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Battle of Tbilisi
Within the next 24 hours in spite of sustained resistance
of the Georgians, the forces of Soviet Russian Central Group took over
strategically important Yaghluja heights while the troops of Left Group
(Soviet Russian and Soviet Armenian) entered the towns of Ekaterinenfeld and
Elisavettal thus pushing the Georgians back to the line Kodjori-Manglisi,
whereas the vanguard of the 26th Rifle Brigade and Mounted
Regiment of 9th Rifle Division penetrated Georgian territory as
far as the village of Beyuk-Kyasiq. By that moment, the remnants of Georgian
Lori group entrenched along the left bank of Khrami river with their flank
dangerously open to the Red Army 54th and 58th Rifle
Brigades advancing from the Red
Bridge. That weakness
resulted in their total defeat by the end of the 16th of February.
In fact, this was the perfect moment for the Red Army to
storm into Tbilisi
keeping in mind that by the early morning of the 17th of February the
defense forces of the Georgian capital were limited to 400 battle-worthy
soldiers and some 150 Military School Cadets. Nobody else was prepared to
defend Georgian capital while the reserves were still on their way to the
front line and the remnants of jaded Georgian units were in the process of reorganization. Meanwhile, Zakatala
direction faced fierce battles for the town of Dedoplis-Tskaro from early 17th until
the late 18th of February. The skirmish at Dedoplis-Tskaro resulted in severe casualties from both sides
including the death in action of Soviet brigade commander Kuryshko who was in
charge of the whole right group of the invading 11th Army.
During the first days of war, Georgian government tried to address Moscow in order to stop
the war but the only answer they were repeatedly getting from the Kremlin was
that there was no war but “some local border clashes” .
Click on the map to get high resolution image
Meanwhile, the Red Army got a serious problem in their
rear. National uprising started in recently sovietized Armenia and between the 16th and 18th
of February Armenian nationalist rebels were launching their assault on Yerevan.
Early in the morning of February 18, the
Commander-in-Chief of all Soviet forces in the Caucasus, Vladimir Gittis,
issued an order demanding intensification of all military operations and
immediate capture of Tbilisi, Surami and
Borjomi by the 11th Red Army with the Terek group simultaneously
taking over the Dusheti district to the south of Main Caucasus
Range. Other units of
the 11th army not involved in the invasion of Georgia were
to strengthen the garrisons of Elisavetpol (Gianja) and Shusha in order to
prevent possible anti-soviet uprisings in the surrounding area, prevent the
spread of Armenian national uprising into Kazakh and Naxcivan districts and
launch more active operations against anti-soviet guerillas in Lenkoran. The
operations of the 11th Army in Kakheti was to be accompanied with
an attempt to seal Georgia’s
border with Daghestan where guerilla warfare was still going on. At the same
time, the 9th Red Army stationed in Sochi
district was to take over Gagra and Sukhumi
in Abkhazia in cooperation with pro-Bolshevik rebels of Abkhazia who launched
an uprising sponsored by Soviet Russia.
Following the above order, the right wing of the 11th
Army was to take Karatapa and Karadjalar with two rifle regiments and two
mounted squadrons enforced with the red cadet battalion that just arrived
from Baku while the 18th Mounted
Division was to take Signakhi, Avchala and Mtskheta thus outflanking Tbilisi from North-East
and sealing a major retreat route.
At the same time, the central group was to secure Yalghuja
heights, which the Georgians were desperately trying to take back.
The forces of the left wing of the 11th Army
were to take over Kodjori heights and possibly Manglisi and after that enter Tbilisi from the South and secure the bridges across Kura (Mtkvari) river. In case of successful capture of
Manglisi the troops stationed there were to develop their offensive towards
Akhalkalaki.
Soviet air forces were to bomb railway stations and
communications in and around Tbilisi.
The above plan clearly demonstrates that the Soviet
command was quite sure to achieve quick victory. The Soviets counted on
panic, weak and ineffective resistance, active fifth column (Georgian
Bolsheviks), possible lack of popular willingness to fight as well as
weakness and non-professionalism of Georgia’s
social-democratic leadership. To a great extent the situation in Georgia came
up to Soviet expectations. The government in Tbilisi did not expect Soviet invasion and
had no clearly defined concept of national defense. The armed forces were
under-funded and the commanders had no clearly defined rights and
responsibilities. Had that situation been different, there was a good
chance for Georgia not
only to defeat the invading Red Army but completely push it out of the South
Caucasus in cooperation with Armenian nationalist rebels, Daghestani
guerillas and at least passive anti-Bolshevik resistance in Azerbaijan.
It is hard to underestimate active support of
Sovietization of the South Caucasus provided by Kemalist Turkey. Since the beginning of
the first Soviet-Georgian skirmishes, Turkish Nationalist troops were ready
to invade Georgia
from the South and South-West and occupy all or at least some of the disputed
territories. In addition, during the first days of the Soviet-Georgian war,
there were two visiting Turkish officers at the Georgian General Staff who
kept providing the Red Army command with strategically important information
by wiring it through Ankara.
Facing the disaster and almost total military collapse of
the country, the government of Georgia followed the old pattern
by appointing the retired general George Kvinitadze commander-in-chief of all
Georgian armed forces. Outstanding strategist Kvinitadze immediately reported
to the government that keeping in mind the current situation only miracle
could save Georgia
and for the fourth time in three years led Georgian troops to defend their
country.
The first order issued by Kvinitadze was to move all
troops he had at his disposal in and around Tbilisi
back to the ring of heights dominating the terrain around the capital and
contain the enemy on Kodjori-Tabakhmela-Shavnabada-Soganlugi line until the
arrival of reinforcements from internal Georgia.
General George Kviniitadze, 1920
Simultaneously, Kvinitadze ordered most of the troops
protecting Abkhazia from the advancing 9th Army to re-deploy to
Tbilisi leaving minimal amount of soldiers in front of Gagra to retreat
slowly along the coastal line with rearguard fighting aimed at wearing out
and containing the enemy until the moment when possible success near Tbilisi
would allow some troops to be sent back and re-take whatever is lost in
Abkhazia. However, even that measure did not prove sufficient for success
although it allowed to postpone the loss of Georgian capital to the Soviets.
February 18-20
Early in the morning, on February 18 the artillery barrage
from board of two Georgian armored trains stationed on he left bank of Kura
(Mtkvari) river forced the Soviets to withdraw from Yaghluja heights their
heavy artillery that was placed on the heights the night before to shell
Georgian positions in front of Tbilisi. That successful Georgian operation
deprived of artillery support the central group of the 11th Army
that launched offensive on Tbilisi
at night of February 18 and in the morning of February 19. The mountainous
range forming natural fortification half-circle to the South-East of Tbilisi along Kodjori-Tabakhmela-Shavnabada-Soganlugi
line, was protected by some 5.5 army and guard battalions as well as some 150
cadets of Tbilisi
Military School. Several attacks of the Reds
resulted in their defeat and retreat.
Modern view of Shavnabada monastery
By the end of 19.02, the 54th Brigade of the
20th Rifle Division was thrown back from the village
of Shavnabada while the 58th
Brigade was literally decimated near the town of Soganlugi by its 1500 defenders with
several armored cars, artillery support from two armored trains and a number
of bomb raids of two airplanes. That day the 58th Brigade lost
over 530 dead as well as some 1000 prisoners and had to retreat to Sakaraulis
mountain.
Georgian military pilots, 1921
According to the Insignia Magazine No. 4 / 2008, the Georgian Airforce had an estimated
strength of 56 Aircraft by Febuary 1921, including 25 Ansaldo SVA-10 and one
Sopwith Camel.
On the left flank the 96th rifle brigade of the
Reds reinforced by the 12th Mounted brigade captured by the end of
Febuary 19 the village
of Kodjori because its
Georgian defenders ran out of ammunition. That was a serious defeat that
could result in the immediate loss of Tbilisi
because since that moment Georgian capital could be heavily shelled from
Kodjori heights, not to mention that possession of Kodjori allowed the Reds
to attack the defenders of Tabakhmela from the rear. To prevent this, General
Kvinitadze managed to put together all his reserves including two new
battalions that just arrived from Western Georgia
and gave them an order to take Kodjori heights
back. Meanwhile, early in the morning of February 20, several dozens of
Georgian cadets with one officer, counter-attacked the advancing 96th
Brigade near the village of Tsavkisi and managed to contain them for a while
until several hours later, the last Georgian reserves counter-attacked the 96th
Brigade from Tskhneti and Tabakhmela and re-captured Kodjori together with
several pieces of heavy artillery that the Soviets were mounting on top of
the heights at the very moment of successful Georgian counter-attack.
Georgian cadet Boris Hechtmann
West of Kodjori, Soviet cavalry group made several
attempts to take over the town of Manglisi
that fell to their hands by the end of the next day only.
On the right flank the 26th Rifle brigade of the 11th
Red Army took the railway station of Rustavi
and stormed towards Tbilisi
along Tbilisi-Elisavetpol railroad. On the 19th of February
however, it was stopped by the Georgians between the villages of Karajala and
Karatagla. Several hours later the 26th rifle brigade was forced
to retreat as far as Amartouli mountain where it was reinforced with a
mounted regiment of the 9th Rifle Division. North-East of the
railroad, the Reds advancing from Sartichala were also stopped in
Orkhevi-Lilo area on the 19th of February and by the end of the 20th
they were thrown back East of Sagarejo.
Further North-East of Tbilisi the 18h Mounted Division
advancing from Telavi took over Signakhi and by the end of the 20th
of February appeared in Kachreti-Kalauri area threatening to envelope
Georgian capital from the North.
Thus, the end of the 20th of February, 1921,
marked the failure of the Soviet-planned blitzkrieg. Georgian defenders of Tbilisi withstood the
first attempt to take over the city, and the heavy casualties of the 11th
Red Army made it incapable of any serious action during the next 4 days.
Decades later, soviet military analysts mentioned severe winter and the
destruction of the Poylu railroad bridge that did not allow the Reds to move
their armored trains and platforms with tanks to the war theater. Georgian
analysts in their turn, tend to believe that Tbilisi withstood the first blow due to the
enthusiasm of the army and almost all strata of the civil society.
Click on the map to get high resolution image
February 24-25
During the four days following the victories at Kojori and
Soganlugi, Georgians were planning to
launch a counter-offensive against the 11th Red Army from their positions
between Lilo and the left bank of Kura (Mtkvari) river in order to throw the
Reds as far back from Tbilisi as possible. However, shortage of manpower made
that plan unrealistic. Meanwhile, the Red Army kept increasing its numerical
superiority by receiving reinforcements that consisted of well-organized
troops with combat experience on the fronts of Russian civil war of
1918-1920. During the above-mentioned four days, Soviet engineers also
managed to repair the Poylu railway bridge, and the 5 armored trains of the
Red Army could come close to the front line together with the tanks mounted
on railway platforms.
British made Mark-V tank used by the red army at the battle of Tbilisi
Early in the morning on February 24, the 11th
Red Army received a new order, this time also demanding immediate capture of Tbilisi. 24 hours prior
to the new offensive, all the forces of the 11th Army were
re-grouped into two wings, left and right of Kura (Mtkvari) river.
The right wing of the 11th Army was to advance on Tbilisi trying to
envelope the city from North-East. This group consisted of the 9th Rifle
Division and the 18th Mounted Division both subordinate to Nikolai Kuybyshev.
The backbone of this group was the 26th Rifle Brigade combined with the 154th
Rifle Regiment (5 rifle regiments altogether) that was to launch offensive
supported by armored trains and tanks from the position between the Lilo
railway station and the left bank of Kura.
Additionally, the 12th Mounted Division re-deployed on the 21st of
February from the left wing was to storm into Tbilisi
bypassing Lilo, take over the bridges across Kura
and further advance on Mtskheta following the retreating Georgians.
Simultaneously, the 18th Mounted division was to raid through Sortichala and
Martkobi towards the railway station of Avchala. The capture of Avchala would
seal Tbilisi
at the west and make impossible both the evacuation of the Georgian
government and organized retreat of the army. If it failed to capture
Avchala, the division was to destroy the railway to the west of Tbilisi in as many
places as would be possible in order to block the movement of trains. The
offensive of the right wing was to be actively supported by Soviet airplanes.
Click on the map to get high resolution image
The left wing of the 11th Army under the
command of Mikhail Velikanov was to enter Tbilisi
from the right bank of Kura (Mtkvari) and
develop further offensive on Mtskheta. In order to fulfill this task, the 25th,
54th and 58th Rifle Brigades supported by heavy
artillery battalion, were to take over the Tabakhmela and Shavnabada heights.
The 96th Rifle Brigade supported by the 9th Mountain
Battery, Red Armenian irregulars and Red Cadets from Baku
- was to capture the Kodjori
heights. At the same time, the combined cavalry group consisting of the
Mounted Regiment of the 20th Rifle Division, Red Armenian Mounted
Brigade and one light battery, was to storm into Tbilisi
from the West through the village
of Tskhneti.
The following 48 hours were marked by fierce fighting
around the Georgian capital. In spite of overwhelming superiority of the
enemy, Georgian soldiers, guardians, cadets and irregulars put up stiff
resistance, especially along the line Lilo-Kura, Kodjori heights, near the village of Tabakhmela and Height 104, as well as
in Shavnabada section. Many positions changed hands several times because
each time the Soviets took them, Georgian counterattacks forced them to
withdraw. All the defense positions around Tbilisi were evacuated by the end of
February 25 only after Georgian troops were given an order to retreat. Most
of them withdrew in perfect order.
Hugo Maler, Georgian
Counterintelligence chief
In fact, the Soviet plan of full encirclement of Tbilisi failed. The 18th
Mounted Division that was to block the evacuation route west of Tbilisi managed to capture the village of Martkobi.
However, several miles to the west, near the village of Norio
it had to withstand a desperate counter-attack of scanty Georgian cavalry
(400 against 1500). The 18th Division managed to defeat the
Georgians near Norio and stormed further westwards along
Mamkoda-Gldani-Avchala line. Avchala station was captured by the Soviets for
several hours but evacuated by the end of the 24th after the
counterattack of Georgian irregulars from Tbilisi supported by an armored train. This
local victory made it possible to successfully evacuate the national
government and battle-worthy armed forces that occurred next day.
Simultaneously, the combined Cavalry group that tried to
attack Tbilisi
from the West, had no success in her attempts to defeat the Georgians
entrenched around strategically important. Height-1496. After a series of
ineffective attacks supported by artillery barrage on the 24th and 25th
of February, this group relocated north-eastwards to Tskhneti area where it
also proved unable to crush Georgian resistance. However, the mounted patrols
of this group appeared in Digomi area, and Georgian command considered that
maneuver a serious threat.
Newspaper clip informing on the deaths in action
Field nurse Maria Makashvili mentioned in the above clip as killed in
action
Keeping in mind the overpowering numerical and technical
superiority of the Red army, Georgian command made a decision to evacuate all
positions around Tbilisi
as well as the capital city herself. Both the well-organized retreat of
Georgian army towards Mtskheta and quick evacuation of the Government
occurred by the end of the 25th of February. While losing the
capital, Georgians managed to save both their armed forces and administration
to continue armed resistance.
On February 25, the “Revolutionary Committee” moved into Tbilisi from Shulaveri and for the second time
proclaimed itself the only legitimate government of Georgia.
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