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pp. 72-74
Thereafter, on behalf of the Armenian National
Council, Khachatur Karjikian, Gevorg Khatisian, and General Gabriel Korganian
met with a special Georgian committee charged with defining the exact
boundaries of the Republic
of Georgia. During that
conference the international Menshevik leader, Iraklii Tsereteli, stunned the
Armenians by outlining the Georgian case for sovereignty over every uezd of
the Tiflis guberniia, together with the Pambak uchastok of the Erevan guberniia. The more Armenian-populated territory
included within Georgia,
he argued, the safer the inhabitants would be. The Armenians would at least
be spared the viciousness of the Turk, and they would reinforce the Christian
element in Georgia
as a bulwark against the Muslims. Vehemently protesting the new Menshevik
tactic the Armenian representatives persuaded the Georgian committee to
reconsider the issue and to resume the discussions in a few days. But before
the two sides met again, Georgian newspapers carried the official announcement
that the Tiflis guberniia was in its entirety an integral unit of the Republic of Georgia. (14)
The Menshevik reversal could logically be defended. Georgian acceptance of
the ethnic principle in Lori and Akhalkalak had come at a time when all Transcaucasia had been combined into an extensive
region (Arai) of the Russian Empire. With the establishment of independent
republics, however, circumstances had changed radically. The Republic of Georgia deemed possession of
Akhalkalak and Lori essential. Historic, geographic, cultural, and economic
considerations now overshadowed the ethnic principle. Georgian kingdoms had
encompassed both districts, which together constituted a natural defensive
boundary. These highlands also provided lush summer pastures for herdsmen of
the plains to the north and, combined with those plains, formed an economic
unit bound to Tiflis, not to Erevan.(15) Furthermore, the Mensheviks now flaunted a
document long since uncovered by Georgian nationalists, the Russo-Georgian
treaty of 1783. This compact not only had placed the realms of King Iraklii
II under the protection of Empress Catherine II but also had provided that,
should the remaining historic Georgian territories subsequently be liberated
from Muslim overlords, they too would be added to the domains of Iraklii or
his successors. The Republic
of Georgia, as heir to
the Georgian kingdoms, thus staked its claim to Akhalkalak and Lori. (16)
The pretensions of Armenia
rested on equally logical foundations. Ethnically, Lori and Akhalkalak were
indisputably Armenian. Geographically, they formed an extension of the Erevan guberniia and contrasted with the Georgian
lowlands to the north. Strategically, they afforded a natural, easily
defended frontier that in the hands of any other power would thrust
menacingly toward the heart of Armenia. Economically, these
highlands were rich in pastures, forests, and mineral resources, which were
vital to Armenia,
a land otherwise exceedingly limited in natural wealth. (17)
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1918, despite
the seriousness of the controversy, neither Armenia
nor Georgia
could enforce her claims. Southern Lori and all Akhalkalak remained under
Turkish domination; the two republics did not even share a common frontier.
Moreover, the Armenians of northern Lori enjoyed greater security under
German protection than did their compatriots south of the Kamenka, where
Turkish violence and pillage were rampant. The cardinal complaint of the Lori
Armenians during this time arose from attempts to induct the village youth
into the Georgian army. On three separate occasions Arshak Djamalian, the
Armenian charge d'affaires in Tiflis,
protested this infringement and reminded Georgian officials of their pledge
that the occupation of Lori would not be permanent. He insisted that Georgia had no right to recruit men in
"an integral part of the Republic
of Armenia." (18)
The Armenian Maneuver in Lori
In
October, 1918, Turkish regiments withdrew from Pambak and southern Lori, thus
eliminating the corridor between Georgia
and Armenia.
General Halil Pasha apparently kept Armenian military authorities better
informed of the evacuation timetable than he did Georgian officials, and on
October 18 Armenian companies attached to Dro's headquarters at Dilijan
rapidly occupied southern Lori from Shahali station, on the border of the Erevan guberniia to the Kamenka river. (19)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
(14) Denikin, Ocherki smuty,
III (1924), 51-52; Armiano-gruzinskii
honflikt, p. 11; Iz arm-gruz
otnoshenii, pp. 10-11; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16 and File 65/1;
D. Enukidze, Krakh imperialisticheskoi
interventsii v Zakavkaz'e (Tbilisi, 1954), pp. 119-120.
(15) Iz arm-gruz otnoshenii, p. 10;
Britain,
FO 371/4940, 5325/1/58; Djamalian, "Haivratsakan knjire" (April,
1928), pp, 92-93
(16) For the text of the treaty of 1783, see Traits conclu en 1783 entre Catherine II, imperatrice de Russie, et
Irakly II, roi de Georgie (Geneva,
1919).
(17) Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 107/6, "La Republique armenienne et ses
voisins"; Abeghian, "Mer harevannere" (Dec., 1928), pp.
120-122, and (Jan., 1929), pp. 129-131; Shakhatuni, op. cit., pp. 16-62, 175-180 passim.
(18) Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 65/1,
Communiques of July 27, Aug. 23, and Sept. 28, 1918, and File 74/1, Djamalian
to Aharonian, Sept. 28, 1918.
(19) Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun,
pp. 171-172. As early as September, 1918, Halil Pasha gave assurances that Armenia would
receive Pambak and Lori. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 74/1, Report of
Sept. 21, 1918; also Lepsius Deutschland
und Armenien, p. 432.
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