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The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in
the Malacca Straits
By Catherine Zara Raymond[*]
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The Joint War
Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's Market Association announced last week that the
Malacca Straits would remain on its list of areas at risk from terrorism and
other related perils. The announcement came despite a collective campaign by
the three littoral states of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore to
have the Malacca Straits removed from the list (Jakarta Post, January 22). The
decision of the Joint War Committee is based on risk assessments of the region,
which concluded that the Straits are a terrorist target. This will mean
increased shipping costs for ships transiting the Straits. When similar war
insurance premiums were applied to ships calling at Yemeni Ports following the
terrorist attack on the French supertanker the MV Limburg in 2002, the impact
on the Yemeni economy was severe.
The initial decision in June 2005 to put the Malacca Straits on the JWC list
caused an outcry from the three littoral states. According to the Singapore
Shipping Association, the classification is "unjustified and an
exaggeration of the actual situation" and "the committee's decision
does not do justice to the efforts put in by the littoral states" (Jakarta
Post, January 22). This view was supported by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak who declared that "there existed an unfair
perception of the security situation in the Straits" (New Straits Times,
December 5, 2005). Indeed, over the last three decades maritime terrorist
attacks have constituted only two percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide
and, apart from a small number of hostage-taking incidents, none of these have
taken place in the Malacca Straits. In addition, despite predictions by
academics and the media alike that it was only a matter of time before the
Straits were blocked by an attack or that ships in the Straits would be used as
"floating bombs," this has not been the case.
This article seeks to assess the extent of the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia and in particular in the Malacca Straits,
a waterway of great strategic and economic importance.
The Threat of Maritime Terrorism
It is well known that Southeast Asia is home
to a number of militant Islamic groups. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is based in the Philippines, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia,
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),
which primarily operates from Indonesia,
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) based in the Philippines.
The al-Qaeda network is also believed to have established a presence in the
region following the destruction of its bases in Afghanistan. All of these groups
are known to use the maritime environment for logistical purposes, have
developed maritime capability or have made preliminary steps toward acquiring
capability in this area. In addition, either through statements or past
activities, all of these groups have displayed a desire to target economic or
maritime targets.
In 2001, it was revealed that JI had planned to attack U.S. naval
warships visiting the region. More recently, evidence suggests that JI has been
conducting training in the southern Philippines in order to develop an
underwater destruction capability. ASG was responsible for what has been
labeled the most lethal maritime terrorist incident since 2000 with its attack
on the MV Superferry 14 in Manila in 2004, which killed over 100 people
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2004). GAM admitted to carrying out an
attack on a boat being chartered by Exxon Mobil in 2002 in Aceh and is
suspected to have carried out a number of kidnap-for-ransom attacks on vessels
in Indonesian waters during the last four years. MILF is responsible for attacks
on Philippine shipping, mainly placing bombs on inter-island ferries being used
to transport members of the armed forces and Christians to and from Mindanao.
Another issue that has caused alarm and has enforced the perception that the
region and its waterways are at risk from terrorism is the massive increase in
incidents of piracy during the last decade. Not only has the high frequency of
pirate attacks drawn attention to the vulnerability of shipping in the region,
but there has also been a worry that pirates and terrorists could join forces.
In particular, terrorists could employ the pirate's great wealth of maritime
knowledge to carry out a devastating attack on a commercial port or a shipping
operation (The Business Times Singapore, May 21, 2004).
The evidence certainly points to the fact that the threat from maritime
terrorism in Southeast Asia is real. Given
that the Malacca Straits has been described as one of the arteries of the
regional if not global economy, and is transited on an annual basis by
approximately 63,000 ships, an attack on shipping in this waterway would also
seem to be a real possibility. Nevertheless, no such attack has yet
materialized.
ASG and MILF traditionally operate within their locality of the Philippines and
its surrounding archipelagic waters; it would be uncharacteristic of them to
carry out an attack on shipping in the Malacca Straits. This is related to the
fact that they are both separatist groups, with the aim of establishing an
independent Islamic state in the Philippines. Therefore, their
targets tend to be either located within the country, or closely associated
with it. GAM is also a separatist group and while there may be some overlap in
terms of its area of operations and the Malacca Straits, its targets have
traditionally included the Indonesian military and security forces. In
addition, GAM has just signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government,
which includes the disarmament and demobilization of its 3000 fighters (PNG
Post-Courier, August 23, 2005).
Through this process of elimination, the group that would appear to be the only
real threat to shipping in the Malacca Straits is JI. The group has shown an
interest in attacking shipping in the Straits and vessels visiting Changi Naval Base in Singapore and is suspected of
developing more expertise in this area. Its maritime capability, however,
remains underdeveloped when compared to its land capability. Attacks against
targets in the maritime domain would require specialized equipment and skills;
depending on the target, they may also require knowledge of shipping patterns,
boat operation and maintenance, and boarding techniques. This explains the
predictions of a piracy-terrorism nexus, of which there is still no evidence.
Various explanations have been proffered as to why there is still no sign of
any cooperation between pirates and terrorists. One explanation is that the
majority of those committing acts of piracy in the Malacca Straits are largely
un-organized petty-criminals who use piracy as a way of supplementing their
inadequate income. These small groups and individuals may not be willing to
cooperate with terrorists who, through their high-profile activities, may
trigger a complete crackdown on all maritime crime.
Carrying out an attack in the maritime domain also presents a number of
difficulties that are not encountered on land. First, if the aftermath of an
attack is to be captured by the media, which is often the wish of a terrorist
group, then the attack needs to be carried out close to land. This then
considerably compresses the theater of operations, as only coastal areas and
ports would be suitable. Second, surveillance at sea of potential targets
offers less cover and concealment than on land and entails the same
environmental challenges as any maritime activity.
Conclusion
The threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia
and specifically in the Malacca Straits is real and should not be ignored. Yet,
an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the threat is paramount. This is
vital for the development and implementation of targeted and effective
counter-measures. Due to the complexities of operating within the maritime
domain and the unpredictable nature of the marine environment, attacking
targets on land has remained the preferred choice of many of the region's
terrorist groups. Until there is a significant level of target hardening on
land, this is likely to remain the case in the future.
In addition, following 9/11 much has been done to enhance maritime security in
the region. Measures include the introduction of the "Eyes in the
Sky" aerial patrols last year, the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols
implemented in 2004, and the creation of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code in the same year. The implementation of these
initiatives has helped to reduce some of the vulnerabilities of the maritime
industry. If this level of cooperative activity continues, the result should be
an even further reduction of the threat from maritime terrorism.
Originally published by
JAMESTOWN TERRORISM MONITOR at www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369896
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