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Abkhazian Separatism: Born in
the Labyrinths of KGB 28.09.2009 11:37 - 29.04.2011 17:47 Levan Kiknadze
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In the course of the last
two decades the Georgian society has been continuously asking the following
question: was it possible to avoid the civil war of the nineties, events of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia that resulted in thousands of deaths, causing
hostilities among people and destroying many in Georgia and the whole
Caucasus? What was a cause of all this? Was it just whims and ambitions of a
small group of people? Or was it assault and confrontation foisted on small
nations by outside forces that had their own interests and agenda? Maybe it
was an objective necessity of historical, social and geopolitical changes. It
will take quite some time for historians, politicians and others to answer
all these questions. This is a modest attempt
from "the Club of Experts" to help the Georgian society look into
the maze of the Russian Security Services, underestimation of capabilities of
which and non-consideration of historical lessons led to many false steps
that itself brought disastrous results in the country. Following the turbulent 20s
of the last century the Bolshevik regime despite mass repressions, war and
difficult material problems managed to weaken a spark of the Georgian protest
and someway put it in the box. Later inner ebullition started again and it
found a pretext for eruption in March 1956 when many in Georgia found
insulting to their national pride personal insults and affront directed at
Stalin’s personality who in the world for decades had been considered as a
sparkle of the Georgian genius, as well as a mysterious physical elimination
of Beria before that. Speech of Nikita Khrushchev
about the Personality Cult of Stalin was met as yet another unfair attempt to
put the blame of century-old sins of Russian Empire on the brutality of the
Georgian nature. Events of the 9th of March was the first unconscious protest
of the Georgian youth against yet unrecognized evil that resulted again
without realization in deaths of tens of boys and girls. But on the 9th of
March awakening of the sleeping Georgian society started. That day Georgian youths
and Russian special divisions that were brought to Tbilisi especially for
that event were facing each other. From the Communications Building the
divisions opened fire at the unarmed column that was coming towards them and
killed and shot hundreds of innocent people on the spot. Astonishment of
witnesses was boundless – Russian soldiers sitting inside the tanks that were
raging on Rustaveli Avenue were helpless in the
face of youths who were enraged by deaths of their brothers and were riding
their tanks. Weapons were taken away
from the Georgian police and security services. Georgian national armed
forces were hurriedly dismantled. The full control was taken by the Military
office. There were rumors that Nikita Khrushchev intended to send the entire
Georgian nation into exile in Siberia. Authorities of the Republic were very
concerned. Despite all this neither
before that nor afterwards there were not a fact of negative attitude towards
Russian citizens based on their ethnicity. Although there were plenty of
attempts to receive such material that would have served as a pretext of
defending the Russian citizens for carrying out repressions. Georgia could
not tolerate dictate and the Russian boot but the latter was never been
identified with the Russian people and the Russian culture. Generations spent decades
in struggling with themselves as it was difficult to reconsider old values in
new ways. Information was lacking and most of the times they were denying
each other. Aspiration towards the western values was gathering strength in a
certain part of the Georgian intelligentsia and youth. Spread of anti-Soviet
leaflets and publishing of the illegal magazines started. Georgian Helsinki
Group of Human Rights was created. Actual formation of the Georgian National
Movement commenced. The Kremlin blamed
everything on the Western propaganda and in response in 1967 created special
so-called fifth operative direction within the State Security Committee, duty
of which was to fight against ideological sabotages and anti-Soviet and
nationalistic manifestations of the main rival. Even later Moscow assessed
Georgian and Baltic national liberation movements as the most dangerous
carriers of the Western imperialist policy that were directed at weakening
and destruction of the Soviet Union. With respect to such report the security
services were given a task to take care and create permanent illegal agent
positions in these republics. We suppose that this task was realized. Hotspots of tensions were
being created in the autonomies of the country and all along the sea coast
considering historical, ethnic, geographic and psychological characteristics.
Separatist forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia became more active and
respectively their demands took more radical form. It is known that protest
letters sent from time to time by the Abkhazian separatists to the Central
Committee of the Soviet Union and organized protest demonstrations with
anti-Georgian slogans and demands of secession from the Georgia was
occasional occurrence since the creation of the first independent republic
and more frequent one since 1957. As a rule, everything tend to finish
"peacefully" with interference of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Union and in many cases at the expense of unjustifiable concessions of
the Georgian Central government. To have a clear understanding
of the events in Abkhazia in the last decade we should definitely mention a
notorious large gathering of the Abkhazian separatists on the 18th of March
1989 in a village of Likhny of Gudauta
district where all the Abkhazian Party elite was present. At that gathering
an anti-Georgian goal – to detach Abkhazia from Georgia - was openly
announced. A statement addressed to the Central Committee of KPSU approved at
this gathering caused turmoil in the Georgian society. The separatists showed
Georgians with this statement that only Abkhazians could decide a fate of
Abkhazia and Georgians would not even be asked. Obedient Georgians were
accustomed to such attitude over the years but the letter of Likhny was a last drop in the overflowing cup of Georgian
patience and immediate protest followed. The Likhny
gathering was like a thunder and spread through the whole of Georgia.
Thousands of demonstrators gathered in Sukhumi, Leselidze,
Gulripsh and Gali were
addressed with speeches about muny-century-old
friendship of the two nations and were called not to align themselves with
the separatists. From the beginning of April
protests started in Tbilisi in connection with the Likhny
events and the demonstrations became permanent. Leaders of the national
liberation movement made a demand of secession of Georgia from the Soviet
Union. Events that took place in
Tbilisi on the 9th of April 1989 completely changed a vector of not only the
development of Georgia but it also put a fat question mark on the existence
of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin considered this too much and immediate
reaction followed. The Russian security services put in motion those slow
action mines – system of the country's national organization of those times -
that were designed for extreme conditions. As we mentioned above the
Kremlin considered Georgia as well as the Baltic Republics to be unreliable
regions and it was expecting that these republics would leave the Soviet
Union. According to the plan made in KGB "Adamon
Nikhas" and "Aidgilara",
organizations supposedly formed by the local national forces started to
actively operate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These organizations were
given a task to counter the Georgian national liberation forces in the
autonomies and to intervene in their fight for the Georgian independence. Coming from a simple logic
if these organizations were really pursuing national liberating goals they
would have fought alongside the Georgians for the secession from the Soviet
Union not against them. Based on common interests
Russian and Armenian organizations "Ruski
Dom" and "Krunk" were in close
contact with "Aidgilara". These
organizations like "Aidgilara" were
formed and managed by the Soviet KGB. The top level of these organizations
consisted mostly of those who during the previous years were registered by
KGB for stirring up separatism in the population. Some of them were under
investigation and some of them even were recruited. The above mentioned
organizations were forming branches in different districts without any resistance.
Their representatives were actively working on the ideological treatment of
non-Georgian population. By falsifying historical facts they were painting
Georgians as occupiers and were constantly implanting into the minds of
non-Georgians and especially Abkhazians an idea of necessity of cleansing
Abkhazia of Georgians. Another ideological front
against Georgia was created as presented by the Northern Caucasian Republics.
The Russian Security Services created so-called popular-national movements
like "Aidgilara" and "Adamon Nikhas" there that
were promising all the help to the Abkhazian separatists. Especially active
was Kabardian national movement "Adaghe Khase". On the
Abkhazian TV and Press the separatist leaders were constantly talking about
unshakable brotherhood and unity of Abkhazian and Northern Caucasian nations.
This period suspiciously coincided with the formation of "the
Confederation of the Mountainous People" whose capital was announced to
be Sukhumi. Meetings were held with Northern Caucasian representatives. Publications of defamatory
articles written by the organization "Ruski
Dom" in the newspaper "Sovetskaya
Abkhazia" about the facts of trafficking that supposedly Georgians were
carrying out towards Russian persons became frequent. Gradual intensification of
the separatist ideas among the Abkhazian population and frequent displays of
the anti-Georgian attitude in various forms had created conditions for
strengthening of the Georgian national consciousness that transformed the
National liberation movement into the united popular movement in Abkhazia.
Naturally, in such conditions, every sensible Georgian, notwithstanding their
past and party belonging started to unite under one idea. Therefore, the national
forces, notwithstanding their desire, were compelled not only to take into
account but also to rely on the local Georgian party authorities. It's hard to imagine what
kind of means and forces should have been used in order to neutralize visible
and invisible anti-Georgian forces in Georgia, and in particular in Abkhazia,
that were subordinated to and nurtured and supported by KGB. The Georgian national
liberation movement had a big test ahead of them as apart from the Communist
regime it was opposed by the separatisms in Abkhazia that was managed by KGB.
It should also be noted that in Abkhazia separatism seemed much more
dangerous to the Georgian national liberation movement than the Communist
regime. The Georgian national
liberation movement and later the national authorities could not pass this
test. Along with subjective there were objective factors as well that
inexperienced Georgian authorities could not take into account as Russia put
in action the entire arsenal of leverage in order to keep such strategically
vital region in its sphere of influence. And although with full concentration
of forces these attacks were temporarily averted but the young government was
not ready to neutralize outbreaks caused by separatism and national rivalry.
Furthermore, many fatal mistakes were made. As a result Russian security
services managed to instigate bloody confrontation with Abkhazians and Ossetians with whom Georgian people were connected
through history of brotherly co-existence, common culture and ties of
relationship for centuries. These mistakes were so many that it will take us
long to recite. We will try to present and analyze just some of them. It should be noted that
transfer of ethnic Russian security service personnel to work in the Security
Committee of Georgia - both in structures of the central divisions and those
of autonomies – under the pretext of exchange of personnel became customary
from the 70s of the XX century. Even such person as General Alexi Inauri distinguished for his loyalty to the Communist
regime at various times had Fedor Pilyugin, Vladimir Kazmin,
Vladimir Arkhipov and Eduard Voitsitsky
as first deputies. Even that was not enough for Moscow and they transferred
Colonel Vitaly Novodnichy
from Nalchiki and appointed him as Inauri's deputy in the matters of personnel. There was a term – Moscow nomenklatura (bureaucratic establishment) – that meant
appointment of a high rank functionary only after consulting with KGB
authorities. A head of the republican KGB and his deputies used to be
appointed with the consent of the organizational department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Apart from the above
mentioned the Security Committee of the Soviet Union used to have curators in
all directions of the operational activities who
along with representatives of the central inspection were coming from time to
time to regional organizations and under the pretence of assistance were
giving recommendations that did not always correspond to existing reality. Information coming from
central and regional operational divisions used to be gathered in Information
and Analytic Centre that was under subordination of the first deputy head.
Also there were gathered data about cases of operational record-keeping and
primary signals. First deputy head used to
carry out verification of all important signal information through
representatives of local security services who were subordinated to central
KGB and the Ministry of Defense. To understand overall
situation please see the following: 1. "Special
department" ("Osobii Otdel")
of the Security committee of the Soviet Union at the Transcaucasian
Military District ("Zakvo") was under
direct subordination of Moscow and was not in any way connected to the
security services of Georgia. "Special
department" was noted for its strict regime of secrecy. Its relation
with central and regional bodies of the security committee of the Republic
was limited with so-called principle of coordination. The department in
question used to send parallel and independent reports to Central Security
Committee about operational situation and especially important events in the
republic. 2. Transcaucasian
Border Forces of the USSR Security Committee not only had huge number of
military personnel and military equipment but they had separate intelligence
and counter-intelligence bodies as well as a large agent network along the
entire border perimeter of the country, and among others in Georgia as well.
Intelligence divisions were working in the rear of the bordering countries.
The main function of the counter-intelligence along with the provision of the
border defense with counter-intelligence information
(revealing of agents/agent networks of foreign countries) was getting
information about important processes happening inside the country. Its
special divisions in central and border regions of the country were carrying
out agent and operational work inside personnel of the border forces, as well
as their friends and relatives in places of their work and residence and in
the 100 km section of the border along the entire country perimeter. The Border Forces
structurally and operationally were under subordination of the central
leadership of KGB and were connected through formal coordination with
regional security services that were obliged to systematically supply them
with information about operational situation in the region. 3. Main intelligence department
of the general headquarters of the Ministry of Defense
of the Soviet Union (GRU) was represented in Georgia with a separate body in
"ZAKVO" and had its positions in armies subordinated to the Transcaucasian Military District as well as in large military
facilities that were under subordination of the General Headquarters of the
Ministry of Defense of the USSR and different armed
forces. According to our information, in case of necessity, the main
intelligence department used to independently plan and realize various acts
on the territory of the republic such as provoking confrontation,
compromising undesirable high rank officials and so on. 4. Unofficial intelligence
is the most secret and dangerous category of intelligence work. Such resident
agents did not exist in Georgia up until the eighties of the XX century and
there were no necessity of their existence. But after the eighties with
connection to aggravation of the situation in the region KGB started to
implant such agents in various bodies of interest (public organizations,
political parties, different government bodies). There were people sent from
Russia not only in the Central Apparatus of the Security Committee of Georgia
but also in the Security Committee of Abkhazia. G. Lichutin,
M. Chulkov and F. Vasev
served as deputy chairmen in various periods. In addition to the fact that it
was in their job description to get to know operational materials and ask
information on any operational source they also directly control and manage
ideological direction of agent and operational activity. It should be noted
that in order to strengthen its position even further Moscow appointed M. Chulkov as the Interior minister of Abkhazia and sent F. Vasev from Russia to replace him in the Abkhazian security
committee. After aggravation of the situation in Abkhazia V. Chulkov had been urgently brought back to Moscow. He was
directing provision of separatists with military ammunition from there. In addition to the above
there were at least two or three operational workers from Russia in the
operational divisions. Information and analytical department was headed by
Vladimir Lisovik, ethnic Russian and experienced
operational worker. And, Oleg Smirnov who had also been sent from Russia was
in charge of the archive where along with archive materials files of agents
were stored. Posts of various rank
officials in the operational divisions were occupied by Popov, Kabanov, Skrilnikov, Stepanov, Tkachuk, Smirnov, Bondarev and others who by the beginning of the war had
already been relocated back to Russia. Holiday homes of the Soviet
Politburo situated on the coastline of Bichvinta, Gagra, Miusera and New Athos,
territory of which amounted in total to several hundreds of hectares and were
serviced (and they never went away) by several thousand personnel of the
so-called 9th department of Central KGB. The latters
together with their families lived on adjacent territories. It is notable
that because of the special importance of the facilities the entire personnel
was brought from Russia. The 9th operational division that was stationed in
Sochi was carrying out agent and operational activities in local population
of the territories adjacent to the holiday residences. Taking into account all the
above today we can hardly imagine pressures and influences of what scale on
the local population we had been dealing with over the years. As we mentioned
in the previous article, public and political situation that existed in
Georgia after the tragic events of April 9th, 1989 clearly showed the Kremlin
that the very existence of the Soviet Union was becoming questioned.
Therefore entire capacity of abovementioned security services as well as that
of officers who were sent from Russia and were implanted into Georgian
security services for "special period" was put in motion. With this
regard the gravest situation was in Abkhazia as Abkhazian workers were in
close contact with the above mentioned contingent. Estrangement and reserve
between Georgians and Abkhazians were obvious. Workers of other ethnic
origins were also avoiding close relationships with Georgians. Georgian heads
of the operational divisions had certain problems with Abkhazian operational
workers. It was difficult to properly evaluate processes that were taking
place among Abkhazian population as information supplied by Abkhazian workers
did not objectively reflect operational reality. Majority of Abkhazian
workers headed by Abkhazian deputy head G. Berulava
were actively cooperating with the well-known anti-Georgian organization
"Aidgilara". The events that were taking
place in Georgia made the Communist regime understand that its dismantlement
was unavoidable. Governing elite both in the capital and in the regions had
been losing its position step-by-step and without any pressure. Now their
main worry was not preservation of their posts but self-preservation. So they
did not shy away from laying all the blame on KGB and that made negative
attitude of the National Movement towards this body even more aggressive.
Another confirmation of fomentation of distrust towards Georgian KGB was that
after resignation of Georgian KGB head and professional chekist
Alexi Ianuri the head of the security committee of
Georgia became party functionaries. First it was Givi
Gumbaridze, and later, after the events of April 9
- Tariel Lortkipanidze.
It should be noted that even workers themselves did not take appointment of
party functionaries as heads of the security services well. The more so
because it was the time of management of Tariel Lortkipanidze when national movement activists stormed
into security committee building. And that gave Moscow an excuse to take away
cases of agents and materials of operational records as well as archive
materials and send them to Smolensk. It must be noted that absence of the
mentioned materials is one of the reasons why the law about disclosure of
personal files is not yet approved.
The Club of Experts always
emphasized in its publications that since the declaration of Independence of
Georgian independence when Georgia's strive towards western values became apparent
the Kremlin was trying to retain its influence over Georgia with all methods
in its possession. All this was clearly demonstrated by further development
of the events and analysis of the materials that depict activities of the
Russian security services. We should start from the
fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union directions of the security
services of the Soviet union that curated Georgia
were subjected to reorganization and a common centre were formed that on the
basis of analyzes of acquired information would develop relevant agent and
operational measures in order to timely respond to and influence processes
that were taking place in Georgia. A new body was created in the Transcaucasian Military District (ZAKVO) by the central
KGB and it was subordinated directly to the above centre and was nominally
included in the 4th sector of the ZAKVO (curator lieutenant colonel Tsurika). The body had branches in Yerevan and Baku. The
main purpose of the division in the new reality was conduction of agent and
operational activities in Transcaucasus and, in
particular, in Georgia that implied infiltration into legislative and
executive bodies, law enforcement agencies (interior ministry, security
services, defense ministry, national guard), union
of veteran of Afghan war, political parties and public organizations. For
this purpose the following was deemed necessary: - Restore connections with
those agents that had been acquired by special divisions during compulsory
military service in military units deployed in various parts of the Soviet
Union and who lived in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. - Creation and conservation
of agent positions between current and former military servicemen of the Zakvo for the time when Soviet troops would withdraw from
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. - Special attention in
agent and operational activities should have been paid to development of
mechanisms through which contacts were to be established with those
representatives of the national movement whose services in formation of
national sentiment and creation of the independent republic was great but a
certain part of which, due to various reasons, was in confrontation with Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Emphasis
should have been made on persons that were offended at being removed from
their positions and who had authority in the national movement and could
influence certain processes. It was believed to be possible to determine and
work on those persons in the circle of Zviad Gamsakhursia who were opposed to his politics and who
could be used in favour of Russia through financial incentive. Operational workers of the
subdivision used to carry out especially intense work with recruitment of
non-Georgian workers of the security committee and this was partially
achieved. In short time they formed new structure divisions (of intelligence,
operational-technical, etc). Informational and analytical group that had the
latest computer technology of the time was fully formed and started to work.
the above group analyzed information received from operational and open
(media) sources and regularly transferred it to the centre where based on the
received information relevant active measures were planned that promoted
artificial tension of the political situation in Georgia, deepening of the existing
confrontations, fomentation of ethnic rivalry, compromising of authorities
and so on. As we mentioned above this
subdivision was directly subordinated to Moscow and was accountable to it.
One of its functions were also to coordinate agent-operational activities in
the Georgian autonomies (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajara),
as well as in other Transcaucasian republics. As the Club of Experts
noted in one of its articles Georgia's national but inexperienced and too
self-confident and ambitious authorities failed to relevantly assess and analyze extremely grave situation, its causes.
And what is more important, abilities of the Russian
security services - heir to very dangerous Soviet KGB that were actively
influencing through their agents on processes in Georgia. More, many
irreparable mistakes were made as a result of which Russian security services
easily managed to overthrow the Gamsakhurdia
government. As it later became apparent
the Kremlin was not that enamoured with Shevardnadze either. But probably at
that tine it was difficult to bet on anybody as an
alternative to Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
So they followed the principle of the "accustomed evil" and made
their choice in favour of the old comrade of Yeltsin. "National"
forces that overthrew Zviad Gamskhurdia
did not allow Shevardnadze who came with the wave of the state coup to enter
the CIS. Offended Russia provoked the war in Abkhazia and dragged Georgia in
unequal war for the period of more than a year. ... Yes, it started it and
defeated us. Nobody should have an illusion that at the time Georgia had any
chance of victory in this war, even a slight chance of emerging from this war
with dignity. We present here a small account how events were unfolding. As we know, on the basis of
a bilateral agreement there should have been 65 members in the Supreme
Council of Abkhazia. 28 of them should have been Abkhazians, 26 -Georgians,
and 11 - representatives of other nationalities. How fair was such proportion
that is another matter. But even in this unfavourable situation it was
possible to find a solution if we had managed to elect 26 persons in the
first round and to find 7 persons out of those 11 non-Georgians and
non-Abkhazians who were loyal to Georgians. The fact that in a situation when
every voice in the Supreme Council were be crucial, the Georgian side should
have been more responsible. First, we failed to choose those 26 people in the
first round, when Abkhazians have selected all 28. And then, although, we
managed to push through 6 out of those 11 persons of other nationalities
but... except for Eteri Astemirova
and Olga Nagarnina, other four - one Russian and
three Armenians betrayed us at the first session and moved to Abkhazian side.
Was it negligence of the Georgian side or treachery? We believe it was both. The reality was that in the
second half of the eighties gradual strengthening of the separatist sentiment
and anti-Georgian radical manifestations of different form created conditions
for strengthening of Georgian national charge that transformed the national
liberation movement in Abkhazia into a united national movement. Naturally,
in this situation, every sensible Georgian, despite its party affiliation and
past, began to unite under a single idea. Therefore national forces,
voluntarily or involuntarily, have fallen under the influence of local
Georgian party or other high-rank functionaries. And among them there were
many who had the only goal - to please Zviad Gamsakhurdia in order to maintain the position or obtain
the desired one. (One of them even accompanied Gamsakhurdia
into the bunker but after realizing that his defeat was inevitable, betrayed
him and fled and later was assuring Shevardnadze of his loyalty). Moreover,
as we know, the circle of Zviad Gamsakhurdia
consisted of opposing groups that were trying separately to impose their own
opinions on the president. The decision depended on which group was quicker
to do this. Therefore, often there were inadequate and, in certain cases,
contradictory decisions. The same happened with regards to the question of
Abkhazia... This is the time when the
national forces that came to power in Georgia and were still in euphoria
treated the Abkhazian issue rather too lightly and were not taking our advice
into account. Neither leaders of the Abkhazian
separatists who were instigated by the Russian security services intended to
yield. When they were selecting
those 11 persons of non-Georgian and non-Abkhazian origin they did not
allowed us, security services, close. In addition, not only did not they
consider persons that we suggested they did not even allow us to study who
their chosen candidates were. Those people not only did
not take responsibility for what happened which was not just negligence but
something tantamount to betrayal, but did not even express regret. It was the
majority that we granted them as a result of our spinelessness that allowed Ardzinba to pass laws unacceptable for the Georgians
side. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that representatives of the Georgians side often did
not have a common position with regards to certain issues. And this was used
by the separatists in their favour. To confirm this we just need to recall a
stir that was raised around the issue of appointment of the chairman of the
council of the ministers of Abkhazia. As we know it was agreed with the
Abkhazian side that prime minister should have been Georgian and that it
should have been presented by the Georgian side. In addition, in order to avoid
any possible misunderstanding candidates for posts of prime minister and
chairman of the supreme council should have been passed in a package. The
Georgian side failed to agree on a candidate for prime minister. There were
many who wished to get this post and they were lobbied by various groups of
the Zviad Gamsakhurdia
circle. The time expired and as Georgians failed to reach an agreement on the
candidate for prime minister they were compelled to make concessions. Ardzinba was almost unanimously elected as the chairman
of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia. Struggle for the post of the prime
minister continued and there seemed no end to it. Ardzinba
was promoting this in every possible way. In the end he violated the
agreement and made the Parliament to appoint prime minister. Let's not forget that he
did not go to open confrontation and appointed as prime minister not
Abkhazian but his loyal, but still ethnic Georgian Zarandia.
This indicated that not all was lost yet. I must repeat that it is clear
today when we know what we know. But then everything was perceived very
emotionally and mistakes were made one after another. The entire country
lived in euphoria. Our long-wished freedom and independence that we got in
the end made us lose our carefulness and we were easily caught in the trap
set up by our enemy. The Club of Experts already
described extremely difficult public and political situation that was in
Abkhazia prior to the beginning of the war actions. The situation was even
more aggravated by illegal decisions of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia
(Abkhazian wing) and its presidium that were under the dictate of Ardzinba that were mainly directed at detaching Abkhazia
from the juridical space of Georgia. Any attempts of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia to regulate the situation were fritless. After the overthrow of the Zviad Gamsakhurdia government
active supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia
that were expelled from Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Zugdidi
and other regions of Georgia poured into Abkhazia which never lacked
supporters of the first president. On the other hand, Russian security
services were conducting undermining activities in Abkhazian and
Russian-language population. Abkhazian Aidgilara,
as well as Armenian and Russian organizations Krunk
and Slavyansky Dom respectively were especially
known for their anti-Georgian sentiments and were adding fuel to the fire.
All of them were created and governed by Russian security services (even
before heads of these organizations were listed on operational records of the
security services for fomentation of separatism in the population). At the same time North
Caucasian "confederates" were occupying resort facilities of Gagra, Gudauta, Sukhumi and
others. Chechen militants were also stationed on the Eshera
base. Back in the spring of 1991, at the request of Ardzinba
and direct assistance and support of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the
Soviet Union Anatoly Lukyanov the 50th special
Airborne Division of the Staff of Generals of the Russian Defence Ministry
was redeployed in the Bombora aerodrome. Resort
facilities such as MBO, PVO as well as special purpose facilities lighthouse,
laboratory of Eshera, tourist site that were
situated in Sukhumi and were still subordinated to the Russian Defence
Ministry were strengthened by armoured vehicles, armament and manpower. And
this was done at the pretext of necessity of additional defence measures
because of special circumstances in the republic. Among the personnel there
were a lot of officers of special departments of GRU and FSB. Vladyslav Ardzinba and its circle understood well that discord of
the Georgian national forces were in their interests. And it should be noted
that they used to manage to aggravate the situation in this direction. And
the situation was becoming highly expolsive. Representatives
of the Gamsakhurdia government were holding rallies
in the centre of Sukhumi on the daily basis. Speakers at the rallies demanded
from local Georgian authorities not to obey to the Military Council that
itself practically further aggravated already existing confrontation between
Georgians and Abkhazians in offices and enterprises. And this added to
division of the personnel along the ethnic lines. Naturally all this was
playing in the hands of the separatists. Existing situation clearly threatened
the territorial integrity of Georgia and made it easy for Russian security
services to achieve their goal. An attempt of Eduard Shevardnadze to show a
united front against unrestrained actions of the separatists did not have a
desirable effect. The reason for this was that those antagonisms, that
existed, were impossible to overcome. They were, on one hand, between
supporters of Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia and, on
the other hand, between those Georgian leaders of Abkhazia who made a fight
for posts as an end in itself and who were not paying any attention as to how
Ardzinba was using confrontation between Georgians
and simultaneously was usurping the power. The presidium of the Ardzinba Supreme Council declared those members of the
National Guard that were expelled from Tbilisi and who accumulated in
Abkhazia in large numbers as illegal armed formations. So called internal
troops of Abkhazia were charged with disarmament and fight against them. And
confrontation between those two forces was taking quite dangerous forms. All
this had negative effects on criminogenic
situation. Efforts of law enforcers had no desirable effects. Facts of
robbery, attack, kidnapping of holding high-rank officials as hostages were
frequent. Explosions carried out by gangs on the Achigvara-Gali,
Tamishi-Ochamchire, Adziuzhba-Tamishi Railway stages were blamed on
supporters of Gamsakhurdia. Besides, the latters were also blamed for attacks on Railway stations
in Gagra, Bzip, Gantiadi, Gudauta, Eshera, Sukhumi, Dranda, Ochamchire, Achigvara and Gali. High voltage electric cables on the railway were
robbed. All this was causing delays in movement of both passenger and cargo
trains. Cargo carriages that were stuck in stations were also robbed. In the existing grave
situation the Ardzinba regime was very passive. It
is true that there were discussions about the existing situation on various
levels of the government but no one was in a hurry to take active steps in
the direction of stabilization of the situation. Decisions that were made
remained just on a paper. A view that Ardzinba and
his circle benefited from the aggravation of the situation was gaining
ground. As to the difficult
situation regarding the railway at the initiative of the Information and
Intelligence Service (former security service of Abkhazia) a complex plan of
defence of the Abkhazian section of the railway was drawn up. Together with
security service the ministry of internal affairs were to be also involved in
it. Divisions of district security services were in charge of the
coordination of measures in places while overall management was carried out
by the information and intelligence service of the security service. Apart
from organisational issues the plan described in details all railway stages,
bridges and tunnels that were to be subject to protection. Necessary
manpowered and armament was calculated. In this situation necessary actions
would only be possible after joint, cooperated actions. If Tbilisi were to
help us, but only sensibly and in the format of the plan, and with low
expenses crimonogenic situation would have improved
significantly, robbery of electric cables and cargo carriages on the railway
would have stopped. The above-mentioned plan was introduced to Ardzinba by head of the security service of the time Avtandil Ioseliani. Ardzinba charged deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers of Abkhazia Kapba with studying the issue
and making decision in cooperation with us. At the special meeting that
was attended by me, as Ioseliani's deputy (At the
time Ioseliani was in Tbilisi), and Minister of
Internal Affairs of Abkhazia General Lominadze, the
plan was approved by Enver Kapba.
But the plan was not destined to be fulfilled as establishment of order was
not in the interests of Ardzinba. It is impossible
to understand reasons but neither Lomindze made
great efforts to implement that plan. The fact is that efforts of security
service ended without results. Despite this, Ioseliani
spared no efforts and visited Tbilisi many times to solve this extremely important
issue. But everything was in vain. Once he even said to me: "Levan, Tbilisi has no time for us. If we do not take care
of Abkhazia everything will end much worse than anyone can imagine".
Everyone was engaged in political clashes and nobody had time for such vital
for the country problems as stopping lawlessness of criminals and protection
of railway communications. To say more, firm request to take strict measures
for the protection of the railway on the place, was perceived as wrong-timed
and as a caprice. Later it was exactly the
reason of protection of the railway that armed formations of Tengiz Kitovani entered
Abkhazia, a decision which was made by the Military Council and which was
strongly opposed by Avtandil Ioseliani.
This opposition was caused by knowledge what could have followed arrival of
although very patriotic but untrained and devoid of all military discipline
Georgian armed forces into Abkhazia. It was clearly a well-planned
provocation against Georgia but due to the existing situation it was
impossible to prevent it. Notwithstanding the fact that Georgian authorities
had a full right to make decisions about movement of armed forces around its
territory they were still obliged to calculate all possible complications in
Abkhazia. All the more that from operational data provided by us it was clear
that Ardzinba did not intend to make concessions
and movement of Georgian armed forces would give him a pretext for
fomentation of a fratricidal war. Everyone believes that
August of 1992 was the beginning of the tragedy in Abkhazia but in the spring
of the same year there already were almost all prerequisites that an armed
confrontation between Georgians and Abkhazians was to become inevitable. Then head of the Abkhazian
security services Avtandil Ioseliani
knew this better than anyone. He saw this and used to take very unpopular for
that time decisions. What is more important, and despite the pressure of
local Georgian leaders he managed and preserved a unified core of the
security service. Although Ardzinba tried to form
an alternative security service that was created under the name of state
protection service subordinated to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia but he
could not manage to win any of valuable workers over, just several backward
workers. First of all, it was due to the fact that no one in the security
committee of Abkhazia of the time dared to get openly involved in political
processes on either side as everyone saw how Avtandil
Ioseliani himself was trying to avert a bloody
confrontation. No matter whether some like it or not, we should also note
that the following was true: Despite a mixed attitude towards us (which
unfortunately continues until today) it was us who controlled better than any one else processes that were going on in various
layers of the society. The only difference was that unfortunately we did not
have leverage for influence. I say unfortunately because we were the
information service and those who could have reacted
they either did not believe our information or, worse, did not have time for
it. This happened even when the Abkhazian University became divided. We can
say it with some assurance that that was a day when a bridge was broken
between Georgians and Abkhazians as this was the first armed confrontation
that was organized by the Abkhazian side and for which Abkhazians were very
well organized. To this day neither party
mentions real reasons for the tragedy in Sukhumi that happened on July
15-16th, 1989 a victim of which, along with other Georgian youths, became a
prominent leader of the nationalist movement Vova Vekua. Nobody mentions because personal, mercantile
interests prevailed over national ones in the actions of some leaders of both
Georgian and Abkhazian part of the university. Unfortunately, provocative
appeals of Georgian leaders of secession were supported by a significant part
of professors and student body - although, despite this, no one can doubt
even for an iota their patriotism and love for their people. But at the time
refusal to support this kind of appeal was seen in the Georgian society as a
betrayal. therefore many often refrained from
expressing a reasonable opinion and were forced to go with the flow. We also negatively assessed
division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs already in the conditions of
existence of independent Georgia. I understand very well that Ardzinba illegally, without coordination with the centre
dismissed Minister Lominadze from the post, and
just as illegally appointed Ankvab to this
position. But, in retrospect, it is obvious that if we had the foresight and
patience and had not separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then –
I am sure - it would have been easy to find common ground with Ankvab for constructive cooperation. Nothing good for the
Georgian side came out of the division of the Supreme Council either. As it
was mentioned above, we had presented Ardzinba with
majority on a silver platter and this enabled him to take unlawful decisions
one after another. Georgian members of the parliament could not come up with
anything but to divide the parliament - and this fact also played into the
hands of separatists. I do not want to say that the Georgian parliamentarians
did not resist to those unlawful decisions. On the contrary, they, of course,
resisted, and we, Georgians, were proud watching their persistent struggle.
This charge of the parliamentary struggle was passing on to the population,
and it was to be followed by something. I do not know whose decision it was
about the division, but in my opinion, Georgian members of the parliament was
not supposed to refuse to participate in plenary sessions and they should not
have left the parliament. This should be regarded as a retreat on the
battlefield. Elected representatives of the people had no right to do so -
they were to fight to the end. The above-mentioned issues
have been constantly discussed, there always were disputes and even quarrels,
but within acceptable limits. I am not trying to convince anyone that we
supposedly had no problems with Abkhazian and Russian workers. On the
contrary, it was difficult to assess processes occurring among the Abkhazian
population, as information provided by Abkhazian workers did not reflect the
real situation. But despite this, the security services still were managing to
retain unity. And Ioseliani used to call other
leaders to this kind of unity and that, as it was already noted, irritated
many Georgian leaders. August 14th, 1992 is one of
the most tragic days in the long history of Georgian-Abkhazian relations. It
was that day when a fratricidal war started which probably could have been
avoided if any of the parties had the slightest idea of its heavy,
devastating results. And though Ardzinba almost did
not leave us a chance and he did everything to take Abkhazia out of the legal
space of Georgia, the State Council made no less a mistake, almost a crime,
when it decided to enter Abkhazia to restore order on the railway. But the
Georgian side's argument that the situation at the Abkhazian section of the
railway at that time required establishing order by use of force and that is
why in Abkhazia military forces were introduced seems quite weak. The
country's leadership was obliged to analyze possible difficulties. All the
more that as written or verbal intelligence presented by us showed that Ardzinba was searching for a reason to unleash a
fratricidal war. In addition, no special knowledge of military affairs was
necessary to calculate that it was impossible to reach a stated goal by using
armed formations of unskilled, collected in a matter of urgency volunteers.
All the more that most of their commanders, not to mention ordinary soldiers,
had no idea about the purpose of their introduction into Abkhazia. A main
goal of the Russian security services was to make the Georgian side yield to
provocation and to lure its armed forces into Abkhazia (even a time was
chosen precisely to transfer armoured vehicles from Akhaltsikhe
military base to Georgia). And events that unfolded afterwards did not demand
from them any development plan or special effort of mind. Ardzinba
also reacted instantly and drew Georgian armed formations into the
fratricidal war. Over the entire period
after the war a lot has been said about the war in Abkhazia. In Georgia, it
is difficult to meet a person who does not have his/her own view on the
Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation and in particular on the war. But
objectivity and impartiality of this view depends on who approaches and how
one approaches this question, how deep their knowledge of the real situation
that existed at that time in Georgia, and, in particular, in Abkhazia is.
Surprisingly, assessment also depends on what political faith people had at
that time, etc. But everything was obscure, and many are confused and cannot
understand what exactly caused the war or our defeat. One gets an impression that
it is not in us that one should seek causes of our defeat, which are not that
small. It is well known that during the war decisive importance is given to
coordinated, organized activities that are strictly subordinated to unified
military command, which the Georgian military formations not just lacked but
they were completely absent in the beginning of the war. Those armed
formations consisted mainly of volunteers, imbued with patriotic feelings.
But, unfortunately, among them were more than enough criminal elements that
went to war for "profit". More than 18 years have passed since the
end of the war and until today reasons for our defeat have not been reviewed
and investigated at the professional level. And this should be done not only
to punish the guilty, but primarily in order to prevent repeat of similar
mistakes. Instead, given the political reality that emerged in Georgia in the
post-war period, it was considered bad taste to even talk about any error on
our part. Otherwise where it is heard that the losing side in the war to be
handing out awards. And this is not about those brave young men who died and
whose heroic actions became known later, or they were not awarded at the time
due to some reasons. Also no one disputes that
memory of those killed or maimed in this war must have been properly
honoured. We are certain what everything is done for them and their families is far from enough. For obvious reasons, the
role of the state security service in the war in Abkhazia is a closed
subject. No one is interested and it is not seen anywhere what we were doing
in that period, or whether we were doing anything at all. The Club of Experts
decided to partially touch upon topics that we hope will be of interest to
readers. We allow ourselves also to talk about shortcomings which interfered
into or prevented implementation of operative-investigative activities. Let's start with the fact that
Eduard Shevardnadze, who came in the wake of the state coup, saw clearly that
he had been held hostage by the forces that overthrew Zviad
Gamsakhurdia and some of their adventurous leaders.
That is why many decisions were made based on populism and a desire to please
the agitated society rather than in favour of state interests. One of such
decisions was to rename the state security service and its transformation
into information and intelligence service that actually meant leaving the
country without security services. The Zviad Gamsakhurdia government also believed that it was
necessary and right to put the former KGB in the service of the country but
they did not know how to accomplish this (and how could they know). Top rank
officials have changed, but the core of operational workers remained almost
unchanged, unless one counts those who had clear anti-national position and
were forced to leave the security service voluntarily or under pressure. And
among the existing staff, of course, were officers deeply implanted by the
Soviet KGB and this was confirmed by later events. Unfortunately, reform of
the security services did not go further than that. It should also be noted
that irreconcilable confrontation, which arose between the Zviad Gamsakhurdia government
and the opposition, not only contributed to the division of Georgian society
into two hostile camps but also had a negative impact on activities of
employees of the security service. At that, the nearest circle of Zviad Gamsakhurdia by putting
constant pressure tried to use the security services and its resources as a
weapon against the opposition. And it was very painful for the public, when
they managed to achieve this, especially when it came to operational
record-keeping. A significant part of society which was in anticipation of
disclosure of personal files and gripped with "agentmania"
was overwhelmed by chaos and uncertainty. The situation was further
aggravated by the Russian security services, which through deeply implanted
workers and their agents exercised relevant influence on the situation (see
"Abkhazian separatism was born in the labyrinths of the KGB - Part
I-II). Naturally, reform of the security service was impossible in this
situation. As we noted above, the
State Council under the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze indeed renamed the
security service into the information and intelligence service, but no
reforms were carried out there, except a few personnel changes. Meanwhile
radical reorganization of the state security service was crucial for the
young independent state. I cannot say whose idea it was to deprive the
security service of all functions, except for intelligence, but realization
of what was in this idea, especially in Abkhazia, would have been tantamount
to treason. We can assume that one of the leaders of the national movement Irakli Batiashvili agreed to
head the service provided that the KGB changed its name and its function were
to be reduced. But after he, already in capacity of chairman of service,
familiarized himself with functions and resources of the security service,
its operational cases, he probably understood that then Georgia needed strong
state security service, staffed with experienced and loyal workers. So he did
the right thing, when he decided to maintain its functions. On this basis,
after consultation with the centre and by decision of Avtandil
Ioseliani who at the time was chairman of the
security service of Abkhazia, gathering of intelligence information remained
our main task. But no one was going to give up old functions either,
especially, as we noted in a previous articles, by order of Ardzinba security service of the separatist government
was already in operation and on its basis it was planned to create an
alternative security service subordinated directly to the Ardzinba.
As the course of the war showed later internal threats posed no less danger
to the country. Fighters of one of the Gumista front battalions captured a person in the evening
hours. He was swimming over from the other bank of the river Gumista – the dividing line of the front. When it was
determined in the headquarters that the captive was a North Caucasian
volunteer he was handed over to our workers that were dispatched there and
who brought him to the security service building. The North Caucasian was
under the strong influence of drugs. When it was possible to interrogate him
it was determined that after taking drugs he and his comrades decided to cool
in the river. A quick current took him towards the middle of the river. After
that he probably lost his bearings and found himself on the other side of the
river. For several days regular interrogations were fruitless. He stubbornly
maintained the same that he came to help his brothers Abkhazians in their
fighting. Aslan, whose full name and nationality we
do not specify for obvious reasons, clearly showed influence of the
propaganda that the Kremlin had been carrying out in the North Caucasus
peoples against Georgia long before the war. He was convinced that Abkhazia
was annexed by Georgia and he believed that the fight for liberation of the
Abkhazian people was the holy duty of the North Caucasian peoples.
Interrogations showed step by step that we were dealing with not an
adventurer or somebody who came there for a common profit but with quite
educated and ideologically well-versed opponent who had close relations with
the separatists. He even participated in the work of the so-called assembly
of representatives of the North Caucasian republics that was held in Sukhumi
in the summer of 1989. As we know it was this assembly where it was decided
to form the Assembly of the North Caucasian Peoples, chairman of the
coordination council of which was elected Musa Shanibov.
It was this assembly where Sukhumi was declared a capital of the non-existent
republic of the Caucasian mountainous peoples and for liberation of which Aslan and many other North Caucasian volunteers went
there. Afterwards when we became convinced that we could not get interesting
information about our adversary from Aslan we
changed out tactics. We told him that we would
release him but for some time he was to stay with us. A room in the security
service building was given to him and a guard was attached to him. Naturally
we shifted interrogations to the mode of dialogue and exchange of ideas. We
used to supply him with various historical and journalistic materials,
arranged meetings with several Abkhazians living in Sukhumi. A great impact
on him had a meeting with Lorik Marshania
to whom Aslan was presented as a guest from North
Caucasus. Obviously all this was
prior agreed with Aslan. Lorik
Marshania talked with Aslan
in details about the centuries-long history of co-existence of Georgians and
Abkhazians, he touched upon the Stalin period when rights of Abkhazians were
violated but he also noted that this was a result of the distorted national policy
of the Kremlin and not purposeful actions of Georgians – of Stalin and Beria
– against just Abkhazians. (As it came to this we should mention that if
Stalin and Beria hated Abkhazians, as it was presented by the separatists,
they could not have found it difficult to find a pretext, or even make up
one, to send them into exile, as it was done with North Caucasian peoples
during the Great Patriotic war, ed.). Aslan could
not hide his surprise when Lorik Marshania acquainted him with statistical data which
showed that Abkhazia was the only autonomous republic in the Soviet Union
constitution of which declared the Abkhazian language as a state language;
that there were 75 Abkhazian and mixed schools in Abkhazia; out of 65 memebers of the Supreme Council 28 were Abkhazians and 26
- Georgians, and the rest 11 were of other nationalities; out of thirteen
ministers eight were Abkhazians and five out of eight chairmen of the state
committees were Abkhazians; that in Sukhumi there were the State University
of Abkhazia, national television where programs where broadcasted only in the
Abkhazian language, state drama theatre of Abkhazia, museum of local history,
geography and culture, the D. Gulia
Literature-memorial museum, the state folk song and dance company, the state
choir of Abkhazia, women vocal-instrumental quartet Gunda,
ethnographic group Nartaa that was a holder of the
international prize of song and dance comprtition
of elders "golden peacock". As time passed we became
more and more convinced that our way of dealing with Aslan
was right. He gradually realized that he was bitterly deceived and could not
hide his outrage at the unimaginable ingratitude of Abkhazians. At that he
used to compare lives of Abkhazians with that of North Caucasian peoples,
noted with regret a deplorable state of his people in the conditions of the
colonial policies of the Russian empire. He also promised us that he would
help change opinions of many of his comrades and would try to convince them
to abandon their participation in the fratricidal war. However surprising it
may sound he asked us not to exchange him for a captured Georgian which was
usual practice in the similar situations since he wanted his stay with us to
be secret and for him to have an opportunity to act freely. We consented to
this and agreed terms of bilateral contacts and sent him to his homeland via
Tbilisi. We continued to meet him in Tbilisi from time to time during which
he gave us very important information about plans and intentions of the
separatists. It was no difficulty for Aslan to go
to the rival-controlled territories and even to the front line. Besides, as
it was noted above participation of Aslan in
various meetings organized by the separatists confirmed his close relations
not only with some leaders of the Abkhazian separatists, and especially with Vladyslav Ardzinba but with
influential persons of the North Caucasus also. During one of the meetings
in Tbilisi Aslan told us that close circle of Zviad Gamsakhurdia invited his
close relative together with several representatives of the North Caucasus to
one of the secret meetings in Grozny. There, at this meeting the so-called
confederates were asked to find a leverage to influence Ardzinba
in order to manage and stop the fratricidal war. But in addition to this they
and the confederates discussed also an issue of possible assistance for the
armed formations of Loti Kobalia in Zugdidi who intended to start an armed rebellion in
western Georgia against "Khunta". At this
very meeting Aslan's close relative found out that
at the necessary time some Georgian armed formations were to take themselves
out of the Abkhazian fronts and were to join the Loti Kobalia
unit and take part in the military actions in Samegrelo.
From the outset Aslan did not consider the promises
of the "confederates" about the stopping of the war serious. And he
later confirmed this when at out request he managed
and learnt from one of the leaders of the Abkhazian separatists that they not
only did not intend to stop the military actions but were going to fight till
the complete victory and their task would have been made much easier if the
Loti Kobalia armed formations were to start
military actions in Samegrelo. After carrying out
relevant operational and technical and operational measures the information
given by Aslan was confirmed by other sources. And
later events of July-August-September of 1993 made everything clear and
completely revealed actions of Loti Kobalia. Against the background of
the actions of the radical wing of the supporters of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia and especially of Loti Kobalia during the course of the entire war we believed
it necessary to tell readers about North Caucasian volunteer Aslan who without any pressure or force diametrically
changed his position when he realized that he was deceived. It is hard to
believe that Kobalia and his supporters whose minds
were clouded by hatred towards Shevardnadze that they did not understand into
which hands they were playing into by blocking the highway and stopping the
railway communication and thus completely frustrating the rear of the front.
More, practically opening the second front even if under a pretext of
restoration of the legitimate authority of Zviad Gamsakhurdia ,
doing this at the time when the fate of the territorial integrity of the
country was being decided can only be assessed as the anti-state action .
Later we will try to describe several facts which will make readers convinced
in correctness of our assessments of the actions of Loti Kobalia. To be continued
Originally published at: http://eng.expertclub.ge/portal/cnid__8425/alias__Expertclub/lang__en/tabid__2546/default.aspx
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