YETT Young Experts’ Think Tank
Marjan Etemadi-Shad:
A Comparison of the Baltic States and the South Caucasus During the
Post-Soviet Era
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p3
2. The Significance of Leadership
Attitudes……………………………………………………………..p4
3. Relations between the Titular Nation and
Minorities………………………………………….p6
4. Comparative Style of
Governance…….………………………………………………………………………p8
5. The Effect of Geography on
Progress…………………………………………………………………….p10
6. The Legacy of Soviet
Occupation………………………………………………………………………………p12
7.
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p13
8.
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………p14
Introduction
1991 marked the dissolution of
the Soviet Empire. Out of the ashes of
the communist polyglot came fifteen new states; four in Eastern Europe, three
in the Baltics, three in the South Caucasus, and five in Central Asia. More than a decade after independence, the
states are managing the transition to statehood with uneven levels of success.
This paper will focus on the
states of two of these regions, the Baltics and the South
Caucasus. While neither
region is a singular entity, the states within do share enough common benefits
and/or limitations with each other, within their respective area, to group them
together. The experiences of these two
regions have been wildly disparate. While
the Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania have prospered, albeit at varying
degrees, the South Caucasian states of Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan have
suffered, again to varying degrees, since the demise of the Soviet
leadership.
In order to elucidate why these
two regions find themselves where they are today, this paper will compare them
in five areas; the attitudes of the leadership towards independence in 1991;
the relations between the titular nation and minorities; the style of
governance adopted; the effect of geography; and the legacy of the Soviet era.
The Significance of Leadership Attitudes
The
attitudes of the indigenous elite towards independence were important in the
direction of the post-Soviet states.
While both the Baltic and South Caucasian elite welcomed independence,
the South Caucasian elite were far less benevolent in their intentions.
The
Baltic leaders, in line with their citizens, supported independence from the Soviet Union. The
Baltic region had been taken under Soviet control in 1940, during the
progression of World War Two, and the Soviets had thus been seen as an
occupying force since. After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union the Baltic states saw themselves as ‘restored’ as opposed
to ‘new’. This perception of restoration hints to the
independence of Baltic thought. The
Baltic elite were not as inculcated to the Communist dogma as other leaders of
the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR); they always maintained ties to their
Scandinavian neighbours to the west. In
the 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika, the Baltic elite began to regain control of politics
and institute local initiatives; such as citizenship delineation in Lithuania in
1989. The effect of this was a united population,
both elite and working-class, in support of independence. This allowed the transition to independent
statehood to begin immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, perhaps even earlier.
The elite
of the South Caucasus also welcomed independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia and Armenia trace their national
identity to pre-Russian times, but saw independence as an avenue to amassing
power and wealth without regard to their requisite communities. Former Communist bosses wield the strings of
power in autocratic presidential systems in all three of the South
Caucasus states.
President Eduard Shevardnadze was
Gorbachev’s Foreign Minister and came to power in Georgia after the suicide of
original president Gamsakhurdia’s suicide the year after Soviet dissolution. In Azerbaijan, the loss of
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian separatists caused the resignation of original
president Elchibey with current president Heydar Aliyev, the former head of
Azerbaijani KGB, gaining control. Both
these leaders have ruled with an iron fist in their respective countries. Armenia saw a leadership change
after the first president, Ter-Petrosyan, was forced to resign due to his
inaction on human rights abuses. There
remains a significant disjuncture between the political elite and the populace. In all three of the South
Caucasus states, there has been a dearth of
institution-building. The elite have
been more interested in consolidating their power and enriching themselves than
consolidating democracy and enriching their peoples.
The
primary divergence in leadership attitude between the Baltic states
and the South Caucasus is the commitment to
democratic institutions and the rule of law.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
are far ahead of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in respects to this
commitment.
Relations between the Titular Nation and Minorities
Relations
between the titular nation and minorities within the country play an important
role in the direction of the post-Soviet states. As in the previous section, the experiences
of the Baltics and South Caucasia differ
significantly.
The titular
nations of the three respective Baltic states
are all well-consolidated ethnic groups. Their self-perceived status as ‘restored’
states, as opposed to ‘new’, and the large number of Russians living in them,
brought concern of how ethnic relations would progress in the Baltics. While citizenship for all residents has not
been automatic, concern of ethnic tension has passed. Estonia
and Latvia
have large non-titular population, primarily Russians,
that comprise close to half their respective populations but minority
marginalization has been minimal. While
some exclusionary practices in regards to citizenship have been adopted this
can hardly be surprising after fifty years under the Russian heel. The composition of Lithuania’s population, on the other
hand, is eighty percent ethnic Lithuanian.
With the security of Lithuanian culture in no doubt, citizenship
criteria is much more lax. All factors
accounted for, the Baltics have been a destination for
minorities.
The South Caucasus states have much more divisive relations
between the titular nation and minorities.
In Georgia,
the division played out with both ethnic and religious connotations. It is a primarily Christian nation with Islam
being the secondary religious affiliation.
Separatist movements sprang up in three regions; Abkhazia, Adjaria, and South Ossetia. A
particularly bloody civil war occurred in Abkhazia but it should be noted that
the region is only 10% Muslim and 20% Abkhaz and Russia had a primary role in
fomenting dissent by dispatching mujhadeen
to fight. South Ossetians wanted to
separate from Georgia even
before the disintegration of the Soviet Union
in 1991. Adjaria’s separatist movement
is not very strong as the Adjars are ethnic Georgians and their Islamic
identity is secondary. This internal
dissent has hampered the ability of the central authorities to effect economic
change and dissuaded the use of Georgian territory as a transit point for oil
from the Caspian Sea region.
In Armenia and Azerbaijan relations between the
titular nation and the minority Azeris and Armenians, respectively, have been
hostile. The Armenian minority
concentrated in Nagorno-Karabakh, located in southwestern Azerbaijan, seized the enclave and receive
assistance from Armenia. Attempts at rapproachment by either government have been met with animosity on
the streets of both states; it is rumoured that the assassination of the
Armenian Prime Minister in 1999 was linked to his negotiations with Azeri
officials concerning N-K. Atrocities committed by both Azeris and
Armenians have been documented by the international community, notably in Baku in which the
involvement of Russian operatives is rumoured.
The relations between the titular nation and minorities has
helped cause the divergent paths regarding progress concerning the Baltic
states and the South Caucasus. While the Baltic states have been able to accommodate and
assimilate their minorities, the South Caucasian states have been rife with
violence between the titular nations and their respective minorities.
Comparative Style of Governance
The style
of governance is vastly different in the Baltics than it is in the South Caucasus.
This is the fundamental difference between the regions.
The Baltic states are all liberal
democracies. The 2002 Freedom House
Survey, which rates political rights and civil liberties from one to seven,
with one being most free and seven being not free, scores Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania quite high. The three states
garnered identical scores of one on political rights and two on civil liberties. They are all embedded electoral democracies
that also have open economic systems; Estonia even had to institute extra
economic regulation in order to apply for the European Union. The Baltics were aided by the fact that the
post-Soviet elite worked to construct and consolidate democratic institutions. The transition from Soviet Republics
to electoral democracies was nearly seamless.
The
states of the South Caucasus are far less
democratic; they are essentially presidential dictatorships. The 2002 Freedom House Survey
rated Azerbaijan
the worst of the three with a six for political rights and a five for civil
liberties. Armenia
and Georgia
garnered identical records of four for both political rights and civil
liberties.
The 2000
parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan
had raised hopes that democratic institutions were consolidating with some
election reform legislation but those hopes were dashed with severe
irregularities in both the conduct and counting of votes. President Aliyev has done a good job of
holding the country together and, with his vast political experience, helped
the country overcome severe setbacks but democracy must continue to move
forward. The people of Azerbaijan have
been the guarantors of progress since independence, taking to the streets if
need be, but an unresponsive political process seems to have engendered apathy. Georgia’s
President Shevardnadze has had to parry the meddling of Russia into the
affairs of his country. He has done so
with a mix of hardline action and compromise with Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, and Adjaria.
President Kocharian of Armenia
has been responsive to his people; his antecedent in the position,
Ter-Petrosyan, had been forced to resign owing to his inaction on human rights
abuses. The absence of oil-related
industry actually benefits Armenian democracy.
Fareed Zakaria posits that reliance on natural resources, particularly energy,
as the basis to a national economy increases corruption and authoritarianism
and diminishes democratic processes.
The style
of governance in the Baltic states
is far more conducive to economic progress and popular support. While elections occur in the South Caucasus, their legitimacy is questioned and
popular participation beyond elections is minimal.
The Effect of Geography on Progress
The
geographical locations of the Baltics and South Caucasus
play a major role in the progress of the post-Soviet states.
The
Baltics are located on Europe’s northeastern
edge. While this places them close to
domineering Russia it also
allows engagement with Europe proper. The three Baltic states are all in negotiations to join the two
pre-eminent European institutions; NATO and the EU. NATO would provide security while EU would
provide access to hundreds of millions of consumers. These institutions also provide a safety net
for the citizens and government. While
the responsibilities of membership are not slight, the benefits are
significant. Their location has also
allowed for the genesis of a service –based economy, as opposed to
resource-based. There has also been
relative peace in the region since World War Two; the threat of Armageddon kept
much from happening. Location has helped
the Baltic states,
particularly by offering the opportunity the join NATO and the EU.
The South
Caucasus is located in the nexus between Turkey
to its west, Russia to the
north, Iran to the south,
and Central Asia to the east. Azerbaijan’s
border on the Caspian Sea affords it large
resources of oil and gas, which has proven to be both a gift and a curse. In order to capitalize on this resource Azerbaijan has
to move it to a market. This seemingly
simple objective is the common denominator to many of the region’s
problems. The traditional route is through
Russia,
who then takes their cut. A new proposed
route bypasses Russia and
goes through Georgia on to Turkey. Russia
has done it’s best to foment instability in the South
Caucasus in an effort to dissuade investors from providing the
necessary funding. This has included
inciting the Abkhazian uprising, provoking the South
Ossetians, and instigating an Azeri-Armenian feud, including mass
atrocities. Turkey
supports the Azeri’s, who are Turkic themselves, Iran
supports the Armenians as a hedge against it’s Caspian
competitor Azerbaijan, and
the United States supports Georgia.
All three of the major
nationalities in the South Caucasus consider themselves European but with Turkey, who has an identity crisis itself,
between them and continental Europe, the
euro-perception does not run both ways.
The Baltics on the other hand are much closer and are considered a part
of Europe proper; and have access to the great
European institutions.
The Legacy of Soviet Occupation
The legacy of Soviet occupation
has weighed heavier on some post-Soviet states than others.
The Baltic states were able to switch their orientation
from east to west relatively seamlessly.
Radar stations once occupied by the Red Army are now pointed towards Russia, feeding
updates of activity to NATO. The period
of occupation there was much shorter than other areas and local identity
remained firm. The authoritarian style
of Soviet governance has been replaced by democracy.
The legacy of Soviet occupation
in the South Caucasus is a lot more entrenched; Georgia still has Russian bases on
its soil. The involvement of Russia in so many of the key events in the South Caucasus since independence seems to warrant an
asterisk beside the description of the South Caucasian states as “independent”. As recent as last year, Russian bombers were
hitting the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia
and President Putin threatened invasion.
Former Communist bosses still hold positions of power in the South Caucasus and look entrenched to remain so.
Conclusion
The post-Soviet states have had
significantly different experiences. The
Baltic states and the
South Caucasian states have had particularly disparate experiences. Five key areas can be discerned that have had
significant ramifications on the countries today; leadership attitudes towards
independence, relations between the titular nation and minorities, style of
governance, effect of geographic location, and the legacy of Soviet
occupation. The effect of these has been
to help the Baltic states prosper while the converse
has occurred in the South Caucasus;
floundering with little hope in the future.
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