The Rebirth of Poland
By Anna M. Cienciala
I. THE POLES IN WORLD WAR I.
were three main political groups:
A.The National Democrats led by Roman Dmowski; B. Jozef
Pilsudski and his supporters; C. Polish leaders in Austrian
Dmowski and the National Democrats
at first lined up with Russia,
the ally of France and Britain. They
hoped for the union of all Polish lands under the Russian Crown as a first step
to later independence (just as Prince Adam Czartoryski
had done during the Napoleonic Wars). However, the Imperial Russian Government made only vague promises and in 1915, when
Russian military weakness was clear, Dmowski went to Western Europe.
August 1917, the Polish National Committee (Polski
Komitet Narodowy - PKN),
made up of National Democrats, was formed in Lausanne,
Switzerland, and soon moved
to Paris. It
was not recognized by the Entente Powers as representing Poland until
the late fall of 1917, because they did not want to alienate first, Imperial
Russia, and then the Russian Provisional Government (March - November 1917).
When the Bolsheviks seized power there in early November 1917, the Powers
recognized the PKN as representing Poland
and leading the Polish army in France.
Meanwhile, in January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson announced the
famous 14 points as a basis for peace negotiations. Point 13 proposed an independent Poland with an
"indisputably" Polish population. This qualification was designed to
calm both German and Russian fears about losing too much territory to Poland. The
Bolsheviks were negotiating peace with the Central Powers, and the Western
powers wanted to prevent this to keep Russia in the war, while the Germans were
to be encouraged to negotiate peace without fear of losing too much of their
Polish territory. Poland
was also to have free access to the sea [Baltic]. However, the American
ambassador explained to the German government in Berlin that this access could be secured by
an internationalized railway. The Poles wanted to have Danzig [Gdansk]
the port city of old Poland,
and the only port that could be used by an independent Poland, at
least for a while.
PKN succeeded in raising a small Polish army in France, recruited from Polish
Americans and volunteers from Poles living in France, mostly coal miners. At
the end of 1918, the “Blue Army,” so named after the blue French uniforms it
wore, was commanded by General Jozef Haller
and formed the military arm of the PKN. (It was to
reach Poland in spring 1919 in time to take part in the Polish-Ukrainian war in
[pictures from Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory,
Meanwhile, in 1914, Jozef Pilsudski formed
Polish Legions in the Austro-Hungarian Army to fight Russia. However, he
secretly informed the British government in the fall of 1914, that his Legions
would never fight against France
and Britain - only against Russia.
first incursion into former Russian Poland in August 1914 was the town of Kielce. The legionnaires
failed to spark the national uprising against Russia that he hoped for.
This was because most educated Poles there sympathized with the National Democrats
and distrusted Germany,
while the peasants also distrusted the Germans. Furthermore, the German army
brutally bombarded the town of Kielce
just before the Pilsudski soldiers reached it, so they were at first tarred
with the German brush.
The charge of legionnaires at Russian positions [picture by Wojciech Kossak]
aimed to use his legions as leverage to obtain Polish independence from the
Central Powers. On Nov. 5, 1916, they promised a Polish Kingdom after the
war, but could not agree among themselves on its boundaries. Meanwhile, the
Germans occupied Warsaw
and allowed a Polish State Council, also Polish education and law
courts. Pilsudski agreed to serve as Head of the Military Department, but he
opposed the German aim of recruiting a large Polish army. Instead, he organized
a secret, underground military organization in German-occupied Poland - and later in Ukraine as well - to give military
training to Poles in order to form a Polish army later; this was the Polish
Military Organization (Polska Organizacja
Wojskowa - P.O.W).
Pilsudski and his officers, 1915
(from: Jan Z. E. Berek i Mieczyslaw Paszkiewicz,
eds., Droga Zycia
the Russian Revolution of February (New Style
March) 1917, Pilsudski began to think of withdrawing his support from the
Central Powers. In July 1917, he and the officers of the First Brigade refused
to swear loyalty in arms with the German and Austrian forces. This led to
Pilsudski’s arrest and internment in Germany together with his second in
command, Kazimierz Sosnkowski,
and the transfer of his officers to other units of the Austro-Hungarian Army.
In Sept. 1917, the Germans established a Regency Council in Warsaw -
their answer to the Russian Provisional Govt. recognition of Polish
independence in March 1917. When defeat stared the Germans in the face,
Pilsudski and Sonskowski were released by the new
German Social Democratic government formed in Berlin
on Nov. 9, 1918, which gave them a special train to proceed to Warsaw,
where they arrived on November 10, 1918.(The Germans
assumed from various statements Pilsudski had made that he would be friendly to
Pilsudski released by the Germans (from: Droga Zycia Jozefa Pilsudskiego.)
was welcomed in Warsaw
as a national hero. The Regency Council transferred power to him. He
became “Head of State” (pending elections to a Constituent Assembly which was
to elect the President), and also Commander-in-Chief. He negotiated with the
German garrison to leave Warsaw and proclaimed an independent Polish
state on November 16, 1918. He also negotiated the free passage of
German troops from the eastern front through Poland
The Provisional People's Government of the Republic
of Poland, formed in Lublin, bowed to Pilsudski, who set about
forming a new government. It was predominantly Socialist and immediately
introduced many reforms long proclaimed as necessary by the Polish Socialist
Party (e.g. the 8 hour day, free school education, vote for women). This was
absolutely necessary to avoid major unrest, but Pilsudski told Polish
Socialists that he "got off the Socialist
street car at the stop called Independence." He believed that as head
of state he must be above political parties. At the same time, he set about
organizing a Polish army out of Polish veterans of the German, Russian and
Austrian Polish leaders did not have anyone comparable
to Dmowski or Pilsudski. Their “Supreme National
Committee” had supported Pilsudski and his legions, but unlike him they supported
the “Austrian solution,” that is, the union of Austrian and Russian Poland into
a Crownland within the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Since
A-H was the ally of Germany, they did not demand union with Prussian Poland).
One adherent of this view was Wladyslaw Sikorski (pron: Vladeeeslaf Seekorskee), who led
another Polish legion in the A-H Army. (He was to become
Polish Premier in early 1920s, then again Premier of the Polish
govt.- in- exile and Commander-in-Chief of Polish Armed Forces in the West in World
War II). The Austrian solution collapsed with Austria-Hungary. Poles began to
disarm Austrian soldiers in Galicia
in November 1918, just as they disarmed Germans in Warsaw at this time.
first Polish government and Pilsudski were both distrusted in the West because
Pilsudski had cooperated with the Central Powers in 1914-17 and because he had
supported the formation of a Socialist government. It was not until January
1919, when the great pianist Ignacy Paderewski became
Premier (also Foreign Minister) of a new government, that it was recognized in
the West. (Paderewski had arrived in Danzig on a British warship, then went to Poznan.
His presence there in late December 1918 sparked German attacks and Polish
resistance, which developed into a Polish uprising against the Germans in
II. POLAND AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE,
JANUARY 12-JUNE 28, 1919,AND THE DECISIONS ON THE
Click on thebelow
map for better resolution
[Map reproduced in: F.W. Putzgers, HISTORISCHE SCHULATLAS, Leipzig, 1929, facing p.120].
A. Polish Demands:
Polish Delegation, mostly National Democratic members of the Polish National
Committee in Paris,
plus a few representatives of Pilsudski who were added in February, demanded
the following territories in the West:
(i) Prussian Poland [Duchy of Posen/Poznan];
Pomorze, that is, Polish Pomerania [called by the
Germans the "Polish Corridor" because it separated East
Prussia from Germany
(iv) Upper Silesia east of the Oder River.
these demands were justified on ethnic grounds, for these territories were
preponderantly Polish. However, the P. Delegation also demanded
Danzig [Polish: Gdansk]
as the only port that could serve Polish needs. Danzig was predominantly
German, but had governed itself and served as Poland’s port from 1466 to 1793.
Napoleon made it a Free City. Afterwards, it became a Prussian garrison town
and fishing port. In the 19th century, it was overshadowed by the German ports
of Stettin, Bremen,
though it revived to some extent in 1900-18 with the building of passenger
ships and then warships in WW1.
In the East (today’s W. Ukraine, W. Belorussia, Lithuania), the P. Delegation
demanded territories with sizable Polish minorities and good defense borders
along the rivers. However, Dmowski and Pilsudski had
very different goals here:
Dmowski wanted a frontier approximating the one that
existed between 1772 and 1793 (between the lst and
2nd Partitions of Poland) on lands where the upper class was mostly Polish. He
assumed that the polonization of other nationalities
wanted a Polish federation with Lithuania
and Belorussia and a Polish
alliance with an independent Ukraine.
Such an arrangement would both weaken Russia and, he believed, satisfy
the national aspirations of the Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples.
Paris Peace Conference could not establish the eastern frontier of Poland because Russia
was in the midst of a Civil War (summer 1918 - early 1921), and therefore could
not be represented in Paris
by an agreed Russian delegation. However, allied statesmen did consult
"white" (anti-Bolshevik) Russian emigre
politicians on the future western borders of Russia. These politicians routinely
demanded that Russia keep
the Baltic Provinces
and old eastern Poland, that is, western Belorussia,
Volhynia and East Galicia (western Ukraine); the latter was conquered
and briefly held by the Russians in WW I.
B. Allied Views on the size and borders of Poland.
France wanted a large Poland as an ally against Germany, but did not want to alienate a future
friendly, non-Bolshevik Russia,
which was expected to emerge out of the Civil War, and which France hoped to
have as an ally again. Therefore, French statesmen wanted Poland to gain as much territory as possible
from Germany, but with an
eastern frontier not very different from Congress Poland, (1815-30).
Britain opposed a
Br. statesmen wanted to minimize German losses so as
to facilitate reconciliation with Germany,
and they opposed Polish demands in the east in order to keep open the
possibility of good relations with a future, non-Bolshevik Russia, seen as a major market for
The United States.
In 1917-18, President Woodrow Wilson had envisaged an ethnic Poland, so as not to alienate Germany and Russia. However, in January - March
1919, the U.S. Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference came to support most
Polish demands in both East and West. They did so out of fear of Bolshevik
Russia and to prevent future German domination
the Russian Civil War the allies
supported the Whites against the Reds, and the Whites would at most tolerate
either within the Russian Empire or bound to it by an alliance. (The Provisional Government, 1917, in recognizing Polish
independence, had left border settlement for later and envisaged a mandatory
alliance). Therefore, Western statesmen were unwilling to alienate the
White Russians by supporting Polish claims in the east.
any case, the Paris Peace Conference was chiefly concerned with working
out a peace treaty with Germany.
With regard to Poland, the
key dispute among Western statesmen was over Danzig and Polish Pomerania [Polish:
Pomorze, pron. Pohmorzhe];
the German name, later accepted in the West, was the "Polish
Corridor"]. The Poles claimed Pomorze
on grounds of self-determination, and Danzig as the natural seaport for Poland. They
wanted the city to be part of the Polish state, but with its own elected
administration and guarantees of [German] cultural freedom. The French
government wanted the city and the Corridor to go to Poland,
while the British government and most of the British delegation wanted them to
stay in Germany.
President Wilson stood on the principle of self-determination, so he
wanted the Corrridor to go to Poland and Danzig to stay with Germany, though most American and even some
British delegates thought Danzig should go to Poland for economic reasons.
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1863-1945, Prime Minister 1916-22),
definitely favored leaving both areas in Germany,
but wanted to do it in a way acceptable to France and the U.S. He asked a
Foreign Office expert on Germany,
the historian W. James Headlam-Morley, to work
out a compromise. Headlam-Morley suggested making
Danzig a Free City - as it had been in the past - with special economic
rights for Poland.
Headlam-Morley worked out the project with a key
American adviser to Woodrow Wilson, Dr. Sidney E. Mezes.
Woodrow Wilson accepted the project because the city was to be under the
protection of the League of Nations, and the
League was his pet project. Also, he did not want to give the Italian-populated
city of Fiume, with its South Slav hinterland, to the Italians, so he
thought the Free City of Danzig would be a precedent for a Free City of
the Danzig Articles of the Versailles Treaty (100-108) stipulated it would be a
Free City with its own constitution and administration, while Poland was to
have free use of the port and other economic rights, also rights for the Polish
minority. The City was to be under the protection of the League
of Nations - though this body was still on the drawing boards.
Pomorze or the "Corridor" with its
predominantly Polish population, was to go to Poland.
Most British statesmen, aware of German resentment at the separation of East Prussia from Germany,
looked on the Danzig-Pomorze compromise as a
temporary arrangement, expecting a revision in Germany’s favor within 10 years or
southern East Prussia,
where the people were mostly Polish-speaking, the Peace Conference mandated a
In Upper Silesia, most of the people east of the Oder river
spoke Polish, and President Wilson thought it should go to Poland
on the basis of self-determination. However, Lloyd George forced through
a decision to hold a plebiscite there,
threatening that otherwise Britain
would not be willing to enforce the treaty. He did so because of loud
German protests that without this coal and steel region Germany would
not be able to pay reparations.
The city and region of Poznan (Posen) was to go to Poland because it was
(For population figures in Prussian Poland and Upper
Silesia, see the tables from Richard Blanke's
book, Orphans of Versailles, below).
was a Polish uprising against the Germans in Prussian Poland which led to
severe fighting in late 1918 - early 1919, and Polish success. The German High
Command gave up plans to send in the army when the French threatened to invade Germany in the
NOTE: In April 1919, the German Cabinet
decided not to request plebiscites in the Polish Corridor, Prussian Poland and Upper Silesia
for fear of losing the vote. However, later German governments accused
the western powers of injustice in not holding plebiscites in all the
territories lost by Germany.
(German and Polish population figures for former Prussian Poland are given
[ Population of Western Poland, from: Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles. The Germans in Western Poland
III. WORKING OUT THE POLISH-GERMAN SETTLEMENT.
A. Danzig [Gdansk]: The British and French governments agreed that
Br. troops were to form the majority of the garrison
in Danzig, as part of the Br. occcupation force in East Prussia pending the
plebiscite there. Also, the First High Commissioner of the League of Nations in
Danzig was to be British. This last
arrangement was made in a secret deal concluded by British Prime Minister David
Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clemenceau in July
1919: there was to be a Br. High Commissioner in Danzig and a
French chairman of the League Governing Commission in the Saar, whose
coal production France needed to offset the mines destroyed by the Germans in
the war. There would also be a French High Commissioner in Memel (Lith.
name: Klaipeda), the predominantly German port
city of Lithuania.
The British were interested at this time in using Danzig as a possible base for
sending supplies to their troops in Russia
(Civil War), also as a future way station for trade with Russia.
Finally, they did not want Danzig to fall into Polish hands, believing that
after a while the city should return to Germany.
Danzig became a Free City in January 1920, when Germany ratified the Versailles
Treaty. As it turned out, the city owed its
livelihood to Polish trade going through the port, but Germany exercised predominant
influence in it for most of the inter-war period. Berlin subsidized the administration and
police, paid the old age pensions, and encouraged Germans to settle there. The
Nazis narrowly won the municipal elections in 1935. In September 1939, alleged
Polish rejection of Hitler’s last minute official demand for the city and a
German corridor through the Polish Corridor, became
his pretext for attacking Poland.
(See Lec. Notes
some pictures of Gdansk,
as restored after the devastation of the war, see below)
(Pan Dragon Advertising Co., 1997, with one
photo by A.M. Cienciala)
B. East Prussia:
A plebiscite was
held in the majority Polish speaking south in July 1920. This was a bad time
for Poland because the Red
Army was advancing on Warsaw, which was expected
the Poles of E.Prussia had been separated from Poland for centuries and most were Lutherans,
while most Poles in Poland
The German authorities promised East Prussian Poles (Masurians)their own schools, newspapers, and of course old age
pensions, if they voted for Germany.
in Upper Sileisa, German "outvoters"
were brought in to vote from Germany.
(The Versailles Treaty stipulated that people born in a plebiscite region but no
longer living there, could return to vote; they were called "outvoters"). The combination of various factors,
religion, fear of Soviet invasion, German schools, led to a majority vote for Germany.
Despite German promises, the Poles’ cultural rights were not respected, and
most of them continued to be germanized.
[On the Polish Masurians and their German allegiance,
see Richard Blanke, Polish-Speaking Germans?
Language and National Identity among the Masurians
since 1871, Cologne,
C. Upper Silesia: Silesia had belonged to Poland in early
medieval times, but passed to the Kings of Bohemia in the 14th
century, then to the Austrian Habsburgs. Frederick
the Great of Prussia seized Upper Silesia from Maria Theresa of Austria in 1740, after which it was part of Prussia.
The area East of the Oder
river was preponderantly Polish-speaking, but most Poles were either peasants or
workmen. Many spoke a dialect akin to Polish; some felt they were Poles, and
some felt they were Silesians.
At the same time, the vast majority of the landowners, businessmen, factory
owners, local government, police and Catholic clergy were German. However,
almost all the higher German officials were Protestant while the vast majority
of Silesians were Catholic.
German census of 1900 recorded 65% of the population as Polish speaking, but
the census of 1910 recorded 57%. This was due to the introduction of the
category of "bilingual" inhabitants, which
reduced the official number of Polish-speaking Silesians, though some
of the latter spoke both German and Polish while the Germans spoke only
German. In fact, according to a language map drawn up by German Professor Paul
Weber, in most Upper Silesian districts east of the Oder
river Polish-speaking Silesians made up over 70% of
the population in 1910. [See also census figures in Blanke,
[Maps reproduced in: Robert Machray, THE PROBLEM OF UPPER SILESIA, London, 1945, facing
Versailles Treaty mandated a plebiscite within two years in the whole of Silesia, although the Polish government only wanted one
East of the Oder. Meanwhile, the German
administration and police were left in place. Poland
used the intervening period for intensive propaganda. The Germans told the
workers that they would lose their jobs and old age pensions if they voted for Poland.
Furthermore, troops of the German "Freikorps"
(Free Corps), made up of veterans of the former German army, terrorized those
Silesians who favored voting for Poland. Polish propaganda stressed
that if Poland won the
plebiscite, Silesian Poles would no longer be oppressed or treated as second
class citizens as they were in Germany,
and they would not lose their old age pensions.
In August 1919, the Silesian Poles revolted, demanding that the
police and local government authorities be both German and Polish.
In February 1920, an Allied Plebiscite Commission arrived in Upper Silesia, made up of British, French, and
Italian forces, but it was too small to maintain order. In any case, the
British and Italians favored the Germans, while the French favored the Poles.
August 1920, German rumors of a Polish defeat by the Red Army led to
German attacks on Poles, and sparked a second Polish uprising.
Finally, the plebiscite took place on March 20, 1921. The result
appeared to be a smashing victory for Germany:
Total German vote
" Polish "
was the vote cast in the whole of Upper Silesia; Blanke
gives the vote only in the part that was awarded to Poland, that is, Polish Upper
German outvoters brought in from Germany numbered
179,910. If we deduct them from the German total, it is reduced to 527,000.
Silesian born Poles working in the Ruhr were
not allowed by their German employers to go and vote. There were 10,000 Polish outvoters from Poland, so the real totals were 527,695 German resident votes and 469,359 Polish
resident votes, or a German majority of 58,336 instead of 228,246. The Polish
majority would have been much larger if the Silesian Poles working in the Ruhr
had been allowed to vote, or if the plebiscite had been held only East of the Oder river. However, it was held in all of Upper Silesia, including the preponderantly German
speaking areas West of the river.*
Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War,
2 vols. Washington, D.C., 1933, background and detailed figures, vol. I, pp. 209 ff. For a breakdown of the population figures and
votes in Polish Upper Silesia (the part East of Oder River awared
to Poland in Oct.1921), by
county, see: The Population in Western Poland
in Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles,
above. The German vote figures for the plebiscite of March1921,
are higher than the German population figures in the Prussian Census of 1910
due to German Outvoters].
British and French governments disagreed on the interpretation of the
plebiscite. The main bone of contention was the "Industrial
Triangle," that is the coal and steel producing district east of the
Oder river bounded by the cities of Beuthen
(Bytom), Gleiwitz (Gliwice) and Kattowitz
(Katowice). The French wanted it to go to Poland,
to give the latter an industrial base and weaken Germany;
the British, supported by the Italians, wanted it to stay in Germany because the Germans claimed they could
not pay war reparations without Upper Silesia.
(Some British politicians also bought shares in German coal mines and steel
mills at very low prices). However, the German need for Upper
Silesia was not as great as it appeared at the time. Before 1914,
50% of the coal and industrial production of the region had been exported
abroad, mostly to Russian Poland. Indeed, during the war, German industrialists
had proposed German annexation of Russian Poland to secure it as a market for
Upper Silesian coal and industry.
late April 1921, rumors flew that the British and Italians would prevail over
the French, so Upper Silesia would stay in Germany. This led to theThird Polish Uprising in May-July 1921.
The Silesian Poles - aided by some Polish officers and arms supplies- occupied most of the region east of the Oder river. The French and British still could not agree,
so Lloyd George proposed to French Premier Clemenceau that the
issue be decided by the League of Nations, expecting it to award the Industrial
Triangle to Germany.
Clemenceau agreed, hoping for the best. As it turned out, the League
appointed its own commission of inquiry which gathered its own data,
interviewed Poles and Germans from the region, and made its decision on the
basis of self-determination. On this basis, in October 1921, the League of
Nations awarded most of eastern Upper Silesia, including the Industrial
Triangle to Poland, to
the great dismay of both Germany
Neverthtless, about half a million Poles were left in
German Silesia, most of them in Oppeln [Opole].
German and Polish historians today emphasize the "small fatherland"
or regional ethnic indentity,and
claim that most Silesians did not feel German or Polish, but Silesian. However,
this fails to explain why the "Freikorps"
terrorized Polish Silesians so they would not vote for Poland, and why so many
of them joined the Third Polish Silesian Uprising of May-July 1921 to prevent
their land being awarded by the Allies to Germany. Some, no doubt, did have a
regional identity, but it is impossible to prove how many because of the
destruction of documents, newspapers, private correspondence etc. in WW II.
In May 1922, the Upper Silesian or Geneva Convention, was worked out by the League
of Nations to preserve the economic unity of the area. It also
set up a tribunal to arbitrate disputes. Furthermore, since Germany claimed
she could not do without Upper Silesian coal, she was allowed to import 500,000
tons per year at reduced prices. However, when the coal agreement ran out in
1925, Germany refused to
import the coal, and tried to use this as economic pressure to make Poland agree to
a revision of the whole Polish-German frontier. Then Germany
started a tariff war with Poland
with the same intent, but failed to reach her goal.*
the Versailles Treaty decisions on Danzig and Upper Silesia and the working out
of these settlements, see Anna M. Cienciala and Titus
Komarnicki, FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO. Keys to
Polish Foreign Policy 1919-1925, Lawrence,
KS., 1984, ch.2-4. For an exhaustive study of Polish
problems at the Peace Conference see Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen,
The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of
the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918-1919, Odense, Denmark, 1979. The
author is very critical of Polish aims regarding Russia.
more detail on Danzig, see A.Cienciala,
"The Battle for Danzig and the Polish Corridor at the Paris Peace
Conference 1919," in Paul Latawski, ed., THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND 1914-23, Basingstoke, London, 1992, pp. 71-94. For
a view sympathetic to Germany,
see: Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles. The Germans in Western Poland
1918-1939, Lexington, KY.,1993,ch.1. On
the working of the Upper Silesian Convention see: Georges Kaeckenbeck,
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA.
A Study in the Working of the Upper Silesian Settlement, 1922-1937,London,
New York, Toronto, 1942. [The author was the President
of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia in
German propaganda claimed that there would be no lasting peace in Europe
unless Germany recovered Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia, claiming that
all these territories were preponderantly German. This was belied by the Prussian Census of
1910, but hardly anyone bothered to look at it. German propaganda had a
profound impact on English and American opinion, which was unaware of the fact
that only Danzig was preponderantly German.
English sympathy for Germany
fitted the traditional British view that Central Europe
was the natural sphere of German influence, and this in turn was to underpin
the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s.
POLAND AND SOVIET RUSSIA:
THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, THE
POLISH-SOVIET WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER
A. Historical Background. There had been many Polish-Russian wars over
the borderlands, that is Belarus
(formerly Belorussia), Ukraine, and the lands that would later become Lithuania, Latvia
At its greatest extent, in the early 1600s, Poland had included most of these lands, but
gradually retreated as Russia
expanded. Russia acquired some Belorussian and Ukrainian lands in the 17th
century, plus what is today Latvia and Estonia in the early 18th
century, while it acquired the rest of the borderlands as well as most of
ethnic Poland in the Partitions of 1772-95.
From that time on, Russian governments looked on the
borderlands, and especially Russian Poland (which was ethnically Polish), as
vital for Russian security. They pointed to Napoleon’s invasion of 1812
and to WWI, when the German and Austro-Hungarian armies drove the Russians out
by the fall of 1915. General Brusilov's offensive
pushed the Austrians out of East Galicia in summer 1916, but the Russians were
driven out of this region in summer 1917 and the Germans and Austrians occupied
most of the borderlands until the end of WW I.
Russian governments and propaganda claimed the borderlands were ethnically
Russian, because they viewed the Belorussians and
Ukrainians as "little brothers." However, these peoples developed
their own national identities in the course of the 19th century. Furthermore,
there were large Polish minorities in what is today
western Belorussia, western Ukraine and central Ukraine.
to the Polish Census of 1931, Poles made up 5,600,000 of the total population
of eastern Poland which stood at 13,021,000.* In Lithuania, Poles had
majorities in the Vilnius [P. Wilno, Rus. Vilna] and Suwalki areas, as well as significant numbers in and around
numbered 4,303,000; Belorussians 1,693,000; Jews
1,079,100; Russians 125,800; Germans 86,200; Czechs 31,000, see: Marek Tuszynski, "Soviet War
Crimes Against Poland During the Second World War and Its Aftermath. A Review
of the Record and Outstanding Questions," Polish Review, no.3,
1999. The Ukrainians and Belorussians were
undercounted in 1931. Tuszynski notes that by October
1939, there were an additional 1,579,000 Polish citizens in these territories,
not counting 379,000 Polish refugees from the Warsaw district, see note 9 ibid].
(i) The Soviet advance westward. 1918-19.The Soviet
government claimed to support the "self-determination" of all the
non-Russian peoples of the former Russian Empire. However, they meant
self-determination by workers and peasants led by native communists sent in
The Soviet government could not help the communists in Finland, who were too weak to succeed by
themselves, and Moscow failed in a bid to take
over the Baltic States.
in 1918 the Soviets managed to take over most of Ukraine,
driving out the Ukrainian government from Kiev,
and they also set up a "Lithuanian-Belorussian
in early 1919, with its government in Vilnius
[Wilno]. It was run by native communists sent there
by Moscow and
supported by Red Army units. This government made itself very unpopular due to
confiscation of food and goods for the army, as well as terror.
A Polish Communist Workers’ Party was established in Warsaw in late December 1918. It was
made up of the left wing of the Polish Socialist Party and the Social
Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. This new party called
for the overthrow of "bourgeois Poland," and was therefore
C. The Polish-Soviet War.
German troops pulled out of Belorussia
in late 1918 and early 1919, Red Army troops began to seep in. Polish troops
advanced east and clashed with them at Bereza
Kartuska in February 1919. In April, the
Polish army drove the Litbel government out of Wilno/Vilnius, which then had a predominantly
Polish and Jewish population (about 50-50), some Belorussians
and only about 2% Lithuanians.
French and British governments, who supported the Whites in the Russian Civil
War, tried to persuade Pilsudski to go on fighting the Red Army, but to
keep recovered eastern territories "In trust" for Russia. He refused
and proposed that a plebiscite be held in the borderlands under League of Nations auspices, but the western powers
ignored this offer. Therefore, Pilsudski adopted a passive stance toward
the Russian Civil War, not helping either the Whites or Reds, but objectively
helping the Reds because he did not attack them.
In December 1919, the Red Army was clearly winning the Civil War and the Soviet
government sent peace proposals to the Polish government. Pilsudski
rejected negotiations, suspecting the Soviets only wanted a breather before
At this time, the French and British were pulling their troops out of Russia and
wanted to avert a Polish-Soviet war.
8 December 1919, the Allied Supreme Council in Paris proposed a demarcation line
between the Polish and Russian "administrations." This line, which
was specifically stated not to be the frontier, was roughly equivalent
to ethnic Poland, but had two possible variations in East Galicia: one
which left Lwow [Ukr L’viv, Rus. Lvov] then predominantly Polish, and the
neighboring oil fields, on the Russian side (Line A) while the other left them
on the Polish side (line B). Pilsudski ignored this proposal. His goal
was a federation between Poland,
Lithuania and Belorussia, allied with an independent Ukraine.
was to infiltrate the borderlands, set up communist governments there as well
as in Poland, and reach Germany
where he expected a socialist revolution to break out. He also expected
revolutions elsewhere, including Italy,
but the German revolution was most important to him for he believed that Soviet
Russia could not survive without the support of a socialist Germany and the help of its industrial know-how
to modernize Russia.
March 1920, Pilsudski learned from military intelligence
that the Red Army was concentrating in Ukraine. He suspected an attack on Poland and, indeed, published Russian documents
on the Civil War show that such an attack was planned, though its first thrust
was to be into Lithuania.
However, inclement weather postponed the Soviet offensive.
decided on a preventive attack and concluded an alliance with the
Ukrainian leader Semyon Petliura
(1879-1926). He had fought the Bolsheviks in defending Ukrainian independence,
was defeated and fled to Poland
with his remaining troops. The Polish-Ukrainian alliance treaty, signed
April 22 1920, had the goal of establishing an independent Ukraine in alliance with Poland. In
return, Petliura gave up Ukrainian claims to East
Galicia (today western Ukraine),
and was denounced for this by the Ukrainian leaders there. The treaty included
guarantees for the rights of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Ukraine.
At the end of April, the Polish army and Petliura’s
Ukrainian divisions, marched east into Ukraine. They entered Kiev on May 7, and an independent
Ukrainian state was proclaimed there. However, the expected Ukrainian
uprising against the Russians did not take place. Ukraine was ravaged by war; also,
most of the people were illiterate and had not developed their own national
consciousness. Finally, they distrusted the Poles, who had formed a large part
of the landowning class in Ukraine
up to 1918.
June 1920, a Red Army offensive drove out the Poles who retreated westward,
and was approaching Warsaw
in late June. On July 2, the Soviet commander, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937), issued an "Order of
the Day" to his troops calling them to press "onward to Berlin over the corpse of Poland!" A group of Polish
communists headed by Felix Dzerzhynsky
(P. Feliks Dzierzynski),
now head of the Cheka (Soviet Secret
Police), set up a Polish Revolutionary Committee in Bialystok,
It was clearly the embryo of a communist government for Poland.
this situation, the Polish government sent a delegation to Spa, Belgium
- where the French and British prime ministers were meeting to discuss German
reparation - and ask them for help. British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George was furious with the Poles for marching into Ukraine because he was negotiating a trade
agreement with the Bolsheviks in London; also,
he feared a German revolution if the Red Army reached Germany.
Therefore, the British government proposed a demarcation line based on the
Supreme Council Line of December 8, 1919, but this was now called the "Curzon
Line" after British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon (who did not draw it
up). The Poles agreed to negotiate with the Soviets on the basis of this
line - which the British extended without telling them, into East
Galicia, leaving it on the Soviet side - but the Bolshevik
government. sure of victory, refused. Meanwhile,
an Anglo-French diplomatic mission and a military mission was
sent to Poland
as a sign of allied support for her independence. The French General Maxime Weygand (1867-1965) was to take over command of
the Polish army. He arrived with some French officers, including captain Charles
De Gaulle (1890-1970, leader of the Free French in World War II, head of
governments 1945-46, President 1958-69).
Poles were in a very difficult position. Germany
proclaimed neutrality and refused passage to French arms and munitions for Poland. In Czechoslovakia, railway workers refused to let
trains with military supplies go through to Poland.
dock workers sympathized with theBolsheviks, so they
threatened to strike if ordered to load ships for the Poles.
only way French supplies could reach Poland
was through Danzig.[P. Gdansk], but Lloyd George,
who was negotiating a trade treaty with Bolshevik delegates in London,
ordered the British
League High Commissioner Sir
to refuse permission for unloading French ships, and the German Danzig dockers threatened to strike if they were ordered to unload
At this time, the Poles unloaded some supplies in the fishing port of Gdynia,
about 20 miles west of Danzig in the "Polish Corridor."
(This experience led to the developmnt
of Gdynia into a Polish port city; work began there in 1924).
it turned out, General Weygand was not welcome to
take over command of the Polish army. He then advised the Poles to
abandon Warsaw and set up a defense line on part
of the Vistula river.
refused. He and his chief of staff, General Jordan T. Rozwadowski
(1866-1928) drew up a daring plan of attack. Some Polish troops were withdrawn
from the Warsaw
perimeter and concentrated in a strike group south of the city.
August 13, Pilsudski launched the attack toward the north-north west. He
drove between the Red Army groups North and Center, and came up in the rear of Tukhachevsky’s army group which was outflanking Warsaw and had reached East Prussia.
The Red Army was defeated. This is known as the "Battle
of the Vistula," or "The Battle of Warsaw." In the
West, the victory was attributed to General Weygand. He denied this, but got
used to the idea with time and came to see himself as the savior Poland. (Most
textbooks on the history of Modern Western Europe do not mention the Polish
victory). In September, Pilsudski defeated Tukhachevsky
again at the Battle of the Nemen
river in Lithuania.
[fom Norman Davies, White
Eagle, Red Star, London,
[Maps, pictures and captions, Norman
Davies, White Eagle Red Star,London, 1972]
should note that the Polish army was made up of both conscripts and volunteers.
The peasants made up the infantry and the rank-and-file of the cavalry. The Red
Army also used infantry and cavalry, notably the Budenny
"Konarmia" or horse army commanded by
Semyon M. Budenny
(1883-1973, pron. Boodyonny), to which Iosif [Joseph] V. Stalin
(1879-1953), the future Soviet dictator, was attached as Commisar, or chief political officer.
The Polish army also used armored trains, which with their heavy guns were like
warships on land. They also transported heavy artillery, horses, and planes.
There was a small Polish air force,and
some of the pilots were American volunteers from the Lafayette Squadron,
France. They flew in the the Kosciuszko
Squadron in Poland.
The pilots found after a while that they could not shoot up Russian troops with
impunity because the Red Army had machine guns mounted on "tachankas," that is, fast moving, small, two wheel
horse carts. The Poles also used them and each side claimed the invention.
the war was mainly a fast moving cavalry war on both sides. It helped the
cavalry to survive in the interwar period as an important part of both the
Polish and the Red Army.
mentioned earlier, in early July the Soviet government refused the offer of the
Curzon Line. In the official answer, given by the Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, Georgii V. Chicherin
(1872-1936), the Bolshevik government said it desired direct negotiations with
the Poles to whom it would offer far more territory than the Curzon Line.
Encouraged by the British, the Poles agreed to negotiate.
However, the Soviet demands put to the Polish delegation in August in Minsk were draconian.
They involved not only loss of territory (basically the Curzon Line with
East Galicia, thus leaving Lwow/L’viv
and the oil fields to the Soviets, though with modifications in Poland’s favor
in the Bialystok and Chelm [Kholm]
regions), but also disarmamen, the establishment
of a "workers’ militia," and the Soviet right of free transit
of passengers and goods through Poland along the Volkovysk-Graievo
railway, which was to be in Soviet possession. The acceptance of
these terms would have made Poland
a Soviet satellite. The Poles refused, though Lloyd George
had urged them to accept. (The French did not).
After the defeat of the Red Army, Lenin gave a confidential explanation
of why his government had refused the Curzon Line offer and continued the
advance into Poland.
It is worth citing because of the insight it gives into Lenin’s thinking in
July 1920 and of Poland’s
key place in it. At a closed meeting of the 9th Conference of the
Russian Communist Party on September 22, 1920, Lenin said:
We confronted the question: whether
to accept [Curzon’s] offer, which gave us convenient borders, and by so doing,
assume a position, generally speaking, which was defensive, or to take
advantage of the enthusiasm in our army and the advantage which we enjoyed to sovietize Poland.
...we arrived at the conviction that the
Entente’s military attack against us was over, that the defensive war against
imperialism was over, we won it... The assessment went thus: the defensive war
was over (Please record less: this is not for publication).
...We faced a new task...We could and should
take advantage of the military situation to begin an offensive war...This we
formulated not in the official resolution recorded in the protocols of the
Central Committee...but among ourselves we said that we should poke about with
bayonets to see whether the socialist revolution of the proletariat had not
ripened in Poland...
[We learned] that somewhere near Warsaw lies
not [only] the center of the Polish bourgeois government and the republic of
capital, but the center of the whole contemporary system of international
imperialism, and that circumstances enabled us to shake that system, and to
conduct politics not in Poland but in Germany and England. In this manner, in Germany and England we created a completely new
zone of proletarian revolution against global imperialism.....
. ..By destroying the Polish army we are
destroying the Versailles Treaty on which nowadays the entire system of
international relations is based.....Had Poland become Soviet....the Versailles
Treaty ...and with it the whole international system arising from the victories
over Germany, would have been destroyed. *
*[English translation quoted from Richard
Pipes, RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME, New York, 1993, pp.181-182, with some
stylistic modification in par 3, line 3, by A.M.Cienciala.
This document was first published in a Russian historical periodical, Istoricheskii Arkhiv,
vol. I, no. 1., Moscow,1992].
Tukhachevsky’s second and final defeat on the Nemen river in September 1920, the
Soviet government decided it needed peace to stay in power. An armistice
with Poland was signed in Riga, Latvia,
on October 12, 1920 and peace negotiations began in that city.
negotiations for a peace treaty dragged on for months due to Soviet reluctance
to sign. However, in Feb. 23- March 171921, the
Soviet govt. faced a sailors’ revolt in Kronstadt which
was brutally crushed by troops led by Tukhachevsky.
But peasants were also rising up against Soviet
authorities, who were confiscating all their food to feed the Red Army and the
workers in the cities. In view of this situation, Lenin ordered the Soviet
plenipotentiaries to secure a peace treaty. This led to the signing of the Treaty
of Riga on
March 18, 1921. It established the Polish-Soviet frontier until the Soviet
attack on Poland
in mid-September 1939. It was a compromise peace for both sides, because Pilsudski
gave up his plans for a federation with Lithuania and Belorussia and alliance
with an independent Ukraine, while Lenin gave up his plans for exporting
the revolution West, at least for the time being The Soviet government never
accepted the new frontier and was determined to change it in its own favor as
soon as opportunity arose. * The Ukrainians blamed the Poles for giving up the
fight and thus the chance of Ukrainian statehood, but the Polish people were
exhausted and public opinion opposed the prolongation of the war. Pilsudski
apologized to the Ukrainian officers who had helped the Poles fight the Red
Army, but now lost their struggle for an independent Ukraine. [For thePolish-Ukrainian
war over East Galicia, see B below].
[Brief Bibliography on the Polish-Soviet War
*[For the military side of the Polish-Soviet
War, see Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. The Polish-Soviet
War, 1919-1920, London,
New York, 1972 and reprints. For the accounts of the two
commanders-in-chief, see Jozef Pilsudski, [THE] YEAR
1920 AND ITS CLIMAX, BATTLE OF WARSAW, London,
1972. It includes Tukhachevsky’s account to which
Pilsudski was replying. For the diplomatic side, see Piotr
S.Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921,
Cambridge, Mass., 1969. For these and other sources see
John A. Drobnicki, "The Russo-Polish War,
1919-1920: A Bibliography of Works in English," The Polish Review,
vol. XLII , no. 1, New York,
1997, pp. 95-104.
a western view sympathetic to Soviet Russia, see Louis Fisher, THE SOVIETS
IN WORLD AFFAIRS. A History of the Relations between the
Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, 1917-1929, 2d Printing, Princeton N.J., 1951 vol. I., ch. VI. White Poland
vs. Red Russia. The work first appeared in 1930. In the Introduction to
the 2nd printing, Fisher thanked Soviet Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, Chicherin, for helping him with the
research, for reading the whole work and giving Fisher his comments. Fisher
also thanked Chicherin’s assistant, then successor,
Maxim M. Litvinov (1876-1951) and other Soviet dignitaries. Therefore,
Fisher’s work can be seen as reflecting the views of Soviet policy makers in
the late 1920s].
Significance of the Polish victory.
(i) It saved not only Poland
but also the Baltic States and perhaps the rest of Central
Europe as well from Soviet conquest, thus allowing the development
of independent states in this area.
It forced the Soviet government to focus on rebuilding the Russian economy, by
introducing the "New Economic Policy" (NEP), a mixture of socialism
and capitalism (1921-28).
neither the factors leading to the Polish-Soviet war, nor the significance of
its outcome were understood by most observers in the West. On the contrary,
many people accused Poland
of having started an "imperialist war" against Soviet Russia and of
annexing "Russian" lands, though these were inhabited by Belorussians and Ukrainians. At the time,these peoples were not strong enough to become
independent and as it turned out, they were to suffer much less under Polish
rule than their brothers in the USSR
who came under the iron fist of Joseph V. Stalin.
Other conflicts over Polish borders.
A. The Polish- Lithuanian Conflict over Vilnius (P.Wilno, R.Vilna)
population of Wilno/ Vilnius and its surrounding region was
predominantly Polish-speaking at this time, but in the city itself 50% of the population was Jewish. The new
Lithuanian state proclaimed the city as its capital, for it had been the
capital of the Duchy of Lithuania before its union with Poland in 1386.
who was a native of the region and had lived in Vilnius,
had two reasons to include it in Poland,
or at least in some union with Poland:
(i) because of its predominantly Polish population
and culture, and
(ii) because the region constituted the northern
passage into Poland from Russia,
that is, north of the Polesie marches. Polish public
opinion stood solidly behind Pilsudski. (The Russians, of course, saw it as a
passage into their country from the West).
armies came into Lithuania
in 1919, when they pushed the communist Litbel
government out of Wilno/Vilnius, and again in the
Polish-Soviet war.The Polish seizure of Wilno/Vilnius in October1920, must also be seen in the
context of Lithuanian-Soviet relations. In July 1920, Lithuania concluded an alliance with Soviet Russia allowing free passage of Soviet troops,
which was obviously a great threat to Poland. In return, the Soviet
government recognized that Wilno/Vilnius was the
capital of Lithuania.
offered a compromise solution to the Lithuanian government and people: the
establishment of a "Central Lithuania" with Wilno/Vilnius in a federation with Poland. The Lithuanian government
October 1920, as the Wilno/Vilnius question was being
debated in the League of Nations, Gen. Lucjan
Zeligowski "mutinied" against Warsaw and led a Polish division into Vilnius. In fact, Pilsudski asked him to do
so, in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the western powers and the League of Nations. He admitted this
later to western ministers in Warsaw
in December 1922. The Polish division was welcomed enthusiastically by most of
the population of the region,which
Britain and other League of Nations powers were furious with the Poles and
the Lithuanians demanded the city. Zeligowski
proclaimed a "Central Lithuania" with its capital in Vilnius. Since Lithuania refused to accept this solution, a
plebiscite was held in the city and region in which the majority - Poles -
voted for union with Poland,
so it joined Poland
in 1922. Lithuanians in the region refused to vote, but they were a minority
anyway. Lithuania never
recognized this union and cut all road, rail, and postal communications with Poland.
1928, Pilsudski managed to make the Lithuanian President, Antanas
Smetona (1874-1944, President 1919-20, 1926-40)
declare publicly at a League of Nations meeting in Geneva that Lithuania would
not go to war with Poland over Wilno/Vilnius.
However, the Lithuanian government refused all Polish attempts at negotiation
and a state of ‘cold war’ existed between the two countries. This lasted until
March 1938, when Poland,
fearing German or Soviet domination of Lithuania,
issued an ultimatum to Kaunas
demanding the establishment of normal relations. Lithuania agreed.*
*[see Cienciala and Komarnicki, FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO, CH. 5. The Polish-Lithuanian Dispute over
Vilna, 1919-1922. For a Lithuanian point of view, see Alfred Erich Senn, THE GREAT POWERS, LITHUANIA AND THE VILNA QUESTION 1920-1928
resentment of Poland
ran very deep and Lithuanians are only now (2004) showing signs of
understanding Polish aims and motives in 1920.
Polish-Ukrainian Conflict over East Galicia.
December 1918, armed Ukrainian units formerly in the Austro-Hungarian army,
seized the then predominantly Polish city of Lwow, (Ukr. L'viv,R. Lvov) and hoisted the
Ukrainian flag over the townhall. They also
proclaimed the establishment of a Ukrainian National Republic. The
Polish population resisted and fighting broke out. Polish troops arrived and
pushed the Ukrainians out of the city.
January 1919, the French government sent a mission headed by General Joseph Barthelemy to arbitrate between the Poles and
was interested in obtaining control over the oil fields in the region.
Barthelemy proposed a demarcation line leaving
just over one third of the East Galicia (now western Ukraine),
including Lwow and the oil fields, to Poland, and the
rest to the Ukrainians. Half of the oil production was to go to the Ukrainians.
government accepted this proposal but the Ukrainians rejected it, so
hostilities resumed and the Poles pushed the Ukrainian troops out of East Galicia.
In April 1920. as noted earlier, Petliura signed an alliance with Pilsudski, giving
up Ukrainian claims to East Galicia, and was
denounced for this by the west Ukrainians. The Poles received allied consent to
carry on the war beyond the river Zbrucz (pron. Sbrooch), though the allies did not approve the Pilsudski-Petliura advance into Soviet-held Ukraine. The
Curzon Line of July 1920 as originally proposed, envisaged an armistice
line leaving Lwow/Lviv and
the surrounding region either to the Poles or the Soviets, but the Foreign
Office extended the line south so as to leave it on the Soviet side.
after the Polish victory over the Red Army, British Prime Minister David
Lloyd George insisted on autonomy for East Galicia as a means of
pressure on Poland and a lever for good relations with Soviet Russia, for he
expected autonomy to be replaced by Soviet annexation. The western powers
finally recognized the Polish-Soviet frontier in March 1923.*
the international context of the Polish-Ukrainian struggle for East Galicia, see Cienciala and
Komarnicki, FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO, 6-8.
For a study of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance and of the Ukrainian Republic
from a Ukrainian point of view, see Michael Palij, THE
UKRAINIAN-POLISH DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE 1919-1922. An Aspect of the Ukrainian
Revolution, Edmonton, Toronto, 1995; Cienciala
review in the American Historical Review, April 1997, p. 484]
Polish government finally agreed to give East Galicia
autonomy, but did not implement it. This was because neither the Poles of East
Galicia nor Polish public opinion as a whole would agree to it in the interwar
period. Furthermore, the Lwow/Lviv
region was the southern passage from Russia
that is, south of the Polesie marshes. (The Russians,
of course, saw it as a passage into their country).Thus, aside from Polish
public opinion, there were security reasons why no Polish government could
consider giving up control over this region.
Ukrainians resented Polish rule, and sought outside support. The Ukrainian
Nationalist Organization [OUN, formed in Vienna,
1929] was financed by Germany
(the Weimar Republic). Ukrainian resentment was
aggravated in September 1930 when Pilsudski
reacted to OUN terrorist actions against Poles by billeting Polish troops in
Ukrainian villages. The troops and police committed outrages,beating up Ukrainians and destroying Ukrainian
libraries and property.
League of Nations considered a resolution condemning Poland for this policy. However,
the head of the Polish Delegation to the League at this time, Edward Raczynski, managed to avert it by showing the statesmen
who backed it photostat copies of documents proving
German subventions for the OUN, and threatening to make them public if Poland
was condemned by the League. League members did not want this done because they
did not wish to antagonize Germany,
a member of the League since 1926.*
Raczynski (1891-1993, pron. Raachynskee),
later Polish ambassador in London 1932-45, also foreign minister in the P.
government in exile, London, 1943-45, President of the P. government in exile,
1971-1986. Raczynski’s account of this incident was
given in a letter to A.M.Cienciala Feb.1, 1982].
[Map from Cienciala
& Komarnicki, FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO.]
Ukrainian nationalists carried out several assassinations and attempted
assassinations against Polish ministers in the interwar period. During WWII,
the Bandera faction of the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (UPA) murdered
40,000-60,000 Poles living in the villages of former Volhynia and former East Galicia, while the Poles
killed some 20,000 Ukrainians, mostly in former East
Galicia in reprisals. (See Lec.Notes
after WWII, in 1947, Polish and Soviet security forces forcibly removed tens of
thousands of Ukrainians from their native villages and resettled them along the
coast in newly acquired Western Pomerania.
This move, called" Action Vistula," was undertaken on Soviet orders
because UPA units fighting the Red Army and NKVD troops sought refuge in south-eastern.Poland and received help from Ukrainians living
there. However, in this case the Poles followed
Soviet orders willingly because of their memories of UPA crimes in former
published at http://raven.cc.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect11.htm
Anna M. Cienciala
Professor Emeritus of History and Russian and Eeast
European Studies (Ph. D. Indiana 1962; M.A. McGill, 1955; B.A. Liverpool,
1952). East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries; Poland from the
partitions to the present, Communist nations; 20th Century Polish, European
and Soviet diplomacy 1919–45. Professor Cienciala
has published 2 books, edited 4, and published around 40 academic articles in
Polish, and German historical journals.
TO POLISH HISTORY