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Battle of Tbilisi
Within the next 24 hours in spite of
sustained resistance of the Georgians, the forces of Soviet Russian Central
Group took over strategically important Yaghluja heights
while the troops of Left Group (Soviet Russian and Soviet Armenian) entered
the towns of Ekaterinenfeld and Elisavettal
thus pushing the Georgians back to the line Kodjori-Manglisi,
whereas the vanguard of the 26th Rifle Brigade and Mounted Regiment
of 9th Rifle Division penetrated Georgian territory as far as the
village of Beyuk-Kyasiq. By that moment, the
remnants of Georgian Lori group entrenched along the left bank of Khrami river with their flank dangerously open to the Red
Army 54th and 58th Rifle Brigades advancing from the Red Bridge.
That weakness resulted in their total defeat by the end of the 16th
of February.
In fact, this was the perfect moment for
the Red Army to storm into Tbilisi
keeping in mind that by the early morning of the 17th of February
the defense forces of the Georgian capital were limited to 400 battle-worthy
soldiers and some 150 Military School Cadets. Nobody else was prepared to
defend Georgian capital while the reserves were still on their way to the
front line and the remnants of jaded Georgian units were in the process of reorganization.
Meanwhile, Zakatala direction faced fierce battles
for the town of Dedoplis-Tskaro from early 17th
until the late 18th of February. The skirmish at Dedoplis-Tskaro resulted in severe casualties from both sides including
the death in action of Soviet brigade commander Kuryshko
who was in charge of the whole right group of the invading 11th
Army. During the first days of war, Georgian government tried to
address Moscow
in order to stop the war but the only answer they were repeatedly getting
from the Kremlin was that there was no war but “some local border clashes” .
Click on the map to get high resolution image
Meanwhile, the Red Army got a serious
problem in their rear. National uprising started in recently sovietized Armenia
and between the 16th and 18th of February Armenian
nationalist rebels were launching their assault on Yerevan.
Early in the morning of February 18, the
Commander-in-Chief of all Soviet forces in the Caucasus, Vladimir Gittis, issued an order demanding intensification of all
military operations and immediate capture of Tbilisi,
Surami and Borjomi by the
11th Red Army with the Terek group
simultaneously taking over the Dusheti district to
the south of Main
Caucasus Range.
Other units of the 11th army not involved in the invasion of Georgia were
to strengthen the garrisons of Elisavetpol (Gianja) and Shusha in order to
prevent possible anti-soviet uprisings in the surrounding area, prevent the
spread of Armenian national uprising into Kazakh and Naxcivan
districts and launch more active operations against anti-soviet guerillas in Lenkoran. The operations of the 11th Army in Kakheti was to be accompanied with an attempt to seal Georgia’s
border with Daghestan where guerilla warfare was
still going on. At the same time, the 9th Red Army stationed in Sochi district was to take over Gagra
and Sukhumi
in Abkhazia in cooperation with pro-Bolshevik rebels of Abkhazia who launched
an uprising sponsored by Soviet Russia.
Following the above order, the right wing
of the 11th Army was to take Karatapa
and Karadjalar with two rifle regiments and two
mounted squadrons enforced with the red cadet battalion that just arrived
from Baku while the 18th Mounted
Division was to take Signakhi, Avchala
and Mtskheta thus outflanking Tbilisi from North-East and sealing a major
retreat route.
At the same time, the central group was to
secure Yalghuja heights, which the Georgians were
desperately trying to take back.
An unknown Georgian officer in new-style uniform
The forces of the left wing of the 11th
Army were to take over Kodjori heights and possibly
Manglisi and after that enter Tbilisi
from the South and secure the bridges across Kura
(Mtkvari) river. In case of successful capture of Manglisi the troops stationed there were to develop their
offensive towards Akhalkalaki.
Soviet air forces were to bomb railway
stations and communications in and around Tbilisi.
The above plan clearly demonstrates that
the Soviet command was quite sure to achieve quick victory. The Soviets
counted on panic, weak and ineffective resistance, active fifth column
(Georgian Bolsheviks), possible lack of popular willingness to fight as well
as weakness and non-professionalism of Georgia’s
social-democratic leadership. To a great extent the situation in Georgia came
up to Soviet expectations. The government in Tbilisi did not expect Soviet invasion and
had no clearly defined concept of national defense. The armed forces were
under-funded and the commanders had no clearly defined rights and
responsibilities. Had that situation been different, there was a good
chance for Georgia not
only to defeat the invading Red Army but completely push it out of the South
Caucasus in cooperation with Armenian nationalist rebels, Daghestani
guerillas and at least passive anti-Bolshevik resistance in Azerbaijan.
It is hard to underestimate active support
of Sovietization of the South Caucasus provided by Kemalist Turkey.
Since the beginning of the first Soviet-Georgian skirmishes, Turkish
Nationalist troops were ready to invade Georgia from the South and
South-West and occupy all or at least some of the disputed territories. In
addition, during the first days of the Soviet-Georgian war, there were two
visiting Turkish officers at the Georgian General Staff who kept providing
the Red Army command with strategically important information by wiring it
through Ankara.
Facing the disaster and almost total
military collapse of the country, the government of Georgia followed the old pattern
by appointing the retired general George Kvinitadze
commander-in-chief of all Georgian armed forces. Outstanding strategist Kvinitadze immediately reported to the government that
keeping in mind the current situation only miracle could save Georgia and
for the fourth time in three years led Georgian troops to defend their
country.
The first order issued by Kvinitadze was to move all troops he had at his disposal
in and around Tbilisi back to the ring of
heights dominating the terrain around the capital and contain the enemy on Kodjori-Tabakhmela-Shavnabada-Soganlugi line until the
arrival of reinforcements from internal Georgia.
General George Kviniitadze,
1920
Simultaneously, Kvinitadze
ordered most of the troops protecting Abkhazia from the advancing 9th
Army to re-deploy to Tbilisi leaving minimal amount of soldiers in front of Gagra to retreat slowly along the coastal line with
rearguard fighting aimed at wearing out and containing the enemy until the
moment when possible success near Tbilisi would allow some troops to be sent
back and re-take whatever is lost in Abkhazia. However, even that measure did
not prove sufficient for success although it allowed to
postpone the loss of Georgian capital to the Soviets.
February
18-20
Early in the morning, on February 18 the
artillery barrage from board of two Georgian armored trains stationed on he left bank of Kura (Mtkvari)
river forced the Soviets to withdraw from Yaghluja heights
their heavy artillery that was placed on the heights the night before to
shell Georgian positions in front of Tbilisi. That successful Georgian
operation deprived of artillery support the central group of the 11th
Army that launched offensive on Tbilisi
at night of February 18 and in the morning of February 19. The mountainous
range forming natural fortification half-circle to the South-East of Tbilisi along Kodjori-Tabakhmela-Shavnabada-Soganlugi
line, was protected by some 5.5 army and guard battalions
as well as some 150 cadets of Tbilisi
Military School. Several attacks
of the Reds resulted in their defeat and retreat.
Modern view of Shavnabada
monastery
By the end of 19.02, the 54th
Brigade of the 20th Rifle Division was thrown back from the village of Shavnabada while the 58th
Brigade was literally decimated near the town of Soganlugi by its
1500 defenders with several armored cars, artillery support from two armored
trains and a number of bomb raids of two airplanes. That day the 58th
Brigade lost over 530 dead as well as some 1000 prisoners and had to retreat
to Sakaraulis mountain.
Georgian military pilots, 1921
According to the Insignia Magazine No. 4 / 2008, the Georgian Airforce had an estimated strength of 56 Aircraft by Febuary 1921, including 25 Ansaldo
SVA-10 and one Sopwith Camel.
On the left flank the 96th rifle
brigade of the Reds reinforced by the 12th Mounted brigade
captured by the end of Febuary 19 the village of Kodjori
because its Georgian defenders ran out of ammunition. That was a serious
defeat that could result in the immediate loss of Tbilisi because since that moment Georgian
capital could be heavily shelled from Kodjori
heights, not to mention that possession of Kodjori
allowed the Reds to attack the defenders of Tabakhmela
from the rear. To prevent this, General Kvinitadze
managed to put together all his reserves including two new battalions that
just arrived from Western Georgia and gave them an order to take Kodjori
heights back. Meanwhile, early in the morning of February 20, several dozens
of Georgian cadets with one officer, counter-attacked the advancing 96th
Brigade near the village of Tsavkisi and managed to
contain them for a while until several hours later, the last Georgian
reserves counter-attacked the 96th Brigade from Tskhneti and Tabakhmela and
re-captured Kodjori together with several pieces of
heavy artillery that the Soviets were mounting on top of the heights at the
very moment of successful Georgian counter-attack.
Georgian cadet Boris Hechtmann
West of Kodjori,
Soviet cavalry group made several attempts to take over the town of Manglisi
that fell to their hands by the end of the next day only.
On the right flank the 26th Rifle brigade
of the 11th Red Army took the railway station of Rustavi
and stormed towards Tbilisi
along Tbilisi-Elisavetpol railroad. On the 19th
of February however, it was stopped by the Georgians between the villages of Karajala and Karatagla. Several
hours later the 26th rifle brigade was forced to retreat as far as
Amartouli mountain where it was reinforced with a
mounted regiment of the 9th Rifle Division. North-East of the
railroad, the Reds advancing from Sartichala were
also stopped in Orkhevi-Lilo area on the 19th
of February and by the end of the 20th they were thrown back East
of Sagarejo.
Further North-East of Tbilisi the 18h
Mounted Division advancing from Telavi took over Signakhi and by the end of the 20th of February
appeared in Kachreti-Kalauri area threatening to
envelope Georgian capital from the North.
Thus, the end of the 20th of
February, 1921, marked the failure of the Soviet-planned blitzkrieg. Georgian
defenders of Tbilisi
withstood the first attempt to take over the city, and the heavy casualties
of the 11th Red Army made it incapable of any serious action
during the next 4 days. Decades later, soviet military analysts mentioned
severe winter and the destruction of the Poylu
railroad bridge that did not allow the Reds to move their armored trains and
platforms with tanks to the war theater. Georgian analysts in their turn,
tend to believe that Tbilisi
withstood the first blow due to the enthusiasm of the army and almost all
strata of the civil society.
Click on the map to get high resolution image
February
24-25
During the four days following the
victories at Kojori and Soganlugi,
Georgians were planning to launch a
counter-offensive against the 11th Red Army from their positions
between Lilo and the left bank of Kura (Mtkvari) river in order to throw the Reds as far back
from Tbilisi as possible. However, shortage of manpower made that plan
unrealistic. Meanwhile, the Red Army kept increasing its numerical
superiority by receiving reinforcements that consisted of well-organized
troops with combat experience on the fronts of Russian civil war of
1918-1920. During the above-mentioned four days, Soviet engineers also
managed to repair the Poylu railway bridge, and the
5 armored trains of the Red Army could come close to the front line together
with the tanks mounted on railway platforms.
British made Mark-V tank used by the red army at the
battle of Tbilisi
Early in the morning on February 24, the 11th
Red Army received a new order, this time also demanding immediate capture of Tbilisi. 24 hours prior
to the new offensive, all the forces of the 11th Army were
re-grouped into two wings, left and right of Kura (Mtkvari)
river.
The right wing of the 11th Army was to
advance on Tbilisi
trying to envelope the city from North-East. This group consisted of the 9th
Rifle Division and the 18th Mounted Division both subordinate to Nikolai
Kuybyshev. The backbone of this group was the 26th Rifle Brigade combined
with the 154th Rifle Regiment (5 rifle regiments altogether) that was to
launch offensive supported by armored trains and tanks from the position
between the Lilo railway station and the left bank
of Kura. Additionally, the 12th Mounted
Division re-deployed on the 21st of February from the left wing
was to storm into Tbilisi bypassing Lilo,
take over the bridges across Kura and
further advance on Mtskheta following the
retreating Georgians. Simultaneously, the 18th Mounted division was to raid
through Sortichala and Martkobi
towards the railway station of Avchala. The capture
of Avchala would seal Tbilisi at the west and make impossible
both the evacuation of the Georgian government and organized retreat of the
army. If it failed to capture Avchala, the division
was to destroy the railway to the west of Tbilisi in as many places as would be
possible in order to block the movement of trains. The offensive of the right
wing was to be actively supported by Soviet airplanes.
Click on the map to get high resolution image
The left wing of the 11th Army
under the command of Mikhail Velikanov was to enter
Tbilisi from the right bank of Kura (Mtkvari) and develop
further offensive on Mtskheta. In order to fulfill
this task, the 25th, 54th and 58th Rifle
Brigades supported by heavy artillery battalion, were to take over the Tabakhmela and Shavnabada
heights. The 96th Rifle Brigade supported by the 9th
Mountain Battery, Red Armenian irregulars and Red Cadets from Baku - was to capture the Kodjori
heights. At the same time, the combined cavalry group consisting of the
Mounted Regiment of the 20th Rifle Division, Red Armenian Mounted
Brigade and one light battery, was to storm into Tbilisi
from the West through the village
of Tskhneti.
The following 48 hours were marked by
fierce fighting around the Georgian capital. In spite of overwhelming
superiority of the enemy, Georgian soldiers, guardians, cadets and irregulars
put up stiff resistance, especially along the line Lilo-Kura,
Kodjori heights, near the village of Tabakhmela and Height 104,
as well as in Shavnabada section. Many positions
changed hands several times because each time the Soviets took them, Georgian counterattacks forced them to withdraw. All
the defense positions around Tbilisi
were evacuated by the end of February 25 only after Georgian troops were
given an order to retreat. Most of them withdrew in perfect order.
Hugo Maler, officer of Georgian Counterintelligence
In fact, the Soviet plan of full
encirclement of Tbilisi
failed. The 18th Mounted Division that was to block the evacuation
route west of Tbilisi managed to capture the village of Martkobi.
However, several miles to the west, near the village of Norio
it had to withstand a desperate counter-attack of scanty Georgian cavalry
(400 against 1500). The 18th Division managed to defeat the
Georgians near Norio and stormed further westwards along Mamkoda-Gldani-Avchala
line. Avchala station was captured by the Soviets
for several hours but evacuated by the end of the 24th after the
counterattack of Georgian irregulars from Tbilisi supported by an armored train. This
local victory made it possible to successfully evacuate the national
government and battle-worthy armed forces that occurred next day.
Simultaneously, the combined Cavalry group
that tried to attack Tbilisi
from the West, had no success in her attempts to defeat the Georgians
entrenched around strategically important. Height-1496. After a series of
ineffective attacks supported by artillery barrage on the 24th and 25th
of February, this group relocated north-eastwards to Tskhneti
area where it also proved unable to crush Georgian resistance. However, the
mounted patrols of this group appeared in Digomi
area, and Georgian command considered that maneuver a serious threat.
Newspaper clip informing on the deaths in action
Field nurse Maria Makashvili
mentioned in the above clip as killed in action
Keeping in mind the overpowering numerical
and technical superiority of the Red army, Georgian command made a decision to
evacuate all positions around Tbilisi
as well as the capital city herself. Both the well-organized retreat of
Georgian army towards Mtskheta and quick evacuation
of the Government occurred by the end of the 25th of February.
While losing the capital, Georgians managed to save both their armed forces
and administration to continue armed resistance.
On February 25, the “Revolutionary
Committee” moved into Tbilisi from Shulaveri and for the second time proclaimed itself the
only legitimate government of Georgia.
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