YETT  Young Experts’ Think Tank


 Erin Brocklebank-Johnson







The newly independent states of the Transcaucasia region have recently found themselves to be at the centre of a commercial triangle which involves the United States, Russia, and oil.  This region which encompasses Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia is important internationally because of its ‘virgin’ oil fields and its ‘vulnerable’ governments.  Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, these states gained a shaky independence from Russia.  As a result of proximity and history, the influence of the Russian Federation is prominent and on going in this area.  The United States has found itself trying to maintain a precarious balance between not stepping on the toes of the Russian government and supporting (fiercely at times) its commercial interests in the Caspian[i] region.  And not surprisingly, Transcaucasia has its own policies regarding the extraction and transportation of oil.  It looks to the US for economic and military support, yet is also engulfed in the contradictory foreign policies of the Russian Federation. 

            This essay seeks to examine the nuances of this triangle, particularly with reference to the geopolitical obstacles to oil extraction and transportation and the shared responsibilities of the three governments and various investors involved.  I will argue that no matter how much money is pumped into and how much oil is pumped out of the region, the geopolitical problems in Transcaucasia will still exist and may even worsen.  Therefore, the political problems, which investors call ‘obstacles’, must be dealt with pre-investment.  It is not feasible to invest first, and look to the accumulation of wealth as a precursor to solving complex ethnic conflicts.   It is certainly not the intent of this essay to say that investment must be halted.  Instead, these countries must be given a chance, between now and the actual ratification of oil deals, to work with non-governmental institutions, other governments, and international organizations in an attempt to stabilize their governments and find suitable arrangements for long term solutions to the ethnic conflicts in the area. 

            This discussion will begin with an examination of the actual oil potential of the region.  Contention prevails in international debates regarding the amount and actual investment prospects.  Next I will discuss the position and the role of the three Transcaucasus states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and analyze the broad effects of oil investment from the mindset of their respective governments.  It is only fitting that this be followed with an outline of the perspectives of both the US and Russian foreign policies regarding the extraction and transportation of oil from this region.  What we will find is that although this region may prove relatively lucrative in area of oil trade, there are many geopolitical ‘obstacles’, which may become inflamed and/or cause a bottleneck in investment.  This part of the discussion will lead us to realize that the most profound of these complications is ethnic disputes in the oil trade area.   

The essay will then turn to the complexities of shared responsibility, between the interested states, both domestic and foreign, and the investors involved regarding solutions to political problems in the region, namely corruption and ethnic conflict.  The essay will conclude with a discussion regarding the present state of oil deals in the Transcaucasus region, along with a prescription of possible ways to include outside assistance pre-investment, in order to ensure a stable long term investment climate which is both advantageous for all peoples of the region, and the external governments and investors involved.


The Oil in the Region:

            The Transcaucasus region, snuggled between the Caspian and Black Seas, is in an exceedingly oil rich area.  Although the actual numbers of potential oil barrels varies from one source to another, it can be estimated that it might be as high as 200 billion barrels[ii], making it a close second to Iraq, or as low as 15 billion barrels[iii], which questions the very profitability of investment in the area. Because of the vast difference between these two numbers, there are various levels of contention regarding the actual oil potentiality in the area.  Some theorists believe that it would be pointless to engage in an extremely expensive oil venture in the Caucasus, while others argue that it is significant enough to be lucrative.  For the purposes of this essay, we will not spend much more time on this debate, and instead settle that the amount of oil in the Caucasus is high enough to be immensely profitable. 

            Throughout the twentieth century the oil from this region played a vital role in supplying many foreign countries during times of both war and peace.  During the First World War, Germany became quite interested in exploiting the oil fields of Baku for their wartime effort. 

                        In summer 1918, the New York Times argued that

safeguarding Caucasian oil field should be a priority

for the Allies, and that they had to be prepared to devote

a significant military force to this project.[iv]


During the Second World War, Hitler also tried to use oil from the Caucasus to facilitate his ambitions of expansionism.  As a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, Caucasian oil made up one third of the energy resources imported by Nazi Germany.[v]  In times of peace following the Second World War, the oil fields of Transcaucasia became the pawn in the games between the Turkish and Armenians, eventually falling under Soviet control.  With the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia found themselves newly independent, with almost exclusive rights to their own resources.  I say almost exclusive because it must be understood that although they had claimed independence from the Soviet Empire, they were still greatly influenced and pressured by their former ‘mother’ country.

            The biggest oil fields in the Transcaucasus region are in Azerbaijan.  While Georgia and Armenia are much less significant in terms of reserves, Georgia has a very important role to play in oil transport.  Most of the large pipelines which have either been started or are planned for the future will run through each of these countries.  The Baku-Supsa pipeline which begins at the port of Baku in Azerbaijan, ends at the port of Supsa in Georgia.  Ports such as these have become extremely profitable for the host countries.  The infamous Baku-Ceyhan pipeline runs from Baku again, through Georgia and ends up in the port of Ceyhan in Turkey.  Much of the oil in the Caspian region is found off shore, which raises interesting questions regarding ownership rights, which due to the brevity of this article cannot be delved into.  Some of the largest offshore Caspian oil basins are in the Kyapaz and Gunashli fields of Azerbaijan which is now under development.[vi]  Georgia plays a more important role than Armenia in the transport of oil, because most present and proposed pipelines actually go around Armenia.  However, Armenia does have some small, yet commercially viable oil deposits. 




Perspectives of Transcaucasia:

            The countries of Transcaucasia have found themselves in a sort of boom or bust situation.  As a result of the oil reserves both offshore and onshore, states such as the United States and Russia have taken an intense interest in the area commercially.  For example, the United States has invested large amounts of money in Azerbaijani development, while situating itself militarily in Georgia.  There are two main aspects of oil trade which the Caucasus considers as imperative to their own political and economical development: increased sovereignty, and European integration.  All three governments claim that the oil trade will reduce their dependence on the Russian Federation, while simultaneously offering increased acceptance into NATO and Europe.  However, on the negative side, it becomes clear that too much dependence on foreign investment can collapse a domestic economy which is as vulnerable as those in the Caucasus.

                        The Caspian Sea states, having survived the first harsh

                        years of independence, are seen as being fully committed

                        to developing their resources in partnership with international

                        energy companies in order to solidify their sovereignty

                        and secure their future as fully independent and prosperous

                        states, at peace with their neighbours and integrated

                        into the global economy.[viii]


            Resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the three countries, although formally independent, were left heavily dependent on Russia because of their centrally planned economies.            The revenues of oil trade are a hopeful way of being able to wean themselves off of Russia’s influence, to gain domestic stability and control over their own foreign policies.  Each of the three governments want to diversify their energy investors in order to achieve this.  Georgia hopes to allow many different pipeline operations to go through its territory, while Azerbaijan has oil trade deals with, among others, the United Kingdom, Europe, Japan, Russia and the United States.  The question is whether the accumulation of wealth from this diversified investment portfolio will really lead to any sort of tangible change in the infrastructure or domestic political policies of these nations.

            The competition over oil resources in Transcaucasia has attracted the interest of many NATO countries.[ix]  Governments in Georgia and Armenia in particular are extremely interested in the attention from these countries, and hopes that it will further their plight for European integration.  Azerbaijan has asked that NATO bases become permanent on Azeri soil in order to exert pressure on Russia, and to help in maintaining a relatively peaceful situation with its neighbours, particularly Armenia.  Georgia has also asked that UN or NATO peacekeepers replace the Russian troops in Abkhazia.  Both Georgia and Azerbaijan stated in 1999 that they wish to leave the CIS Collective Security Treaty.[x]  This definitely caused an uproar in Moscow as Russian influence would be reduced dramatically if it did not have any sort of guaranteed security presence in the region.

            Basically, all three countries of Transcaucasia yearn to completely release themselves from the yolk of Russian influence, while developing normal inter-state relations with the help of Western countries.  These countries are likely to receive considerable monetary attention from the West due to their large oil reserves, and the potential of their oil transport corridors.  However, we must realize that what these countries actually need is developmental assistance in the way of political advice and education in order to move their economies away from the centrally planned Muscovite version, to a more internationally feasible liberal market model.  If this does not happen pre-investment, then the governments will find themselves no longer under the Russian sphere of influence, but instead, extremely dependent on Western countries economically.  This would be detrimental to any sort of independent development in the near, or even far, future for Transcaucasia.


Interests of the United States:

            As can be gathered from the above information, the United States has definitely been a large player in oil extraction and trade in Transcaucasia.  Since the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the US has become increasingly interested in the potential for profitable resource extraction in this area.  The US has established a recent policy goal of diversifying oil partners in order to better guarantee a steady uninterrupted supply of oil to maintain American consumption patterns.  The American government wants to get away from dependence on Persian Gulf oil, especially during what has been labelled the war on terrorism.  Also, the US is always interested in new resource investment opportunities which are almost guaranteed to yield a high return.

            Diversifying oil partners has been on the American agenda for quite some time, and although the US has invested in Canadian, Russian, Middle Eastern and African oil, none of these oil exporting countries have the potential for as high a profitability margin as does the Transcaucasus. In this region the US has shown particular interest in Azerbaijan, which has been illustrated by the high amounts of foreign aid the US plugs into the Azeri government every year.   Perhaps one reason which may account for the high aid amounts is that the government of Azerbaijan is vulnerable to outside pressures, especially those which are exerted by the United States.  The United States senses the Azeri disillusionment towards Russia, and is glad to step into a country which has such open arms to Western liberal capitalism.  The only problem is that Azerbaijan has an unstable government which will not only find itself influenced by Western pressure, but which may actually bend completely to the needs and policies of the United States. 

            The United States has recently shifted its multi-pipeline oil trade policy to one which supports single large projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline which would link Azerbaijan to Turkey.[xi]  This seems a bit surprising, considering that the original policy of multi-pipeline support was intended to lower environmental and geopolitical risk factors which may impede the extraction and transport of oil in this region.  Interestingly, the Caspian states also support the multi-pipeline ideal as it helps to ensure that no one country can exert too much pressure on the area.[xii]

            Laurent Ruseckas states that the chief stated objective of the US toward the newly independent nations of Transcaucasia is “to encourage their evolution into strong, independent states based on democracy, the rule of law and market economics.”[xiii] The US seeks to help maintain a balance of powers in the area, by protecting the Caucasus region from its main external pressure, Russia.   Although the US states that it does want to encourage the development of these states into strong, independent nations, it is an objective which is complex, and needs more than high investment amounts.  The American government, if truly concerned about the stability of these states, needs to support them pre-investment with administration assistance, in order to help in making the situation for both the Transcaucasian peoples and American investors advantageous.


Interests of the Russian Federation:

            Russian foreign policy regarding the Transcaucasus region and oil trade is one which is rife with contradictions.  One group of government officials, including past foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, argued that oil is a way of keeping power in the post-soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This group convinced past President Boris Yeltsin to sign the secret directive ‘On Protecting the Interests of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea’ which states that one of the chief foreign policy goals is to maintain a strong sphere of influence in the region.[xiv]  This group sees any large investment by Western countries as a direct threat to the influence of Russia in the area.  They usually don’t support any joint ventures regarding oil trade, although that is beginning to change.  The other side of the coin is represented by the Prime Minister, and oil-industry officials who argue that Western participation in the extraction and transport of oil in the Transcaucasus region is actually beneficial to Russia because it ensures access to technological advancements.[xv]  

                        They have worked for Russian inclusion in Western

                        consortia in order to improve their own technology,

                        to establish a foothold in world oil markets, and to

                        share in the profits available to those on the markets.[xvi]


An unsurprising result of the Russian perspectives being so diametrically opposed to one another, has been that the response to issues regarding oil trade has been disjointed.  Usually it comes down to the first school condemning, usually publicly, the actions of the second.  The government officials who argue against including Russian firms in consortiums condemn the actions of the country’s gas giants; LUKoil and GAZPROM. 

            Recently, the position of the Russian Federation has begun a bit of a turn around.  Although Russia yearns to maintain control in the region, it is realizing that turning its back on Transcaucasia oil ventures, in order to maintain distance from Western influence, is ill-advised.   Russia has a very fragmented investment climate of its own, with countries like the United States pulling out of oil deals because of lengthy and confusing negotiation processes.  Russia simply cannot afford to not be part of the consortiums which are investing in Caspian oil.      


‘Obstacles’ to Oil Export:

            There are many geopolitical obstacles to oil export in the Caspian region.  It must be understood that many of these are results of Transcaucasia’s communist past.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armneia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were left with a communist infrastructure and democratic dreams.  Obviously, the two do not mix well.  There are two main constructions which must take place before a post-communist nation can be open to high foreign investment:

            The construction of viable market economies.

            • The establishment of working institutions of representative democracy.[xvii]


As can be surmised from the above political description of Transcaucasia, none of the three nations is truly a positive example of a post-communist nation. Corruption has always been a particular problem of not only communist, but also post-communist governments.  The problem tends to lie in the fact that accountability is greatly diminished in a nation which has no representative democracy. 

Due to the necessity of brevity, this portion of the essay will study only one of the many political problems which serves as an obstacle to oil trade in all three countries, that of ethnic conflict.  For a better understanding, I will use the territorial dispute, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Nagorno-Karabakh[xviii] as a case study.  Upon studying the complexities, the multiple alliances, and the historic underpinnings, it will be clear that this dispute will not fade with the onset of foreign investment, but must instead be dealt with pre-investment by international organizations, non-governmental organizations investment companies.  This will help the host nation become stable and confident as it develops policies regarding separatism and ethnic disputes.  If these struggles are not sufficiently managed pre-investment, they will only become more acute as accumulated wealth is not properly disbursed in the region. As we will see later in this paper, assisting newly independent nations is a shared responsibility.

Ethnic Conflicts and Obstacles to Pipeline Development in Caucasus: [xix]


Issue and Location

Parties Involved


Obstacles to Pipeline

War over Nagorno-Karabakh, in Western Azerbaijan


Armenia and (diaspora), Azerbaijan, Russian military, OSCE.

Long standing ethnic dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region

Planned pipeline going through northwest Azerbaijan and SW Georgia could be attacked from Armenian controlled territory.

War over status of Abkhazia in North western Georgia.

Ethnic Abkhaz in Georgia and Turkey, Georgia, Russian military, Armenians.

Separatist movement which escalated into war during 1992-1994.  Involvement of Chechen and Russian military.

Potential for long term instability due to refugee problem and localized terrorist attacks.

War over status of South Ossetia in North Central Georgia.

North and South Ossetia, Georgia, Russian Military.

Separatist movement which escalated into civil war early 1990s.  Situation remains one of ‘frozen instability.’

Potential problems for West routes, and high potential for  disruption of northern bypass to Novorossysk or Southern bypass to Medit.


            As the above chart illustrates, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is one of numerous ethnic disputes which has ravaged the Transcaucasian region.   The NK dispute is exemplary of many similar situations in the area, in that it arises from a similar avenue: “newly independent Soviet successor states or their internal autonomies challenge the artificial borders imposed on them by the Kremlin during the Soviet era.”[xx] The land of NK as shown below in the map, is situated in western Azerbaijan, even though this region is predominately made up of ethnic Armenians.  The nation of Armenia supports the actions of NK because it believes that it was ambiguously separated from its mother country (Armenia) during the Soviet era. The NK military forces have occupied large amounts of Azeri territory between Armenia and NK in order to create a sort of land bridge which would eventually link them to their ‘mother’ country.[xxi] Besides intense fighting which was only recently, although dubiously, halted by ceasefire, the dispute has caused a refugee crisis with over a million displaced persons in the area.  This situation has also involved in the United States, because the US supports the Azeri government through large amounts of investment and foreign aid.  The US, France and other Western countries as well as Russia, want the NK area returned to Azerbaijan, which is absolutely intolerable to the Armenians.  The war in Nagorno-Karabakh is the longest running conflict in the post-Soviet republics.[xxii] 




            Ethnic conflicts, such as the dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh, are considered ‘obstacles’ to oil investment because they are unpredictable, which may cause unplanned disruptions in oil extraction and transportation.  The area of Nagorno-Karabakh is important to both the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa Pipeline Projects because the actual route of both pipelines transverse quite close to NK and surrounding territory.  The major threat to the pipeline is that extremist Armenians, may attack the pipeline and disrupt the flow of oil out of Azerbaijan.[xxiv]   One of the biggest problems with potential pipelines going through Armenia and present pipelines going near Nagorno-Karabakh is that the Armenians in both places do not share in the accumulation of wealth.  This leaves them feeling embittered towards their neighbours of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.  It is impossible for the Transcaucus region to cooperate financially in any oil dealings, because of this and other historic animosities.  Although the problem of disbursement of wealth is not really considered a pressing ‘obstacle’ to development by major investors, it should be.  Investors are more concerned about the actual security risks along pipeline corridors.[xxv]  Because security risks result from unsolved conflicts and unfair wealth disbursement, preventative action must be taken.  The investor countries must first prepare the host country with effective conflict management skills in order to aid in making the investment opportunity in Transcaucasia more beneficial for everyone involved.


 A Shared Responsibility

            Investing states, non-governmental organizations and international organizations need to work together to come up with satisfactory conflict management policies which would enable the Transcaucasian area to cooperate financially.  This would be beneficial to all involved because it could dramatically lower the risks to oil investors, while at the same time aiding in a sort of peace process in the region.  This is by no means a ‘new’ theory[xxvi] but what is novel about this thesis is that intervention must happen pre-investment in order to set the climate for high profitability and low geopolitical risk before disruptions happen along pipeline routes which cause companies enormous amounts of money to fix.

Prescriptions for intervention pre-investment include: [xxvii]

• investment companies must initiate a web of commercial agreements beforehand which would facilitate increased regional cooperation.


• the US should expand its efforts through multilateral institutions such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program to help stabilize the region pre-investment.


• an organization, such as ASEAN, with a neutral mediator, must be implemented in the region to control regional security issues, making possible an open dialogue between disputing parties, which may aid in creating ceasefire agreements prior to investment disruptions.


• careful analysis and attention must be paid to statements made by observer NGOs such as Human Rights Watch,  Greenpeace, Amnesty International and local/regional organizations which specialize in the geopolitics of this area.


• aid in building infrastructure, such as transportation links and communication technology in order to benefit the local people of the area.


• responsible and accountable action by investment companies regarding such issues as upholding international law, human rights and environmental issues must be committed to pre-investment in order to establish an environment which is fair for people and the living earth.


            As can be deduced from the above prescriptions, there is a role for interested parties in making the investment climate in Transcaucasia one in which the benefits are felt by all people involved.  This calls for increased action by international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as increased accountability by companies.  It is no longer satisfactory or accepted practice to simply extract resources from a vulnerable state, and then leave the floundering government to deal with the results.  This shows that the responsibility must be shared before actual heavy investment begins.



            As this paper comes to a close, it is important to remember that oil investment is a positive endeavour in developing countries, as long as certain rules of conduct and procedure are followed.  All interested parties must make an effort to understand the perspectives of each other, and to establish stable policies before actual investment begins.  Countries such as the United States and Russia must continue to act in joint ventures or consortiums in order to balance the effects of foreign influence in the area.  Oil investment is definitely part of the solution in Transcaucasia because it will bring considerable wealth to the area, as long as the governments have assistance in developing long-term policies to deal with distribution.

            As I write this, oil deals are being negotiated in Azerbaijan, and the construction of pipelines is taking place near Armenia and through Georgia.   Although it seems as though the pace of development in this region makes it impossible for any intervention pre-investment, we must remember that there is always time to aid those that need it the most.  Environmental assessments need to be fully complete before extraction, human rights abuses by security personnel need to be criminalized, and international law, such as that of contracts, needs to be properly interpreted and negotiated with the help of a neutral mediator.

            In conclusion, I will remind the reader that the point of this paper was to illuminate the fact that regional problems, namely ethnic conflicts, will not go away with the simple idea that money from oil investment will eventually help Transcaucasia work out its disputes.  It is not enough to throw money at the problem.  Instead of investing directly into resources, we must begin by investing into people and governments.  Only then will the oil politics of Transcaucasia be truly profitable.























[i] For the purposes of convenience I will use the terms Caspian, Transcaucasus and Caucasus interchangeably to refer to the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the directly surrounding areas.

[ii] Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, at, 3.

[iii] Dr. Bahman Aghai Diba, Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: The Biggest Development, in Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connection, Volume 7, Issue 19, Oct 01 2002. Also Amy Jaffe, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus at 1

[iv] Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia at, 4.

[v] Ibid, 4.

[vi] Amy Jaffe, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus, at

[vii] Chart courtesy of Azerbaijan Country Brief at .

[viii] Sheila N. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and Outlook, at 3.

[ix] Dr. M.A. Smith, Geopolitical Challenges to Moscow in the Transcaucasus, the UK Ministry of Defence at 2.

[x] Ibid, 4.

[xi] Laurent Ruseckas, US Policy and Caspian Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-Ceyhan, at 1.

[xii] Shiela N. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and Outlook, at 3.

[xiii] Laurent Ruseckas, US Policy and Caspian Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-Ceyhan at 1.

[xiv] Rosemarie Forsythe,  The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia at, 8.

[xv] Ibid, 8.

[xvi] Ibid, 8.

[xvii] Both of these are courtesy of Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly’s Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World in World Politics 53 (October 2000), 1.

[xviii] Nagorno-Karabakh will be referred to as NK or Nagorno-Karabakh interchangeably.

[xix] This chart is altered from the original by Sheila N. Heslin,  Chart: Political Constraints to Pipeline Development at

[xx] Richard H. Solomon, Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, USIP Peaceworks 25.

[xxi] Ibid, 1.

[xxii] Information courtesy of Nagorno-Karabakh,

[xxiii] Map courtesy of Nagorno-Karabakh,

[xxiv] Nagorno-Karabakh,

[xxv] Sheila N. Heslin, Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and Outlook at , 6.

[xxvi] See authors such as Sheila N. Heslin and Amy Jaffe.

[xxvii] The first three of these were inspired by Sheila N. Heslin’s work.












• Cornell, Dr. Svante E., US Policy in ‘Caspian-Asian’: Imperatives of the Strategic Vision a bi-weekly briefing from the cacian analyst at,


  Diba, Dr. Bahman Aghai.  Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: The Biggest Development,  Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connection, Vol. 7 Issue 19, October 01 2002.


  Henderson, Karen and Neil Robinson. Post Communist Politics: An Introduction, (London: Prentice Hall) 1997.


  Jaffe, Amy Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus – Main Study, Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, April 1998. at


  Kasenov, Oumerserik. Russia and Transcaucasia: Oil, Pipelines and Geopolitics,  The     Eisenhower Institute,


   Kopstin, Jeffrey S. and David A. Reilly. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World, in World Politics 53 (October 2000), 1-37.


  Ruseckas, Laurent.  US Policy and Caspian Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-Ceyhan, a BCSIA Publication at


  Solomon, Dr. Richard H., Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, USIP Peaceworks Papers, Volume 25.


  Smith, M.A. Geopolitical Challenges to Moscow in the Transcaucasus, the UK Ministry of Defence.


  The following documents are from the website (Radio Freedom Europe)

            Russia Oil Firms Trying to Step up Exports to US

            Georgia: Javakheti Armenians Call for Autonomy has Tbilisi on Guard


• The following articles are from :

            Why US Oil Companies and Russian Resources Don’t Mix.


• The following Country Briefs are from the website

            Caucasus Regional Country Brief

            Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief


• The following description of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is from