-57), convinced that a single religion would enhance the
unity of his realm, issued a decree formally admonishing the peoples of the Caucasus to renounce Christianity and embrace Mazdaism
and dispatched Zoroastrian magi to Kartli to take charge of conversion
(Trever, pp. 203-5). The majority of Georgian nobles submitted, but their
commitment to the new faith proved shallow. Efforts to convert the common
people were even less successful, since Christianity appears to have struck
deep roots among them.
In seeking to weaken
Christianity, Persian rulers involved themselves in the internal affairs of
the Christian churches in the Caucasus. They
tried to take advantage of disputes among Christians by offering protection
to the Monophysites, who were opposed to the Chalcedonian doctrines
patronized by the Byzantine emperors, and they promoted unity among the
Armenian, Albanian, and Georgian churches in order to extend their control
more easily over them. Under Persian pressure the three churches adopted the
Monophysite doctrines at Dvin in 506 (Berdzenishvili et al., I, p. 136), but
when Persian vigilance slackened, the Chalcedonians rose again, and by the
end of the 6th century Monophysitism in Georgia had all but disappeared.
Religious
controversy was intertwined with political struggle in the 5th century. The
leading champion of Georgian independence was King Vakhtang I (447-522;
Toumanoff, 1990, p. 378), who was called Gorgasar "wolf-headed"
(Gorgasa in Georgian) by the Persians, because of the shape of the helmet he
wore. Married to a Persian princess, he guarded the northern passes through
Kartli and participated in Persian campaigns against Byzantium between 455
and 458 and in India, probably in Pźrōz's wars against the Hephthalites in
474-76 (Dzhuansheriani, pp. 84-89). But loyalty had its limits. Vakhtang
resented Persian encroachments on his independence and reinforced his
position by supporting autocephalous status for the Georgian
Church and by uniting western Georgia with
Kartli (Muskhelishvili, p. 211). In 482 he led a general uprising against his
suzerain and declared war on "Persian Christianity," that is,
Monophysitism. But he was defeated, and his country was ravaged by Persian
punitive expeditions in 483 and 484 (Toumanoff, 1963, p. 365). After a short
exile he made peace with the great king Balā (q.v.) in 485 and returned to
Kartli, but when Kavād I (488-96, 498-531) summoned him as a vassal to join
in a new campaign against Byzantium,
he refused. Their dispute may be related in part to Kavād's efforts to force
Mazdaism upon the Georgians. When Kavād attacked Kartli in 517-18, Vakhtang
appealed to Justin I for help, but the Byzantines provided none, and he fled
to Lazika, where he probably died in 522 (Frye, p. 152).
Byzantium and Persia continued their contest for supremacy
in the Caucasus. War broke out in 526 and
ended with the cession of Iberia
to Persia
in 532. But Khosrow I Anōīravān (532-79) was eager to reach the Black Sea
and in 542 moved through Iberia
at the head of a large army toward Lazika and Colchis
(Berdzenishvili et al., I, p. 120). The Byzantines countered by invading Persia and
forcing Khosrow to make peace in 546. Once again it was merely a truce.
The Byzantine-Persian
rivalry had baleful consequences for Iberia. In 580 Hormozd IV
(579-90) abolished the monarchy after the death of King Bakur
(Dzhuansheriani, p. 97), and Iberia
became a Persian province. Hormozd at first had the support of the great
nobles, but rather than receiving the enhanced privileges promised them, they
were subjected to heavy taxation and a restrictive administration headed by a
Persian-appointed governor (marzbān). When, therefore, the Byzantine
emperor Maurice attacked Persia
in 582 many Georgian nobles urged him to revive the kingdom
of Iberia, but in 591 Maurice and
Khusrau II Parvźz (590, 591-628) agreed to divide Iberia
between them, with Tbilisi
to be in Persian hands and Mtskheta, the old capital, to be under Byzantine
control (Dzhuansheriani, pp. 98-99).
At the beginning of
the 7th century the truce between Byzantium
and Persia
collapsed. Stepanoz I, Prince of Iberia (ca. 590-627), decided in 607 to join
forces with Persia in
order to reunite all the territories of Iberia, a goal he seems to have
accomplished. But Emperor Heraclius's offensive between 622 and 628 brought
victory over the Georgians and Persians and ensured Byzantine predominance in
western and eastern Georgia
until the invasion of the Caucasus by the
Arabs.
The Arabs reached Iberia about 645 and forced its prince,
Stepanoz II (637-c. 650) to abandon his allegiance to Byzantium and recognize the caliph as his
suzerain. Iberia thus
became a tributary state, and an Arab amir was installed in Tbilisi about 653 (Balādhorī, Fotūh,
pp. 201-2; Tabarī, I, p. 2674).
Between the Arabs'
consolidation of their position in eastern Georgia
in the 730s and the emergence of the Safavid dynasty in Persia at the beginning of the 16th
century the Georgian kingdom was revived, experienced a period of glory, and
then declined in the face of powerful new enemies. At the beginning of the
9th century, Ashot I (813-30) of the new Bagratid dynasty (see BAGRATIDS),
from his base in southwestern Georgia,
took advantage of the weakness of the Byzantine emperor and the Arab caliph
to establish himself as hereditary prince of Iberia. A successor, Bagrat III
(1008-14), brought the various principalities together to form a united
Georgian state, and David II "the Builder" (1089-1125), laid the
foundations for Georgia's
golden age during the reign of Queen Tamara (1184-1213). Georgia's
decline began with the Mongol invasions of the 1220s, and, despite brief
revivals, it proved inexorable. The rise of the Ottoman Turks and their
capture of Constantinople in 1453 raised up a powerful new military threat to
Georgia at a time when, at the end of the 15th century, the country had been
fragmented into three kingdoms (Kartli, Kakheti, and Imereti) and the duchy
of Samtskhe-Saatbago.
At the beginning of
the 16th century Georgia
once again lay in the precarious middle ground between two powerful enemies,
the Ottoman Turks to the west and the Persian Safavids to the east. The two powers
were themselves constantly at war (1514-55, 1578-90, 1602-18, 1623-39), with
control of Georgia
one of their objectives. Mainly under the leadership of the kings of Kartli
the Georgians carried on a valiant, but unequal struggle to maintain their independence
(for an overview of Georgia's economic and political situation between Persia
and the Ottoman Empire in the 16th17th centuries, see Dumbadze, ed., pp.
85-186).
At first, the
initiative lay with the Safavids. Shah Esmā“īl I (907-30/1501-24), the
founder of the dynasty, sent raiding expeditions into Georgia, notably in
1518, but he was too preoccupied with consolidating his hold on power at home
to pursue more ambitious undertakings in the Caucasus (Mozµtar, ed., pp. 109,
542-45, 555, 557; Hasan Rūmlū, ed. Navā`ī, pp. 218-19, 225; Brosset, II/1, p.
446). Shah Tahmāsb I (930-84/1524-76), who launched four campaigns against Georgia between 1540 and 1554, inaugurated the
systematic extension of his dynasty's control over Georgia. All four expeditions
were costly for the Georgians. In the first, 947/1540-41, Persians captured Tbilisi and plundered
it and the surrounding region. They repeated these practices during
subsequent expeditions in 953/1546-47, 958/1551, and 961/1553-54. Much booty
was taken, especially from Georgian churches, and Tahmāsb claimed as his
rightful share the wives, daughters, and sons of the nobility, instead of the
usual one-fifth of the treasure (Eskandar Beg, I, pp. 84-90, tr. Savory, I,
pp. 140-44, 146; Hasan Rūmlū. ed. Navā`ī, pp. 383-85; Brosset, II/1, pp.
445-53, based on Eskandar Beg's account with notes and commentary; on the
importance of Eskandar Beg's work for the history of Georgia, see Puturidze).
The death, probably in 1558, of King Luarsab I (1534-57; Lovārsāb in Eskandar
Beg) brought a temporary end to the hostilities.
During these
campaigns Tahmāsb brought to Persia
large numbers of Georgians, whose subsequent role in the army and civil
administration led to significant changes in the character of Safavid
society. The new ethnic element became a "third force" which
interposed itself between the two "founding elements," the Persians
and the Turkmen. Indeed, by the end of the 16th century the Georgians were
threatening to replace the latter, the qezelbā, as the military
aristocracy of the realm.
The competition
between the Ottomans and the Safavids for control of the Caucasus
was temporarily interrupted by the Treaty of Amasya (962/1555, q.v.). In Georgia it
established a rough balance between the two rivals, as Kartli, Kakheti, and
eastern Samtskhe (Masq) fell into the Persian sphere of influence, and
Imereti and western Samtskhe into the Ottoman.
Shah Tahmāsb used
the opportunity to tighten Persian predominance in eastern Georgia by
imposing Persian social and political institutions and by placing converts to
Islam on the thrones of Kartli and Kakheti. One of these was David/Dāwūd Khan
II (1569-78), whose reign marked the beginning of almost two and a half
centuries of Persian political dominance over eastern Georgia, with
only occasional interruptions, until the advent of the Russians at the end of
the 18th century. To hasten the integration of eastern Georgia into his realm Tahmāsb
used bilingual Georgian-Persian firmans to make Persian the official
administrative language of the country (Tabatadze, pp. 262-63).
The Ottomans, eager
to extend their control over Kartli and Kakheti, attacked Persian positions
in eastern Georgia
in 1578. Despite spirited resistance led by King Simon of Kartli (1557-69,
1578-99; Brosset, II/1, pp. 36-42), the Ottomans prevailed, and in 1590 the
Persians recognized all of Georgia
as an Ottoman possession (Uzunēar¶ili, pp. 57-63).
Shah “Abbās I
(996-1038/1587-1629) was determined to restore Persian predominance in the Caucasus. Although he inflicted enormous devastation on
the Georgian kingdoms and appointed and dismissed their rulers almost at
will, he never succeeded fully in stamping out resistance to his rule. When
he resumed war with the Ottoman Empire in
1602 he forced Giorgi X of Kartli (1599-1605) and Aleksandre II of Kakheti
(1574-1605) to join the campaign. But resistance to “Abbās was fierce among
the nobles. In 1605 they revolted and placed Teimuraz/Tahmūrath I (1605-63)
on the throne, who for sixty years served as a rallying point for opposition
to the Safavids. “Abbās acquiesced and confirmed Teimuraz as king in 1606. He
also recognized Luarsab II (1605-14) as King of Kartli, but when Luarsab
refused to become a Muslim and encouraged the nobles to reject a Muslim
replacement for him, “Abbās exiled him to Isfahan and in 1622 had him strangled
(Dumbadze, IV, p. 276).
“Abbās undertook
another campaign in 1614 against Kartli and Kakheti, replacing their kings
with Muslims. When nobles of Kakheti rose in revolt in 1615, his troops ravaged
the country, a punishment from which it never fully recovered (Eskandar Beg,
pp. 896-901, tr. Savory, II, pp. 1081-83; Brosset, II/1, pp. 484-87). Perhaps
as many as 70,000 people were killed and over 100,00 deported to Persia.
“Abbās appointed a loyalist, Simon II/Semāyūn Khan (1619-29), as wālī,
or viceroy, but he kept a tight grip on Kakheti, administering it through an
appointed governor (on the functions of the wālī and the role of other
Persian officials appointed to supervise Georgian affairs in the 17th
century, see Gabashvili, pp. 366-411). “Abbās regarded these arrangements as
temporary and apparently planned to deal a drastic blow to the rebellious
Georgians: the Kakhetians were to be wiped out or deported and their country
settled by qezelbā and other Turkmen tribes, while the nobles of
Kartli were to be resettled in Persia (Berdzenishvili et al., I,
p. 358).
In subduing the two
Georgian kingdoms, “Abbās had counted on a leading noble, Giorgi Saakadze
(known to the Persians as Mūrāv Beg). A Muslim, he was admired in Persia for
his military exploits and was regularly consulted on Georgian affairs
(Eskandar Beg, pp. 1020-21, tr. Savory, pp. 1242-43). “Abbās had appointed
him advisor to Simon II of Kartli and in 1620 entrusted both with the suppression
of anti-Persian opposition. For reasons that are unclear Saakadze turned
against “Abbās and led a rebellion of nobles in 1623. He invited the exiled
Teimuraz/Tahmūrath to return home and proclaimed him king of Kartli and
Kakheti. But in 1624, “Abbās won a decisive victory against the rebels on
Marabda Field near Tbilisi
(Eskandar Beg, pp. 1024-28, tr. Savory, pp. 1245-49; Dumbadze, IV, pp.
255-87). He also used the rivalry between Saakadze and Teimuraz to divide the
Georgians and drive the former into exile in Istanbul, where in 1629 he was executed
(Dumbadze, IV, pp. 1284-85).
“Abbās's measures in
Kartli and Kakheti represented a continuation of his predecessors' efforts to
integrate eastern Georgia
fully into the Safavid empire. Besides war, he institutionalized the practice
begun by Tahmāsb of employing Georgians as qūllar or gholāmān-e
khāssa-ye arīfa in the Persian army and civil administration. They were
obliged to become Muslims, but the majority of such conversions were entered
into without conviction. After a period of training they were assigned either
to the special regiments of the army or to a branch of the royal household
administration. Estimates vary as to the size of the military forces composed
of Georgian "slaves." One source indicates that in 1588 “Abbās had
formed his bodyguard from 12,000 of them taken into his service. Another
source in 1608 puts the number of Georgian cavalry guards at 25,000 (Lang,
1952, p. 525). In any case, the Georgians were renowned throughout Persia as fierce
warriors. Both Tahmāsb and “Abbās were pursuing a policy to strengthen the
"third force" in Safavid society and thus diminish the power of the
qezelbā, whose loyalty had become suspect.
The contributions
which the gholāms made to the Safavids were substantial. Many
of “Abbās's gholāms were the descendants of those Georgians who had
been brought to Persia
by Tahmāsb. Still other Georgians, nobles and princes among them, entered
Persian service voluntarily, and a significant number achieved high office.
Two outstanding examples were Allāhverdī Khan (d. 1022/1613), who rose to be
governor of Fārs province and commander-in-chief of all Persian forces (sepahsālār-e
Īrān), and his son, Emāmqolī Khan (qq.v.). Other Georgians became
prefects (dārūgha) of Isfahan.
But the majority of the Georgians were settled in widely scattered parts of Persia
and became cultivators of the soil. The most important of these Georgian
colonies was in Farīdan (q.v.) in Isfahan
province, where their descendants still speak Georgian and retain their
Christian faith (Oberling, pp. 128-33; Sharashenidze).
During the remaining
century of Safavid predominance in Georgia after the death of “Abbās
in 1629 Persian influence was unprecedented. The kingdom
of Kartli was transformed into a province of Persia and regularly paid tribute and
sent gifts (pīke) to the shah in the form of boys and girls, horses,
and wines (Berdzenishvili, ed., 1973, pp. 252-54). The Georgian economy was
also closely linked to that of Persia, and Georgian literature
was enriched by translations of Persian classics and adaptations of Persian
genres.
Nonetheless, in
contrast to the calamities of Shah “Abbās's reign, eastern Georgia
experienced a period of relative peace and prosperity under an enlightened
and able viceroy, Khosrow Mīrzā, the son of Dāwūd Khan and a Muslim. As a
reward for aiding Sām Mīrzā gain the throne as Shah Safī (1038-52/1629-42)
the shah granted him the title Rostam Khan and in 1632 appointed him wālī
of Kartli, a post he held until 1658 (Bagrationi, pp. 63-68). His willingness
to cooperate with his suzerains won for Kartli a large measure of autonomy,
but Kakheti, the center of unyielding resistance to the Safavids, was brought
directly under Persian rule.
Kakheti knew little
of peace and prosperity during this period, as nobles and the populace
rallied around the exiled Teimuraz in the hope of ending their subjection to
Muslims. Teimuraz himself was intent upon uniting all of eastern Georgia under
his rule and sought help from the Ottomans and the Russians. But when he
contested Rostam Khan's administration in Kartli in 1634, neither of his
presumed allies moved to support him. At the behest of Shah “Abbās II
(1642-66) Rostam invaded Kakheti in 1648 and, driving Teimuraz into exile
again, was named ruler of Kakheti (1648-56; Berdzenishvili et al., I, pp.
368-69). In order to end resistance in Kakheti once and for all, the shah
revived “Abbās I's plan to populate the country with Turkmen nomads, a
measure that incited a general uprising of nobles in 1659. Although they
halted the settlement of Turkmens, they failed to shake Persian control of
their country (Berdzenishvili et al., I, pp. 369-72).
Georgian nobles now
grudgingly recognized the need for an accommodation with the Persians. Even Teimuraz
concluded that the prospects for Georgian independence were nil and submitted
to Persia.
But when his grandson Erekle/Ereglī Khan rejected Teimuraz's understanding
with the shah, both men were imprisoned. Teimuraz died in captivity in 1663.
The Persian-appointed
kings of Kartli never completely abandoned the idea of independence. Vakhtang
V (1659-75), āhnavāz II to the Persians, tried to reestablish a united kingdom in eastern Georgia by
placing his son, Archil II, on the throne of Kakheti (Brosset, II/1, pp.
74-78; Asatiani, pp. 115-26). Although Archil converted to Islam and assumed
the title āhnazar Khan (1664-75), factions at the Persian court thwarted
Vakhtang's master plan (Bagrationi, p. 159).
Giorgi XI (1678-88)
tried to achieve the unity his father, Vakhtang, had sought, but the shah
discovered his plans and forced him into exile (for Georgian-Iranian
relations between 1675 and 1725, see Tabagua, pp. 12-41). But Giorgi/Gorgīn
Khan, too, eventually reconciled himself to Persian suzerainty and in 1696
agreed to terms with the new shah, Soltān Hosayn (1105-35/1694-1722). It was
the beginning of an illustrious but, ultimately, tragic career in the service
of the Safavids. The shah entrusted him with restoring order along the
eastern frontiers of the empire. As beglarbegī of Kermān, Giorgi,
aided by his brother Levan, by 1700 had reestablished the shah's fiat in the
region. As a reward the shah made Levan dīv@ānbegī (q.v.) of Persia and his son, Kaikhosro/Khosrow Khan, dārūgha
(see CITIES iii) of Isfahan.
The shah appointed Giorgi commander-in-chief (sepahsālār) of his
armies and dispatched him to the east once again, this time to relieve the
garrison at Qandahār, which was under siege by Afghan rebels. The shah also
designated him wālī of Kartli, but, while he was in the field, he
entrusted the administration of the country to a nephew, the future Vakhtang
VI. Giorgi was victorious at Qandahār in 1704, but the leaders of the
anti-Georgian faction at the shah's court had him assassinated in 1709. A
punitive expedition to the Afghan border led by Kaikhosro in 1711 ended
disastrously with his death and the destruction of nearly his entire force of
30,000 (Lang, 1952, pp. 530-34; for a contemporary account of the
Georgian-led campaigns between 1700 and 1711, see the chronicle of Sekhnia
Chkheidze in Brosset, II/2, pp. 16-31).
For much of the 18th
century Persia
generally maintained its position in Georgian affairs, but the viceroys
asserted their independence whenever the opportunity arose. They looked for
support to Russia, which
now supplanted the Ottomans as Persia's
chief rival in the Caucasus.
Vakhtang VI, wālī
of Kartli (1711-14, 1719-23), at first opposed Persian predominance and was
forced to give up his throne. But in 1716, convinced that no foreign aid
would be forthcoming, he accepted Islam. After serving the shah as sepahsālār
of Persia and beglarbegī
of Azerbaijan,
he became wālī of Kartli again in 1719. But his true allegiance was to
Georgia, and he made no
secret of his pro-Russian and pro-Christian sentiments to Russian envoys in Persia
(Butkov, pp. 16, 51). When Persia
was attacked by the Afghans in 1722 and the Ottomans in 1723, he sided with
the Russians (Paichadze, 1970, pp. 35-59). He hoped that Peter the Great
would not only seek gains for Russia,
but would also protect Georgia
from both Persians and Turks (Paichadze, 1965, pp. 26-35). But the tsar cut
short his Caucasus campaign, and Vakhtang had to flee to Russia, where he died in 1737.
Under the vigorous
Nāder Shah Afār (1148-60/1736-47), Persia
reasserted itself in the Caucasus. In 1734
and 1735 he drove the Ottomans out of eastern Georgia, confirmed Teimuraz II
(1729-44) as wālī of Kakheti, and appointed a Persian as governor of
Kartli. His forces pillaged the country and deported thousands of villagers
to Persia
(Brossert, II/2, pp. 49-50). When the Georgian nobles revolted, Teimuraz and
his son Erekle, who had fought with Nāder Shah's armies in India in
1737-40, aided the Persians in defeating the rebels. For services rendered,
Nāder Shah awarded Kartli to Teimuraz (1744-62) and Kakheti to his son,
Erekle II (1744-62; Bagrationi, pp. 177-82). Yet, Nāder Shah continued his
despotic ways, relentlessly draining both countries of their resources
(Brosset, II/2, pp. 114-19).
Nāder Shah's
assassination in 1747 promised a measure of relief. The new ruler, “Ādel Shah
(1160-61 /1747-48, q.v.), who had married one of Teimuraz's daughters, sought
Georgian help in consolidating his rule over all of Persia (Brosset, pp.
118-25). Both Teimuraz and Erekle used the opportunity to assert their
independence. When Teimuraz died in 1762 Erekle succeeded him, thus uniting
eastern Georgia
as a single state for the first time in nearly three centuries.
Under Erekle II
(1762-98) the independence of Kartli-Kakheti remained precarious, and he
reluctantly decided to seek Russian protection. His policy coincided with
Catherine II's renewed interest in Georgia, and in 1783 the two
monarchs signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, which made Kartli-Kakheti a Russian
protectorate (Tsagareli, pp. iii-x, 32-36; Paichadze, 1983, pp. 91-137). It
also marked the beginning of the end of Persia's
pretensions to political dominance over Georgia.
The founder of the
Qajar dynasty, Āghā Mohammad Khan (1193-1212/1779-97, q.v.) was determined to
recover those provinces that had once formed part of the Safavid empire. Georgia was
the special object of his ambitions. Erekle (Ereglī Khan) refused to become a
mere wālī of Kartli-Kakheti and reaffirmed his attachment to Russia. Āghā Mohammad
responded by attacking the country, capturing Tbilisi in September 1795 and
deporting some 15,000 of its inhabitants to Persia as slaves (Hedāyat, Rawzµat
al-safā IX, pp. 269-71; Tsagareli, II/2, pp. 107-24; Hambly, pp. 126-30).
His assassination in 1797 ended plans for a second expedition into Georgia.
Fath-“Alī Shah
(1212-50/1797-1834), Āghā Muhammad's successor, pursued a similar policy
toward Georgia.
In 1798 he demanded the unconditional submission of Erekle's son and
successor, Giorgi XII (1798-1800; Tsagareli, II/2, pp. 181-82). Giorgi
refused, and Russia's
firm support caused Persian armies to remain in place (Dubrovina, pp.
116-21).
The end of Georgian
independence, nonetheless, was at hand. When Giorgi died in December 1800,
Tsar Paul took advantage of the interregnum to proclaim the incorporation of
Kartli and Kakheti into the Russian Empire in January 1801. War with Persia, which
broke out in 1804, ended in 1813 with the Treaty of Golestān. Under its terms
Persia gave up all claims
to Kartli and Kakheti in favor of Russia, thereby effectively
ending her centuries-long involvement in Georgian political affairs.
Although Russia and Persia
were at peace, Fath-“Alī Shah had not given up hope of reclaiming Georgia.
War between the two countries broke out again in 1826, and Russia's success on the battlefield and the
Treaty of Torkamānchāy in 1828 confirmed her control of Georgia
(Shengelia, pp. 55-72). The treaty also set the tone of Russo-Iranian
relations down to World War I and made manifest Persia's
inability to challenge Russia's
supremacy in Georgia and
the Caucasus.
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