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Armeno-Georgian
War of 1918 and Armeno-Georgian Territorial
Issue in the 20th Century By Andrew Andersen and Georg Egge
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The Battles of Ekaterinenfeld
and Shulavery; Georgian Counter-offensive Ekaterinenfeld Operation During the second half of
December, while the piece negotiations were nearing
the final stretch in Tiflis and Karaklis (see above),
the hostilities went on in the areas of contact between Armenian and Georgian
troops. The most fierce fighting was taking place near
the German colony of Ekaterinenfeld (now part of Bolnisi). On December 19, Armenian troops and rebels approaching
from Vorontsovka entered the village Bolnis-Khachen (now also part of Bolnisi)
to the south of the colony. Meanwhile, predominantly Armenian-speaking
villages of Belyj Klyuch,
Samshvilde and Daghet to
the north of Ekaterinenfeld turned into one more
zone of anti-Georgian uprising. The armed rebels that were in control of the
above three villages were, in fact, the Armenian vanguard stationed at the closest
distance to Tiflis. And although that direction was not the major one, but
nonetheless, a possible Armenian advance from Daghet
- Ekaterinenfeld area could represent an additional
threat to Georgian capital. Thus, situated on the banks of the river Khrami Ekaterinenfeld became a
strategically important point on the way of the Armenian vanguard in the
direction of Tiflis from the west. As early as on December 18 (on
the day when the government of Georgia finally issued mobilization order) all
the Georgian troops deployed in Ekaterinenfeld were
put under command of National Guard officer Vladimir (Valiko)
Jugheli, while General Akhmetelashvili
was appointed the commander of the newly formed army. At the dawn of December 19, a 600 men strong
contingent of Georgian National Guard from Tiflis under the command of Jugheli was deployed in the village of Ekaterinenfeld in order to block any Armenian expansion
in the area[1]. However,
the first hours of the presence of Jugheli’s troops
in Ekaterinenfeld demonstrated poor discipline and
lack of organization typical of Georgian National Guard: the camp was not
properly pitched, the guard duty was not organised and the artillery was
placed not in the second or third echelon where it was supposed to be, but at
the forefront, within extremely short distance of the enemy lines[2]. The Georgian
troops went to sleep without putting the guard and not knowing that the village
had been at dusk surrounded by the Armenians, and the attack was scheduled
for the early morning. During the night the Armenians took over the Georgian
artillery (8 cannons) and placing their machineguns on the roofs of the
tallest houses of the village opened fire at the Georgians. But the seeming
Armenian victory was nullified by the actions of Vladimir Jugheli
whose personality was marked by both carelessness and bravery: he managed to
put the situation under control and led his soldiers and guardsmen into close
combat as a result of which the Georgians took over Armenian machine gun
positions and later regained their canons thus re-establishing full control
over Ekaterinenfeld. At that very moment, a
Georgian cavalry unit under the command of Colonel Kakutsa
Cholokashvili which unexpectedly appeared at the
battle scene, charged the retreating Armenian troops and dispersed them. Total casualties of Georgian forces
in the above battle were about 30 killed and 70 wounded. Armenian forces lost
about 100 killed and the same amount taken prisoner. December 19-20 The Ekaterinenfeld group of Georgian troops got reinforcements
and started preparing for an offensive in northern direction against the rebel
enclave in Daghet-Samshvilde area in order to
secure their rear. The offensive started in the morning on December 23 from
Ekaterinenfeld. The Georgian troops when Georgian forces
crossed the river Khram near the village of Karakend-Kosalari and advanced westwards and
north-westwards towards Daghet. The Georgians were opposed
by some 500 rebels firmly entrenched in rocky terrain. However, the Georgian
attack was supported by the fire of artillery, deployed on the right bank of
the river Khram, near the hill of Kanonenpickel. On December 24 the rebels were outflanked
from the north and on December 25 the village of Daghet-Khachen
fell to the Georgians. Three days later, on December 27, the Georgian troops
took the village of Samshvilde - this time without
any fight, and the whole rebel enclave north of Ekaterinenfeld
was thus liquidated and pacified. Shulavery Operation By December 22 the Armenian troops
reached the river Khram to the north of Shulavery thus coming to the furthest extent of their main advance aimed
towards Tiflis. By the end of the next day (December 23), after the successful
breakout of the remnants of General Tsulukidze’s
forces from the Sadakhlo pocket, the Armenians could
boast de-facto control over the whole disputed portion of the Borchalo county to south of the rivers Khrami and Mashavera, excluding
the small area around Ekaterinenfeld.
General Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) On December 24 General Drastamat Kanayan (“General Dro”), the commander of all Armenian forces in already
conquered Borchalo sent an ultimatum to the Georgians
demanding the immediate transfer of Georgian controlled Akhalkalaki county
to Armenia. In his message General Dro also threatened
the spread of the hostilities to the north of Khrami
if the ultimatum was rejected. That was tantamount to the threat of direct
Armenian attack on Tiflis[3]. The government of Georgia rejected
the ultimatum and decided to switch from purely defensive doctrine to an offensive
one. In order to facilitate
the transition to more active military operations an experienced General
George Mazniev (Mazniashvili)
was appointed commander of all Georgian forces on the Shulavery
direction with Generals David Sumbatov (Sumbatashvili) and George Kvinitadze
appointed his deputy and Chief of Staff, respectively. In addition, the announced
mobilization resulted in the formation of new Army, National Guard and
militia units.
Since the Armenian forces still
had a considerable numerical advantage on the Shulavery
direction and also owned the initiative, the Georgian command sought to pin
the enemy troops down by means of active manoeuvres with the existing small
forces until the arrival of major reinforcements and thus exclude the
possibility of Armenian assault on Tiflis.
In the morning of December 24, Georgian
cavalry with the artillery support from the armoured train, crossed the river
Khrami and took the station Ashaga-Seral
with a surprise attack. Few hours later, detachments of Georgian infantry
entered the village of Little Shulavery on the
right bank of Khrami and secured control over the
railway bridge in the village of Imir[4]. On the
same day, one battalion of the Georgian army took over the mountain that
separated Ashaga-Seral from Shulavery.
That allowed the Georgian Staff to move from the station of Sandar to Ashaga-Seral, closer
to the war theatre, where it was stationed until the very end of the war[5]. Now, following Mazniev’s plan, the Georgians were supposed to draw the
main Armenian forces away from the Tiflis direction which was the most
dangerous one at that moment. In case of an Armenian attack on Tiflis across
the river Khrami, the Georgians would be unable to
withstand it due to their limited number of troops available until the
arrival of significant reinforcements. Following the above situation, the
Georgian forces on the right bank of Khrami were ordered
to carry out a diversionary attack at Shulavery west of the railway, to attract Armenian forces
away from the major direction[6]. Facing the Georgian attack on Shulavery, the Armenian command committed a serious error
and acted exactly the way Mazniev expected: practically
all available Armenian troops were re-grouped and concentrated for the defence
of the town, Colonel Korolkov also ordered
mobilisation of all local Armenian men able to fight to present themselves
for the service of the Armenian Republic[7]. Meanwhile,
new Georgian reinforcements from Kakheti and Western
Georgia kept coming by railway to the train station of Sandari. By December 25, Mazniev’s
force increased in total by 1000 men[8]. The danger of an Armenian attack on Tiflis was
nullified, and the Georgian command began to plan a
counter-offensive, the main element of which was to recover Shulavery and destroy the bulk of the Armenian forces
deployed therein.
In order to take Shulavery the Georgians undertook deep outflanking manoeuvre
from the west with one National Guard battalion and an artillery battery. On December
25, the outflanking group entered the muslim village
of Sarachlo whose residents were hostile to
Armenians and loyal to the government of Georgia. While the Georgian artillery
was stationed at Sarachlo the National Guard battalion fought its way to the top of the dominating mountain
to the north of Shulavery. According to Mazniev’s plan the capture of the above mountain that gave
the Georgians total control over all the approaches to the town, was to be
followed by the general attack. At that moment all Georgian artillery (14
howitzer cannons) launched massive barrages of the Armenian positions[9]. The same day two Georgian
airplanes dropped bombs on the Armenian positions near Shulavery[10]. That marked
the first use of combat aircraft in the history of Georgian armed forces as
well as in the history of all national armies of the South Caucasian states. However, the attack on Shulavery
scheduled for December 26, did not take place because of the following
incident: an ill-disciplined National Guard unit that had taken the
above-mentioned mountain to the north of Shulavery,
left its positions at night, and despite the best efforts of its commander -
General Christopher Chkhetiani – to stop that
action, went down to the village Sarachlo “in order
not to freeze in the trenches, and have some tea"[11]. Early the next
morning, the opposing Armenian detachment re-occupied the unguarded mountain.
During the day, the Georgians took the mountain back, but again refused to
spend the night in the cold trenches, and lost the strategically important position
to the Armenians for the third time. When General Chkhetiani,
informed the headquarters of those events, he accompanied his report with his
resignation application feeling unable to be in command of such an
irresponsible and ill-disciplined contingent[12].
Thus, the operation scheduled for December
26, was foiled. The next day (December 27) Mazniev
attempted to take Shulavery by frontal attack and personally
led his troops into the battle, but the assault was repelled by the
Armenians. Then another scheme was developed for the
capture of the town and new precautions taken to ensure the success of the
planned operation. For example, ill-disciplined National Guard units
operating in the north-western section of the front were replaced with
regular army detachments. By that moment the reinforcements that had arrived from
Tiflis allowed Mazniev’s forces to act in two
directions simultaneously: one group was strong enough to finally capture Shulavery at the third attempt while another one could
attack down the railway line on Sadakhlo and thus
isolate the Armenian forces in Shulavery from
possible reinforcements and prevent their organized retreat. Armenian
commanders also realized the importance of the Sadakhlo
direction, and on December 28 they deployed artillery to the positions south
of Ashaga-Seral station, but its fire on the train station
brought no tangible results. At the same time, Armenian troops in Shulavewry were reinforced with a Rifle Regiment that
just arrived from Baku[13]. The decisive battle for Shulavery
started at noon, on December 28. After a two-hour artillery barrage the Georgian troops numbering about 3,500 started general
offensive on a 10 km long front line[14]. During the fierce
battle Armenian units several times undertook unsuccessful counterattack, but
by evening of the same day, the Georgians managed to capture the heights east
of Shulavery and thus dominate over the town. In the morning of December 29, a Georgian
detachment manned with the former officers entered Shulavery.
The defeated Armenian troops withdrew to the south in two groups: one group retreated through the village of Sioni while another one tried to reach the railway line
through the valley where it was ambushed and scattered by Georgian cavalry.
That operation was followed by the Georgian offensive to the south along the
railway section Ashaga-Seral – Sadakhlo,
in two columns advancing on both sides of the river Debed,
lasted about 24 hours, until finally the station Sadakhlo
was taken in the morning of December 30 at the same time with the village Lambalo. Both Georgian and Armenian commanders
were simultaneously developing plans of deep outflanking of the enemy. The Armenian
plan was to capture the heights east of Lambalo and
after that to attack the Georgian troops in Sadakhlo
from the flank and from the rear. The Georgian plan, in turn, consisted of a manoeuvre
in the western direction across the Loki ridge and further - down to Sanain station, thus also cutting the enemy off from the
rear. The Georgian command was not
timely informed by their government on the ceasefire scheduled to begin at
midnight December 31, and planned to launch a new offensive on the first of
January. The Armenian commanders possessed an advantage in this respect, having
been clearly informed on the time frame left for the warfare and used it on December
30, concentrating all Armenian troops retreating from Sadakhlo
together with the fresh reinforcements, near the station Ayrum,
and preparing a counter-offensive on Lambalo. While
the Georgians began to re-deploy most of their troops from Sadakhlo to the west, concentrating around the villages
of Sioni and Opreti, in
order to subsequently move across the Loki Range the Armenian command, knowing
that December 31 was the last day for possible combat operations, were
preparing the recapture of Sadakhlo. The attack
began at dawn on December 31. The Armenians were advancing in two columns from
Ayrum - along both sides of the river Debed. The left column stormed the village and station Sadakhlo, while the right moved towards the village Lambalo and the mountain Tana-Dag.
The left column had no success: after hours of fierce fighting, the Georgians
managed to knock the Armenian detachments out of Sadakhlo.
The right column of the Armenians acted more successfully captured Lambalo, despite several Georgian counterattacks with their
reserves that came from the village of Mamay. The disposition of the opposing
parties, as of the end of December 31, can be determined accurately enough on
the existing document, signed by the commanders of both Georgian and Armenian
forces in the area of the conflict: «As of December 31 / 24:00, the territory under
control of the Georgian forces includes: the village Opreti,
the village Khojorni, the village Gulli-Bagh, the village Sadakhlo,
the village Lambalo, the ridge to the north of Sadakhlo station from the Height 1554 to the
north-east uop to the Height 2660, and further to
the graffiti saying “the Spring” which is to the north of Kaji-Kala[15]. Original signature: General Mazniev. Note: As of December 31 / 24:00, the village
Lambalo and the Height 2660 were under my control and
were evacuated by 8:00 of January 1, exclusively following the Letter Nr.139 fromGeneral Mazniev dated by January
1, 1919, in order to exclude direct contact between our forces and Georgian units
and thus avoid unpredictable consequences. On the other clauses agreed. Dro. Confirmed by: Colonel Natsvalov»[16] One could add to the above that
the delimitation line, as specified in the above quotation, is almost
identical to today's state border between Georgia and Armenia in the disputed
area. |
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