Polish-Swedish Wars: 1600-1629 by S. Jasinski Maps:  Westrmann atlas zur Weltgeschichte, Berlin, 1953             The New Cambridge Modern History Atlas, Cambridge, 1970

BACK TO 1601 OPERATIONS

Military Operations, from late 1601 to 1604

It was only until mid-summer that the Commonwealth had mobilised a large army under the nominal command of the King, though in reality commanded by the experienced Chancellor and Grand Royal Hetman Jan Zamojski. He was assisted by Zolkiewski and Farensbach. Zamoyski, 57, was a great organiser and had an impeccable military record which included the siege campaigns with King Stefan Batory (1579-1582). His army comprised:-

3,600	- Hussars (Polish-Lithuanian)
1,250	- Cossack cavalry (Polish-Lithuanian)
500	- Rajtar cavalry
5,200	- Polish-Hungarian Infantry
2,000	- Zaporozhian Cossacks (infantry)
1,000	- Royal Guard
	together with private magnates forces and 'Wybraniecka' infantry all totalling some 15,000 men, with 50 cannon including 15 heavy siege cannons.

While Zamojski gathered the army at Rakiszki on the Kokenhausen - Wilkomierz - Wilno road Duke Charles and Jan Nassau were laying seige to Riga. Zamoyski's intention was to cross the Dwina at Selburg, some 100km from Riga, then, moving along the river, to threaten the Swedish lines of communication. In so doing he hoped to break off the siege of Riga and force a battle. If battle did not ensue he planned to direct a pursuit in parallel after the enemy. Unfortunately the route of the march along the Dzwina was closed by flooded and marshy areas. In the end the main forces of around 10,000 crossed on 21st September. On 29th, when he was some 50 km from Riga, news reached Zamojski that Duke Charles had retreated north two nights previously. Despite the advice of the King and Farensbach, Zamojski postponed the commencement of a pursuit and only on 2nd October did he send Royal Field Hetman Zolkiewski on a reconnaissance, moving the main forces the following day. A week later the forces reached the River Gauja and news that the Swedes were avoiding battle and had moved into Wolmar and Ronneburg, while Charles had retreated to Parnawa.

Some eleven thousand Swedish infantry were spread amongst eleven castles while 3,600 cavalry were at Dorpat under the command of Nassau. Duke Charles had returned home to Sweden.

Wolmar, which was held by Gyllenhjelm and a thousand men, was the Polish-Lithuanians' first target and a blockade was commenced on 18th October when advance units arrived. Wolmar was a well defended castle and town. The castle was on a hill above the town, which was protected by walls and a deep ditch. Zamojski formed four canon opposite the castle together with Scottish and German infantry under Faresenbach. Another four cannon targeted the town and they were defended by the Polish-Hungarian arquebusiers. The frozen ground made the construction of defensive earthworks slow and difficult. On 18th December, after the fortifications had been weakened by the artillery Zamojski ordered a general attack. The town was taken and the outnumbered Swedes took refuge in the castle. On the following day Gyllenhjelm accepted the terms of surrender and the remaining 518 defenders swore not to fight against the Commonwealth again and matched to Rewel, while Gyllenhjelm and Jacob de la Gardie were taken prisoner.

The winter cold, hunger, disease and desertions had reduced the army to around 5,000 and further offensive action was unrealistic. Zamojski moved his forces towards Dopart and awaited spring.

When thaw arrived Zamojski directed his forces at Felin which was held by 800 Swedes. On 25th March his advance units under Zolkiewski reached the town, followed a few days later by the main forces, while the heavy artillery arrived on 19th April. Under cover of the siege artillery Cossacks scaled the towns walls and took the town.

Next came the turn of the castle. On 16th May the artillery spoke and the infantry moved to attack. Ignoring the defenders' fire men filled the deep ditch and then with a heavy timber ram they broke through the gate. From an adjacent bastion a withering flank fire struck the attackers, among which were dismounted hussars armed with sabres, and by the moat Farensbach was killed while many officers were injured. Even Zamojski was said after the attack to have found a pistol ball amongst his clothing. Though this attack failed, the following day the prospect of another attack led the Swedes to surrender.

On 26th June Zamojski, with 2,900 cavalry, moved on to Bialy Kamien and its 700 defenders. He began with a blockade while he waited for reinforcements. The small Teutonic Knight castle was placed amongst marshes and was one of the most modern in Livonia, possessing a strong artillery.

Zamojski sent Zolkiewski with a few hundred cavalry to destroy the Swedish cavalry which were standing at Rewel. On the approach of Zolkiewski the Swedes positioned themselves so as to be shielded by a stream and constructed field fortifications between the upper lake and bogs. So when the Commonwealth's forces arrived on 30th June there lacked the opportunity for a frontal attack by hussars. Instead in a brilliant encircling maneuver Zolkiewski sent his cossack cavalry around the lake. Travelling 16 km in two hours they struck the surprised Swedes in the rear. They fled losing 200 men and the Swedes at Bialy Kamien had lost their hope of relief.

By the 7th of August the first infantry reinforcements arrived at Bialy Kamien, but at first the strong fortifications held out against the Polish-Lithuanian cannon. It was only when the batteries were moved to the marshy side - which required extensive construction work under enemy fire - was significant damage made to these weaker walls. At the end of September the castle capitulated, but the Polish cavalry insisted on a return home leaving 3,000 infantry.

By the Autumn of 1602 almost all of Livonia and Estonia were in Polish-Lithuanian hands, with Swedish garrisons remaining only at Prnau, Dopart, Rewel and Narwa. With Charles having difficulties with the Swedish parliament the opportunity arose for a comprimise, however the stubborn Zygmunt would not agree believing he could still regain his father's crown. Instead he sent 500 'Wybraniecka' Infantry reinforcements to help, while Zamojski aging and sick left for his home town of Zamosc after paying the army 19,000 Zloty from his own coffers.

Zamojski's replacement should have been Grand Lithuanian Hetman Radziwill, who not wanting to serve under another's command had spent the Chancellor's campaign in Wilno. Radziwill excused himself due his health and financial complications (he still awaited repayment from the state for his funding of the army in the previous campaign) so in the middle of October the command passed to the Field Hetman, Chodkiewicz.

The army had now risen to 4,000 and in December the siege of Dorpat commenced. The number of besiegers matched the Swedish garrison of 2,000. On the 5th March 1603 at Rakibor with 1,000 men Chodkiewicz defeated the Swedish relief force of 2,000 and on 13th April Dopart capitulated. Much of his forces were unpaid and could not be convinced to pursue further military operations. So in June Chodkiewicz formed a fortified camp south of Rakibor from where he directed minor operations - in the form of cavalry raids.

	The Battle of Bialy Kamien (Paide) In August 1604 Arvid Eriksson Stalarm attempted to capture Bialy Kamien, but retreated when Chodkiewicz moved from Dopart. He returned a month later on 15th September with 5,000 men and 6 cannons and began siege operations. Chodkiewicz's relief force of 2,300, almost all cavalry, left from Dopart in the direction of Rewal cutting off the Swedes shortest line of retreat to the sea. They arrived on 25th forcing the Swedes to fight under the fortress' walls. General Linderson rested his strong left wing on a dike and track to Rewal and in order to stiffen the resistance of his cavalry he mixed them with infantry units. Chodkiewicz massed all his own hussars on his right and in one lightning strike he enveloped the Swedish left wing aiming to cut off their escape. His centre's, comprising infantry and rejters, and his left wing's tasks were only to engage and occupy the Swedes. The hussar charge on the Polish-Lithuanian right wing smashed the Swedes there, forcing them back against the marshes. With the Swedish left destroyed the remainder of their forces collapsed. The Swedes lost 3,000 men, 6 canon and their camp which helped to feed the hungry garrison, while the unpaid Polish-Lithuanian army confederated and then moved South to Courland. With this victory, following the recent death of Radziwill, the Grand Hetman's mace passed to Chodkiewicz.
Military Operations, 1605 VIDEO In 1605 Charles IX, king since the previous year organized an army of around 12,000 men - composed of a large proportion of mercenary Germans as well as Dutch and Scots, and even some Poles and Hungarians. A political rebellion was developing in Poland and it meant that at the start of year the Sejm broke up without passing any new taxes for the army. Even so Chodkiewicz had managed by the summer to gather some 5,000 men of which 3,500 were for use in the field. The rest were barely enough to garrison a few of the major forts. The main forces stood at Dorpat while garrisons held Bialy Kamien, Felin, Dopart, Kies and probably Rakibor. Some 150 Polish-Hungarian infantry and 100 peasants garrisoned Dynemunt closing access to Riga from the sea while Riga itself had a strong garrison. The coastal road from Parnawa to Riga was left undefended due to lack of men, though this would in any case have been difficult as Sweden ruled the sea. Charles IX decided to strike at the most important town in Livonia - Riga. Its capture would allow military operations along the Dwina and so cut of Livonia from the Commonwealth. Charle's limited number transport ships precluded the movement of all his forces by sea straight to Riga. At Dynemunt on 12th August Joachim Mansfeld landed with approximately 3,000 mainly Germans together with the siege train which included two great 'kartauna' (royal) cannons and commenced the blockade of Riga. At Rewal between 15 to 20th August arrived around 4,000 mainly Fins, but including mercenary Dutch soldiers, commanded by Andersem Lennartsson. At Parnau on 30th August landed King Charles IX at the head of 4,000 Swedes and Scots. On news of the blockade of Riga, Chodkiewicz moved on around the 17th towards Riga, leaving most of his tabor at Dorpat. On 21st he reached Wolmar and news reached him that Riga was currently not in significant danger. Riga had at its disposal some few thousand defending inhabitants and a few hundred mercenaries. Chodkiewicz then also discovered that Lennartsson had landed at Rewel and may be moving south. There was a chance that that Lennartsson could be caught in the open, while the careful Mansfeld would have easy access to his supporting ships. Around the 23rd August Chodkiewicz moved his main forces north against Lennartsson. At the same time he sent a few banners of cavalry under Tomasz Dabrowy towards Riga to observe Mansfeld. Lennartsson meanwhile had initially decided to take advantage of Chodkiewicz's march south to capture Fellin, however when he heard the enemy were returning north the Swedes aiming to avoid battle moved to Fickel (Vigala) and fortified themselves in a strong position between bogs and forests and formed field obstacles. Chodkiewicz arrived at Fickel around the 29th Aug and attempted to coax Lennartsson into the open. In this he failed and in an exchange of musket fire the Poles inflicted some 200 losses on the enemy. It was here that Chodkiewicz learnt of Charles IX's landing at Parnawa, which could threaten Felin, so on 1st September the Hetman left for Felin arriving on two days later. Lennartson took this opportunity to march to Pernau to join Mansfeld, their combined forces were some 8,000 men. On 5th Charles IX led his forces along the coastal road, which was shielded from the east by forests and marshes, to Riga. At the same time his fleet escorted his forces, moving in parallel with them. They rested between 11th and 14th Sept at Salis. The belt of forests and marshes along the coast made it difficult for Chodkiewicz to orientate himself of the Swedish movements and almost certainly he expected the Swedes to return and move east towards Fellin. He probably remained at Fellin on 8th Sept or even until 14th. Some time here news reached him of the Swedish march south and he quickly moved to Wolmar, reaching it on 16th. Chodkiewicz, who was used to the previously careful Swedish movements and strategy, was not expecting a march to Riga. He felt too weak to fight a pitched battle with the combined Swedish force and he wanted to delay, waiting on reinforcements from Lithuania. While in Wolmar he received a false report that the Swedes were intending to attack him and decided to fight a defensive-offensive battle. In the region of Kies he crossed onto the left bank of the Gau river, raising field defences from which to counter attack the Swedes. He waited until the 24th, by which time his tabor from Dorpat joined him, when he received unexpected news that Charles IX had reached Riga the day before. Mansfeld having relatively weak forces had not really begun the siege of Riga. On 24th Charles has sent a delegation demanding capitulation, and when this was rejected the Swedes commenced the siege. This serious threat to Riga forced Chodkiewicz to move to relieve the town, despite the inherent risks with such a numerically superior enemy. In a fast two day march (25th-26th) he reached Kircholm (Salaspils) some 15km south east of Riga. THE BATTLE OF KIRCHOLM (click here for more details) The Swedish council of war on 26th decided to move with all their forces to Kircholm in order to surprise the Poles in the night. They left only a few hundred soldiers to guard the camp. At about 22:00 the Swedes 10,700 strong - 8,200 infantry 2,500 cavalry and 11 canon - left their camp but marched during a down pour. The watch alerted the Polish-Lithuanian camp and because of this the Swedes waited for sunrise (approx 5:30) on 27th before forming up on the heights above the village Kircholm. They stood facing the Polish-Lithuanian army which was on the opposing heights across a dried river bed which was marshy only at its northern edge. The Swedes formed themselves in four lines in a checkerboard pattern alternately cavalry and infantry. The latter were positioned in 13 small tercios - squares of some few hundred men (7 in the first and 6 in the third lines) while the cavalry formed the second (6 squadrons) and the fourth (5 squadrons) lines. The Swedes began to dig in, they positioned their infantry opposite the enemy and the cavalry behind ready to move onto the wings or between the gaps in the infantry. So that they could attack the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry once it had lost its impetus in battle with the infantry. Due to the great depth of formation the rear lines moving to the wings would parry any outflanking maneuvers. Neither side wanted to loose its advantageous position on the higher ground above the valley and both waited for the enemy to attack. Wanting to provoke the Swedes to attack Chodkiewicz positioned his forces in a few lines to try and give the impression that his forces were even smaller than in reality. This did not however have the desired effect as Charles did indeed dread moving down into the path of the hussar lances. Finally in the afternoon Hetman ordered his screening arquebusiers to withdraw suddenly and obviously, in an attempt to give the impression it was the start of the retreat of the whole army. Charles on seeing this and fearing this movement of his weaker enemy as a real retreat ordered his forces to attack. Giving up his caution he resigned from his intended defend-attack tactic and moved his cavalry to the wings, so as to provide for more options in attack. Most of the cavalry he moved to his left wing wanting to push the enemy against the river Dzwina. As the Swedes made their initial maneuvers Chodkiewicz, concerned with his army's morale, ordered a group of camp followers, whom had previously sent North, to reveal themselves. They moved south towards this main forces in a cloud of dust and with much noise to give the impression of arriving reinforcements from Krzysztof Radziwill. Until now the Poles and Lithuanians had stood in a column and now they deployed into battle order. Chodkiewicz had 3,700 to 4,000 men of which 2,700-3,000 cavalry and around 1,000 infantry. This was prior to the arrival of 300 reiters in the service of Prince Frederick Kettler of Courland - who arrived crossing the river and taking up positions behind the Polish-Lithuanian centre. Though the Hetman had significantly weaker forces he managed to achieve a numerical superiority on his; Left wing led by Tomasz (Thomas) Dabrowa comprised 1,200 to 1,300 cavalry - 100-400 hussars, 200 reiters, 700-900 cossack cavalry and the Tartars in the camp - in 4 lines. The edge of the left wing was shielded by the fortified camp position on the heights of the Dwina river bank and held by 2 cannon and 4 banners of Tartars (350). Mansfeld had 1,000 reiters to oppose them. The Polish centre under Wincent (Vincent) Wojna stood in two lines and comprised 1,000 infantry with 5 cannon, 300 hussars and 300 Courlandian reiters against 8,200 Swedes with 11 cannon under Lennartsson. On the right wing in 4 lines stood 700 cavalry almost solely hussars, though including 100 Cossacks of Jan Piotr Sapieha, against 1,500 retiers led by Henri Brandt. The main reserve under Teodor (Theodore) Lacki numbered 200-400 hussars. Chodkiewicz aimed at an outflanking on the left wing so as to force the Swedes away from the river rather than pushing them against it. This was the preferred option in order to allow the Polish-Lithuanian horsemen to take advantage of the drier ground and maximise use of their best qualities - the impetus - of full gallop charges. The wet meadows of the old riverbed to the north did not provide the opportunity of launching a forceful outflanking on that wing, limiting the fighting to a relatively confined area. Further more the wet meadows did not pose for the Swedish cavalry the same problems as they did not use the full gallop charge. However the right Polish-Lithuanian wing was fairly strong, proportionately stronger than the 'tying-in' wing at Kokenhausen in 1601. Therefore it was certainly intended to be an active wing. Not having superiority in impetus or numbers they had some advantage due to their shallower line allowing the use of more lances. While the right wing and center were primarily formed of heavy cavalry (hussars and reiters) best for breaking through enemy formations in frontal attacks, so the left wing was primarily Cossack cavalry, so superb at maneuvers on enemy flanks. VIDEO AUDIO When the Swedish infantry reached the base of the valley and began to climb the opposite slope, the Polish-Lithuanian artillery opened fire and as the Swedes drew nearer so did the infantry. Next from between the gaps moved the hussars followed by the Courlandian reiters, attacking in full gallop charges leading to vicious fighting with the Swedish infantry. The retreat of the arquebusiers had lured the Swedish right wing into the fire of the Polish-Lithuanian Camp. The distracted cavalry was then attacked frontally by Dabrowa's main forces and at the same time outflanked by the Tartars and were quickly broken. Cavalry struck the rear and side of the Swedish right wing tercio who were busy in battle with the Polish-Lithuanian centre. The fighting on Sapieha's wing lasted longer. Brandt's reiters moved somewhat later than the rest of the Swedish forces. Sapieha waited, while the wet meadows were passed, where his hussars would have lost impetus. When the Swedish cavalry moved onto firmer ground, Sapieha attacked with his first line smashing the enemy and pushed them onto the wetlands, however the Swedish second line repulsed the hussars, who had not managed to reform after the chase. When the Swedes reached the dry ground they were struck by Sapieha's second line, who then also repulsed Brandt's reorganised first line. Chodkiewicz seeing the success of Dabrowa and the tying up of the Swedish centre, and since the Swedes had also engaged all their forces, decided to use his reserve to outflank them on Sapieha's wing. Lacki struck the side of Brandt's reiters and crushed them completely. The routing Swedes fell into the left wing of their own infantry who were already retreating and further disordered them. When Lennartsson (centre's commander) was killed part of the retreating tercios collapsed. At least half of the infantry became surrounded by the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry and the rest met defeat in the pursuit, which continued almost to Riga. The Swedish losses were around 6,000, of which only a few hundred were prisoners. Particularly heavy losses were suffered by the infantry, well over half their original strength. The Poles and Lithuanians lost some 100 dead and a few hundred injured, mostly in battle with the infantry. The remainder of the Swedish infantry escaped onto ships at Dynemunt, while reiters led by Mansfeld retreated to Parnawy. The unpaid Polish-Lithuanian army revolted and Chodkiewicz was unable to take further advantage of this superb victory.

Overview

1605 Campaign and Kircholm

Kircholm is not a simple success of masses of hussars like Lubieszow, Kokenhausen or Bialy Kamien. Here is not only a defeat but total destruction of the main enemy forces. Chodkiewicz was aware of the significant tactical superiority of his cavalry and so went further than Radziwill at Kokenhausen. He formed not one but two attack groups with the aim of not just breaking but also surrounding the Swedish centre after the destruction of both enemy wings. He organised one of the groups, his left wing, to be two times stronger than the other wing and only with this wing did he have local numerical superiority. This was a classic example of the economic use of force, even though the enemy had almost three times numerical superiority. This is however a consequence of the formation of not one but two attack groups and, though rather small, the reserve played a critical role.

Kircholm is one of the few examples in modern history up till W.W.II of a victory of the type of Canne, envelopment of the main enemy forces, and exceptional with forces so decisively disadvantaged in numbers.

The Swedish operations at operational level were effective when Lennartsson evaded battle in the open field and the Swedish intentions to utilise marshes, forests or fortifications to their advantage. The new Swedish battle order used at Kircholm embraced correct concepts so as to neutralise the superiority of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry. However it had not been tested in practice. The use of significant depth and the mixing of cavalry and infantry would be successfully adjusted by Gustav Adolf. The Swedes were correct in their selected area of operations - Riga and the shortest route to her - by sea.

CONTINUE TO 1607 – 1609 OPERATIONS

Originally published at www.jasinski.co.uk/wojna/index.htm

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